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IV 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant-Appellant Lisa M. Brown ("Appellant" or "Ms. Brown") appeals from 
certain orders and judgments entered by the Third Judicial District Court in favor of 
Plaintiff-Appellee South Ridge Homeowner's Association ("Appellee" or the "HOA"). 
Specifically, Ms. Brown appeals the September 2, 2008 Order and Judgment and the 
September 22, 2008 Judgment entered by the Third Judicial District Court of Summit 
County.1 The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of the appeal under Utah Code 
Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
This appeal raises three primary issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in 
granting summary judgment against Ms. Brown on Appellee's claim for breach of 
contract based upon (a) its ruling that Article X, Section 2(a) of the Declaration of 
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for South Ridge Subdivision (the "CC&Rs") was 
unambiguous as a matter of law; and (b) its interpretation of Article X, Section 2(a) of the 
CC&Rs to mean that a member of the South Ridge Subdivision is not permitted to rent 
his or her property for any period of less than thirty (30) days; (2) whether the trial court 
erred by entering permanent injunctive relief against Appellant in the absence of any 
threat of continuing harm, and by ordering her to provide one-week advance written 
notice to the HOA of any visitors to Appellant's residence, with the names of each family 
member or friend who will be using Appellant's residence and the expected dates of use; 
Copies of these orders are attached as Exhibits A and B to the Addendum hereto. 
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and (3) if the trial court's entry of summary judgment is reversed, whether the trial court 
erred by awarding attorney fees and costs to Appellee. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The Court of Appeals reviews a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo, 
"considering the record as a whole, with no deference afforded to the legal conclusions of 
the district court." Innerlight, Inc. v. The Matrix Group, LLC, 2009 UT 31, ^ 8. In 
reviewing a summary judgment ruling, the appellate court "considers] the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party," which in this case is Ms. Brown, "and 
affirm[s] only where it appears that there is no genuine dispute as to any material issues 
of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Swenson v. 
Erickson, 2000 UT 16, \ 10, 998 P.2d 807 {"Swenson F) (emphasis added). 
The interpretation of restrictive covenants is generally governed by the same rules 
of construction applicable to contract interpretation. See id. at j^ 11. "The trial court's 
interpretation of the language of a restrictive covenant, absent resort to extrinsic 
evidence, presents a question of law . . . review[ed] for correctness." Id.; see also Deep 
Creek Ranch, LLC v. Utah State Armory Bd., 2008 UT 3, \ 10, 178 P.3d 886 (stating that 
a trial court's interpretation of a contract is a matter of law reviewed for correctness); 
Mark Technologies Corp. v. Utah Resources Int'l, Inc., 2006 UT App. 418, ^  4, 147 P.3d 
509 (same). Likewise, the determination of whether contractual language is ambiguous is 
a question of law reviewed for correctness. See Bennett v. Huish, 2007 UT App 19, ^  8, 
155P.5d917. 
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On the second issue, in reviewing the entry of a permanent injunction, appellate 
courts consider "whether the trial courts exercised its discretion using sound equitable 
principles based on all the facts and circumstances." Dairy Product Servs., Inc. v. City of 
Wellsville, 2000 UT 81, j^ 16, 13 P.3d 581; see also Birch Creek Irrigation v. Prothero, 
858 P.2d 990, 993 (Utah 1993). 
Finally, with regard to the third issue, whether an award of attorney fees was 
properly made is a matter of law reviewed for correctness. See EDSA/Cloward, LLC v. 
Klibanoff 2008 UT App 284, \ 8, 192 P.3d 296. 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES 
The issue of whether the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment to 
Appellee was properly preserved for appeal, because the trial court received complete 
briefing and held a hearing on Appellee's motion for summary judgment. See R. 48, 55, 
64, 78. In addition, each component of the first issue, including the court's ambiguity 
determination and its interpretation of the contract, was raised in the briefing and at oral 
argument. See generally id. 
Appellant preserved the issue of whether the permanent injunction was properly 
entered, including the whether the scope of the injunction was overbroad, by arguing that 
the injunction was improper and that there was no threat of any future violation, and by 
objecting to the form of order submitted to the court by Appellee. See R. 110-11. 
The propriety of the attorney fee award was properly preserved, because the issue 
was raised in Appellee's affidavits of attorney fees and costs, see R. 79, 102, and in 
Appellant's Motion to Tax Plaintiffs Attorneys' Fees and Costs. See R. 83. 
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of, or of central importance to, this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves what amounts to the persecution of a single neighbor by the 
overly-active Board of the HOA, and the overly-restrictive manner in which the HOA 
seeks to construe the CC&R's. The HOA commenced an investigation against Ms. 
Brown after one of its members apparently learned that renters were at the house on one 
occasion in February 2007. The HOA also discovered that Ms. Brown had advertised her 
property for vacation rentals with a three-day to four-day minimum stay on the Internet. 
See R. 46, Ex. E & Ex. F. Armed with this minimal information, the HOA commenced 
this case against Ms. Brown in April 2007, seeking to obtain a judicial definition - at Ms. 
Brown's expense - of a portion of the CC&Rs that was not defined in the document, had 
never been put to a vote before the HOA membership, and could not be defined by the 
HOA or its attorneys. 
The facts that came out through discovery, in the parties' briefing, and in the 
hearing on the HOA's summary judgment were slightly - but significantly - different 
from those originally alleged by the HOA. Specifically, while Ms. Brown acknowledged 
that she had, on occasion, rented her South Ridge property for periods of at least a week 
at a time, she did not ever rent her property for less than that period. See R. 124 at 15 ("I 
don't rent my one on a nightly basis ever. Never have, never will."). Thus, despite the 
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statements on her website advertisements that the property was available for three- or 
four-night rentals., she had never actually rented the property for such a short period, and 
the HOA provided no evidence to the contrary. In fact, the online calendar relied upon 
by the HOA to show that Ms. Brown did rent her property for stays shorter than a week 
actually showed the times when the property was not available for rent, because Ms. 
Brown and her family would be using the property. See, e.g., R. 65. 
Accordingly, the question before the Court at the time of the summary judgment 
hearing was whether Ms. Brown's occasional weekly rentals of her property violated the 
CC&Rs. See R. 124 at 16 ("[T]hat's the question, whether that [weekly rental] does in 
fact put you in violation of the CC&R's."). Even though the trial judge admitted at the 
commencement of the hearing that the phrase appeared to be ambiguous, the court 
answered this question in the affirmative, incorrectly determining that the phrase "nightly 
rental or similar use" was unambiguous as a matter of law, and that the phrase meant any 
rental for less than thirty days. On the basis of this ruling, the court imposed a permanent 
injunction against Ms. Brown, and it awarded costs and attorney fees to the HOA. Ms. 
Brown now appeals these rulings. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
The HOA filed the Complaint in this matter on April 23, 2007. See R. 1. Ms. 
Brown was personally served with the Complaint on May 5, 2007, in her home state of 
California. See R. 8. 
After a brief discovery period, the HOA filed a motion for summary judgment, 
seeking not only a ruling that Ms. Brown had violated the CC&R's but also a permanent 
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injunction precluding her from renting her property for any period of less than thirty 
days. See R. 43. Ms. Brown submitted an opposition to the motion on February 11, 
2008, see R. 55, along with a declaration in opposition to the motion. See R. 64. The 
HOA filed a reply memorandum on March 5, 2008. See R. 67. 
The district court held a hearing on the motion for summary judgment on May 9, 
2008. See R. 78.3 Ruling from the bench, the trial court granted the HOA's motion, 
instructing the HOA to work with Ms. Brown to prepare the proposed order, to work with 
Ms. Brown to carefully draft the order of injunctive relief, and to submit an affidavit of 
attorney fees. See id. In opposition to the HOA's submission of its affidavit of attorney 
fees and costs, see R. 79, Ms. Brown filed a Motion to Tax Plaintiffs Attorneys' Fees 
and Costs. See R. 83. After the HOA prepared its own order and essentially refused to 
consider any input from Ms. Brown, the parties submitted competing, with each side 
objecting to the other's orders on various grounds. See R. 98, 110. In a Ruling and Order 
dated August 29, 2008, the trial court partially reduced the amount of attorney fees and 
costs sought by the HOA. See R. 108-110.4 In addition, the court ruled that the HOA's 
proposed order more closely reflected its summary judgment ruling. See R. 110-11, Ex. 
D at 3-4. The court therefore executed the form of order submitted by the HOA, making 
two revisions to the text of the order. See R. 113-14, Ex. A at 1-2. Specifically, the trial 
court struck from the order language indicating that Ms. Brown "threatens to continue 
Ms. Brown appeared pro se in the trial court proceedings. 
3
 A copy of the hearing transcript is attached as Exhibit C to the Addendum. 
The Ruling and Order is attached as Exhibit D to the Addendum. 
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violating the CC&Rs" and "threatens to continue renting" the property. R. 114; Ex. A at 
.2 (emphases added). The executed Order and Judgment states only that Ms. Brown 
violated the CC&Rs by renting her property for periods as short as one week, and it 
indicates nothing about any continued threat of any violation. See id. 
On September 22, 2008, the Court entered the final Judgment, awarding the HOA 
$11,262.50 in attorney fees and $310.00 in costs, for a total award of $11,572.50. See R. 
117-18; Ex. B at 1-2. Ms. Brown timely filed a Notice of Appeal on September 26, 2008. 
SeeR. 120. 
Several months after the entry of the final Judgment, on February 9, 2009, the 
HOA filed a Motion for Contempt, see R. 129, contending that Ms. Brown had violated 
the trial court's injunction by having "renters" in her home without providing prior 
written notice to the HOA. See R. 134, 135. Ms. Brown filed an opposition to the 
motion for contempt on February 27, 2009, in which she informed the HOA and the court 
that the alleged "renters" at the property were not renters at all, but family members of 
Ms. Brown. See R. 140. Although the record does not so indicate, the case docket shows 
the Court held a telephone conference with the parties on April 21, 2009. Ms. Brown 
subsequently filed a proposed Stipulated Order Following Hearing on Plaintiffs "Motion 
for Contempt" on April 23, 2009. The proposed order was not signed by opposing 
counsel, nor has it been executed by the court. See R. Vol. 2 (unnumbered pages at front 
of Vol. 2). As of this writing, no further proceedings have occurred in the trial court. 
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III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ms. Brown owns a home located at 4059 Sunrise Drive in Park City, Utah, within 
the South Ridge Subdivision of the Jeremy Ranch area. The property is subject to certain 
recorded Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (the "CC&Rs"). See Ex. B to R. 46.5 
In April 2007, the South Ridge Homeowners' Association, of which Ms. Brown is a 
member, filed suit against her for allegedly violating the following provision of the 
CC&R's: "No timeshare, nightly rental or similar use will be allowed on any single 
family residential lot." Ex. B at to R. 46 at 15; Ex. E at 15 (Art. X, Sec. 2(a)) 
(hereinafter, "Section 2(a)," or the "nightly rental" provision"). The Complaint alleged 
that Ms. Brown had improperly advertised her home for rent on the Internet, and that 
neighbors of Ms. Brown had discovered renters at the home in February 2007. See R. at 
2-3. 
Although the Complaint included a general and unspecified claim for direct and 
consequential damages, it did not allege that any actual, specific damages had resulted 
from Ms. Brown's conduct. See R. at 4. In fact, apart from its request for attorney fees 
and costs, the HOA did not seek any damages in its motion for summary judgment, nor 
did it otherwise suggest that any damages had actually occurred. See R. 43-44; id. 124 at 
6 ("THE COURT: I see. So you're not looking for damages? MR. LEE: No, we're 
not."). Thus, the primary form of relief requested by the HOA was injunctive. See R. 43. 
As Ms. Brown forthrightly acknowledged in the proceedings below, during 2006 
and 2007, she occasionally rented her South Ridge home for periods of at least a week at 
5
 A copy of the CC&Rs is also attached as Exhibit E to the Addendum. 
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a time. See R at 48, | 12. Nothing in the record establishes that Ms. Brown rented her 
home for less than a week. To the contrary, the evidence relied upon by the HOA in an 
effort to show that Ms. Brown had rented for shorter periods of time actually 
demonstrated that Ms. Brown and her family were the ones who stayed at the home for 
periods shorter than a week. See R. at 56-57. Moreover, the only factual finding made 
by the trial court on the subject states simply that "defendant has rented the Residence for 
periods as short as one week." R. 114, ^ f 3, Ex. A at 2, f^ 3 (emphasis added). 
The CC&Rs, recorded in the Summit County Recorder's Office on August 13, 
1993, include various restrictions on property use in the South Ridge Subdivision. See 
generally Ex. B to R. 46; Ex. E. The specific provision the HOA claims Ms. Brown 
violated appears in the following paragraph: 
No lot shall be used except for single family residential purposes. No 
buildings shall be erected, altered, placed or permitted to remain on any lot 
other than one detached single family dwelling not to exceed two stories in 
height exclusive of basement. No timeshare, nightly rental or similar use 
will be allowed on any single family residential lot. The structures existing 
on lots 101 and 102 at the time of this declaration are exempted from this 
selection. 
Ex. B to R. 46 at 15; Ex. E at 15 (emphasis added). Despite the fact that the CC&Rs 
contain a "Definitions" section, including definitions of twelve different terms, see Ex. B 
to R. 46 at 3-4; Ex. E at 3-4, the CC&Rs do not define any of the terms in the provision 
Ms. Brown is alleged to have violated. Specifically, the CC&Rs do not define the term 
"timeshare;" they do not define "nightly rental;" and they do not define "similar uses." 
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Not only do the CC&Rs fail to define "nightly rental," but another provision of the 
CCRs expressly grants homeowners the right to rent their properties "from time to time," 
without specifying the length of time for which they may do so: 
The lands within the property shall be used exclusively for single family 
residential living purposes and shall never be occupied or used for any 
commercial or business purpose other than traditional home business 
conducted within the home and except that the Declarant or its duly 
authorized agent may use any lot owned by Declarant as a sales office, 
sales model, or property office or rental office, and with the further 
exception that any owner or his duly authorized agent may rent or lease 
said owner's residential building from time to time. 
Ex. B to R. 46 at 18, Ex. E at 18, (Art. 10, Sec. 16) (emphasis added) (hereinafter, 
"Section 16"). This provision appears in the same Article of the CC&Rs as the "nightly 
rental" provision, entitled "Article X, Use Restrictions." Ex. B to R. 46 at 15; Ex. E at 
15. 
The HOA's motion for summary judgment argued that the CC&Rs generally 
prohibited "short-term" rentals, which the HOA claimed was any period less than thirty 
days. See R. 50. According to the HOA, Ms. Brown's admission that she had rented her 
residence for periods as short as one week mandated summary judgment in favor of the 
HOA, because a week's rental fell within the CC&R's ostensible prohibition of "short-
term rentals. See R. 51. 
At oral argument on the HOA's motion for summary judgment, the district court 
acknowledged early on that the "nightly rental" provision was "perhaps ambiguous." R. 
124 at 3; Ex. C at 3. The court went on to state that, "I guess my concern is that at least 
on summary judgment, that this indeed may be an ambiguous sentence and restriction 
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that is subject to the need for some testimony." Id. at 4. When presented by the HOA 
with the definition of "nightly boardinghouse" included in a Summit County business 
licensing ordinance, the court further remarked that the thirty-day definition provided by 
the HOA based upon the ordinance was "not a definition I would have expected, in all 
candor." R. 124 at 9; Ex. C at 9. 
Despite these observations, the trial court went on to grant the HOA's motion for 
summary judgment, ruling that the proper definition of "nightly rental," as the term was 
used in the CC&Rs, was "a rental less than 30 days." R. 124 at 50; Ex. C at 50. The 
court also stated that anything less than a thirty-day rental was a commercial or business 
use of the property, which was precluded by Section 16 and the CC&Rs as a whole. In 
addition, the Court relied heavily upon the Summit County business ordinance and the 
manner in which the term "nightly" is used therein. See, e.g., R. 124 at 24; Ex C at 24. 
However, the ordinance was not presented by the HOA until the day of the hearing, and it 
is not included in the record. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the HOA should be 
reversed. The court's judgment relies on its significant misinterpretation of the operative 
provision of the CC&R's, which proscribes "nightly rental or similar use." The court 
first erroneously determined the language was unambiguous as a matter of law, and then 
it concluded - again as a matter of law - that "nightly rental or similar use" means any 
rental for less than thirty (30) days including the "weekly" rentals Ms. Brown 
acknowledged had occurred. 
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The trial court's initial determination of ambiguity was legally incorrect. Because 
Ms. Brown's interpretation of the phrase is equally - if not more - tenable than the 
HOA's, the trial court erred by rejecting her interpretation and deeming the phrase 
unambiguous. Further, to resolve the ambiguity, the Court should have applied the well 
established rule of interpretation calling for the narrow construction of restrictive 
covenants in favor of free property use. Alternatively, the court erred by failing to admit 
extrinsic evidence for purposes of making the factual determination of the parties' intent. 
The court's summary judgment ruling must be reversed. 
In addition, the interpretation of "nightly rental" concocted by the HOA and 
adopted by the Court is incorrect as a matter of law. That is, even if the trial court's 
ruling on ambiguity was correct, the court's interpretation of the language was erroneous, 
because it is contrary to the plain language of the CC&Rs. The term "nightly" has a clear 
and simple meaning, which is "by the night" or "every night." The term is not the 
equivalent of "weekly," "monthly," or "annually," and, if the drafters of the CC&R had 
intended to proscribe "weekly" rentals, they easily could have done so. They did not. 
Reading the CC&Rs as a whole supports this interpretation. And, application of the well 
settled principle of covenant interpretation that restrictions should be construed narrowly 
mandates this interpretation. 
The trial court also erred by entering a permanent injunction against Ms. Brown. 
As the trial court itself acknowledged, the HOA failed to establish there was any threat of 
any continuing violation, a crucial prerequisite to the extraordinary remedy of a 
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permanent injunction. Absent such a threat, the injunction was improper and must be 
vacated. 
Additionally, the scope of the injunction was overbroad and invasive, going far 
beyond what was required to achieve its alleged purpose. The injunction improperly 
requires Ms. Brown to provide private information to the HOA any time she has visitors 
in the home - whether they be friends or family - including the names of every visitor 
and the length of their intended stay at the home. This measure is surely unnecessary to 
prevent rentals of the home, which Ms. Brown has stopped doing in any event. Further, 
the injunction prohibits and improperly restricts Ms. Brown from doing something she 
has every right to do, i.e., to allow friends and family to stay at her home, at no charge 
and at any time, without alerting the entire neighborhood as to her intentions. As such, 
even if an injunction remains in place - which it should not - it must be limited in scope 
to precluding rentals of the property, not visitors. 
Finally, if this Court reverses the summary judgment ruling, then the award of 
costs and attorney fees to the HOA must also be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED THE HOA'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In at least two critical respects, the trial court's analysis of the HOA's motion for 
summary judgment was flawed. First, the court's determination of ambiguity was in 
error, because Ms. Brown's proposed interpretation of the "nightly rental" provision was 
as tenable as the HOA's, if not more so. To resolve the ambiguity, the Court should 
apply the well settled rule of construction applicable to restrictive covenants, which 
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requires such covenants to be construed against the party seeking to enforce them, and in 
favor of the unrestricted use of property. In the alternative, the trial.court's erroneous 
determination of ambiguity requires reversal for assessment of extrinsic evidence and 
resolution of the factual question of the parties' intent. 
Second, even if the ambiguity determination was correct, the court's interpretation 
of the provision was incorrect, contrary to the provision's plain language, and 
unsupported by the CC&Rs as a whole. Thus, even if this Court does not reverse the 
ambiguity determination, it should rule as a matter of law that the "nightly rental" 
provision means what it says - that rentals by the night, not weekly or monthly rentals, 
are precluded under the CC&R's. 
A. The Trial Court Erroneously Determined that the "Nightly Rental" 
Provision Was Unambiguous 
The district court in this case erred on the first and most fundamental 
determination in this matter - whether the provision of the CC&Rs precluding "nightly 
rental" is ambiguous as a matter of law. Because there are more than one tenable 
interpretations of the provision, the language is ambiguous. As such, the ambiguity 
should be resolved in favor of Ms. Brown, or the case should be remanded for 
consideration of extrinsic evidence. 
As mentioned above, the interpretation of restrictive covenants is generally 
governed by the same rules of construction applicable to contract interpretation. See 
Swenson /, 2000 UT 16, ]f 11. "If the language is unambiguous, [the court] will 
determine 'the parties' intentions from the plain meaning of the contractual language as a 
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matter of law.'" Swenson v. Erickson, 2006 UT App 34, ^ 11, 131 P.3d 267 ("Swenson 
IF) (quoting Fairbourn Commercial Inc. v. Am. Hous. Partners, Inc., 2004 UT 54, \ 10, 
94 P.3d 292). "A contractual term is ambiguous if, looking to the language of the 
contract alone, it is reasonably capable of being understood in more than one way such 
that there are tenable positions on both sides." Deep Creek Ranch, 2008 UT 3, ^  13. 
More specifically, "[a] contractual term or provision is ambiguous 'if it is capable of 
more than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing 
terms, or other facial deficiencies.'" Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, f 25, 190 P.3d 1269 
(citations and quotations omitted). 
In general, the court must make a determination of whether a contract is facially 
ambiguous before resorting to parol evidence of the parties' intent. See id. at f^ 25 
('Thus, before permitting recourse to parol evidence, a court must make a determination 
of facial ambiguity."). Nevertheless, in making the initial ambiguity determination, a 
court may consider "relevant and credible evidence of contrary interpretations" in 
analyzing the contractual language, because otherwise the determination would be 
"'based solely upon the extrinsic evidence of the judge's own linguistic education and 
experience.'" Id. at j^ 26 (quoting Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass V?, 907 P.2d 264, 
268 (Utah 1995)). In assessing such extrinsic evidence, however, the Utah Supreme 
Court stressed that there is no "preference for that evidence over the language of the 
contract." Id. at f 27. 
In this case, the parties each offered tenable interpretations of the agreement. In 
fact, based on the plain language of the CC&R's (and as discussed more fully below, in 
15 
Section LB), the HOA's interpretation was less tenable than the interpretation offered by 
Ms. Brown. According to the HOA, the term "nightly rentals" equates to "short term 
rentals," which it interprets as any rental for a period of less than a month. The HOA 
supports its interpretation by claiming that, since "timeshares" and "similar use[s]" are 
also prohibited, and since "[t]imeshares are most frequently sold in one-week 
increments," the CC&Rs "prohibit nightly rentals, weekly rentals, such as those typically 
used in timeshares, and all other similar, short term uses. . . ." R. 50. The HOA also 
claims that the provision of the CC&Rs which expressly permits rentals or leases "from 
time to time" supports its interpretation, because this type of rentals is "grouped with 
leases, which are typically long term and grant to the tenant a real estate interest." R. 51. 
In addition, the HOA relied on the belatedly-submitted Summit County business 
ordinance, which purportedly defines "nightly lodging facility" as "any place or a portion 
thereof that is rented or otherwise made available to persons for transient lodging 
purposes for a period of less than 30 days." R. 164 at 8, Ex. C at 8. However, the 
ordinance was not presented until the hearing, providing Ms. Brown with no opportunity 
to respond to the evidence or to submit competing evidence. The ordinance also has not 
been made part of the record, precluding this Court's consideration of it on appeal. See, 
e.g., State v. Pliego, 1999 UT 8, % 7, 974 P.2d 279 ("An appellate court's 'review is . . . 
limited to the evidence contained in the record on appeal.'" (quoting Wilderness Bldg. 
Sys., Inc. v. Chapman, 699 P.2d 766, 768 (Utah 1985)). Hearing these arguments, the 
trial court adopted the HOA's interpretation as its own. 
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The interpretation offered by Ms. Brown, but rejected by the trial court, is equally 
if not more tenable than the HOA's interpretation. Under Ms. Brown's interpretation, 
only rentals "by the night" or for less than a week are precluded under Section 2(a). Ms. 
Brown's interpretation relies upon and is supported by the plain language of the CC&Rs. 
Specifically, under common usage, the term "nightly" means "every night," "at or by 
night," "happening, done, or used by night or every night," and/or "of or relating to the 
night or every night." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, definition of "nightly," 
available at <a href=Mhttp://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nightlyM>nightly</a>. 
The term "nightly" does not have the same meaning as "weekly," "monthly," or 
"annually," but instead is used in contrast to such terms. Whereas "nightly" means "by 
night" or "every night;" "weekly" means "every week" or "by the week." See id., 
definition of "weekly," available at <a href=,fhttp://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/weekly">weekly</a>. Likewise, a property available for rent by 
the night is not necessarily available for rent by the week or by the month; and, a property 
available for rent by the week or by the month is not necessarily available for rent by the 
night. To hold otherwise would impermissibly alter the meaning of the language. In the 
words of the Supreme Court in Daines, the language of the provision is more than 
"reasonably susceptible" to Ms. Brown's interpretation, see Ward, 907 P.2d at 269, 
which is based upon the common usage and the basic dictionary definition of the term. 
Ms. Brown's interpretation is also supported by the CC&Rs as a whole. In 
interpreting a contract, the court is to "'consider each contract provision . . . in relation to 
all the others, with a view towards giving effect to all and ignoring none.'" Cafe Rio, Inc. 
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v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 27, \ 25, 207 P.3d 1235 (quoting Green River 
Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, \ 17, 84 P.3d 1134). In the same Article in which the 
"nightly rental" provision appears, the CC&Rs expressly grant to subdivision owners the 
right to "rent or lease" their properties from "time to time." See Ex. B to R. at 46 at 18; 
Ex. E at 18. This provision demonstrates that subdivision owners are permitted to rent 
or lease their properties, and it does not limit the length of time for which the owners may 
do so; instead, it simply restricts the right by saying the renal or lease can only occur 
from time to time. The only other modification or qualification of this right occurs in 
Section 2(a), which states, simply, that a rental may not be "nightly." Tf an owner may 
rent his or her property, and if just one of the two restrictions on the right provides that all 
types of rentals but "nightly" rentals are permitted, it defies logic to stretch this limitation 
to encompass anything more than it says - to construe the term more narrowly would 
unduly restrict the express right to rent granted in Section 16. 
Further, contrary to the HOA's argument, the "grouping" of the term "lease" with 
the term "rent" in Section 16 does not suggest or otherwise support the imposition of a 
time limitation on the right to rent expressly granted under Section 16. The term "lease" 
is commonly used as a synonym of the term "rent," just as the term "rental agreement" is 
commonly used in place of "lease agreement." The term "lease" does not imply any 
specific term or duration for which a property may be "leased" or "rented." Further, 
although the term "lease" may sometimes associated with the written document 
memorializing a party's rental of a property, the fact that a party enters into a lease or 
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rental agreement at all, i.e., the formality of the transaction is more suggestive of a longer 
lease term than the labeling of the agreement as a "lease" or "rental" agreement. 
Finally, even if the term "lease" were distinguishable from the term "rent" in the 
manner suggested by the HOA, the mere "grouping" of the two terms is not 
determinative. The language of the CC&Rs clearly provides both alternatives - an owner 
may "lease or rent" his or her property from time to time; the language does not say that 
one form of lease or rental agreement is preferable, and it does not specify whether long 
or short-term periods are contemplated. Thus, Section 16 supports the interpretation of 
Section 2(a) to permit any rentals other than "nightly" rentals. 
Because Ms. Brown's interpretation of the operative provision is at least as tenable 
as the HOA's, the Court's determination that the Section 2(a) unambiguous as a matter of 
law was reversible error. See Deep Creek Ranch, 2008 UT 3,^15 (holding that the term 
"surplus" property was, "as a matter of law," "ambiguous on its face" because each party 
presented tenable position on meaning of term). 
1. Under the Rule Requiring Restrictive Covenants to Be Construed 
Narrowly Against the Party Seeking to Enforce Them, the 
Ambiguity Must Be Resolved in Favor of Ms. Brown 
The trial court improperly failed to consider a basic rule of construction applicable 
to restrictive covenants, which is commonly used to resolve ambiguities in such 
covenants. Pursuant to this rule, "restrictive covenants are not favored in the law and are 
strictly construed in favor of the free and unrestricted use of property." Dansie v. Hi-
Country Estates Homeowners' Ass 'n, 1999 UT 62, f 14, 987 P.2d 30 (quotations and 
citations omitted) (emphases added); see also St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's 
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Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 198 (Utah 1991) ("Where expressly stated, restrictive covenants are 
not favored in the law and are strictly construed in favor of free and unrestricted use of 
property."); Swenson v. Erickson, 2006 UT App 34, t 8, 131 P.3d 267 ("Swenson IF) 
(same). 
This rule of strict construction is clearly well established in Utah case law, and it is 
widely-recognized and applied in other states. For example, the Virginia Supreme Court 
recently applied the principle to resolve the ambiguity in a restrictive covenant stating 
that "no lot shall be used except for residential purposes." See Scott v. Walker, 645 
S.E.2d 278 (Va. 2007). Due to the ambiguity inherent in the term "residential" as used in 
the covenants, the court resolved the ambiguity by interpreting the term "in favor of the 
free use of property and against restrictions," concluding that the nightly and weekly 
rentals engaged in by the defendants did not violate the covenant. Id. at 218 (quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
In Yogman v. Parrott, 937 P.2d 1019 (Or. 1997), the Oregon Supreme Court 
likewise concluded that the term "residential" was ambiguous as used in the restrictive 
covenants at issue. According to the Court, the provision was ambiguous under both an 
examination of the text alone, and under an assessment of the available extrinsic 
evidence, because the term "'residence' can refer simply to a building used as a dwelling 
place, or it can refer to a place where one intends to live for a long time.'" Id. at 1021. 
"[I]f 'residential' refers to an intention to live in a home for more than a temporary 
sojourn or transient visit, even defendants' own use of the property, as well as their rental 
use, is not 'residential." Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, to resolve the ambiguity, the 
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court turned to "appropriate maxims of construction," including the "familiar rule of law 
that restrictive covenants are to be construed most strictly against the covenant." Id. at 
364 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Application of this maxim led the 
court to conclude that the defendants' rentals were permissible under the covenants. See 
/^. at 1023.6 
Numerous courts have applied this rule in a similar fashion, as should this court. 
See, e.g., Moore v. Stevens, 106 So. 901, 904 (Fla. 1925) ("[A]mbiguity or doubt must be 
resolved against the person claiming the right to enforce the covenants."); Boyce v. 
Simpson, 746 So.2d 507 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (declaring that restrictive 
covenants are strictly construed, and ambiguity is resolved in favor of the homeowner); 
Mullen v. Silvercreek Condominium Owner's Assoc., Inc., 195 S.W.3d 484, 487-88 (Mo. 
App. 2006) (holding that provisions restricting use to "single family residential use" and 
prohibiting business uses should be interpreted "narrowly in favor of the free use of 
property). Applying the rule of construction in this case requires the ambiguity in 
Section 2(a) to be interpreted in favor of Ms. Brown. 
2. In the Alternative, the Case Should Be Remanded for Consideration 
of Extrinsic Evidence 
Alternatively, the case must be remanded for consideration of extrinsic evidence 
of the parties' intent - a factual determination inappropriate for summary judgment. See 
In each of these cases, the courts use the term "nightly" in accordance with the common, 
dictionary definition of the term, and they use the term in contrast to "weekly." See 
Walker, 645 S.E.2d at 280 (referring to rentals at issue as "nightly and/or weekly"); 
Yogman, 937 P.2d at 1020 (referencing the "daily and/or weekly" fee charged to renters 
by the defendants). 
21 
Deep Creek Ranch, \ 31 (stating that remand was necessary for resolution of the "factual 
issue" of the parties' intent from extrinsic evidence); see also Ward, 907 P.2d at 296 
(reversing trail court's grant of summary judgment and remanding for consideration of 
extrinsic evidence). 
At the summary judgment hearing, the HOA asserted that Ms. Brown would be 
unable to supply any evidence to ascertain the parties' intent, even if she were provided 
with the opportunity, relying in part on its own unsuccessful effort to contact the 
developer of the South Ridge Subdivision. See R. 164 at 4-5. However, even if the HOA 
were unable to contact the developer, other evidence, such as testimony on the 
interpretation by other members of the HOA or other homeowners' association board 
members, and evidence of industry usage and custom, could also be admitted and 
considered on the issue. See, e.g., Ragen v. Petersen, No. D040766, 2004 WL 385347, 
(Cal. App. 4 Dist. Mar. 2, 2004) (indicating that court had previously remanded case for 
consideration of extrinsic evidence to interpret CC&Rs, including without limitation 
evidence of the intent of original developer and evidence on industry custom and usage). 
Indeed, Ms. Brown stated at the hearing that she would seek out utilize just this type of 
evidence for purposes of a factual hearing or trial on the matter. See R. 164 at 42. The 
extrinsic evidence presented by the HOA at the summary judgment hearing - the Summit 
County business licensing ordinance - also qualifies as this type of evidence, i.e., usage 
of the term in a similar but not identical setting. Ms. Brown was denied the opportunity 
A copy of this unpublished opinion is included in the Addendum as Exhibit F. 
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to respond to or submit conflicting evidence, because the HOA did not identify the 
ordinance until the hearing. Thus, the HOA's claim that no extrinsic evidence could be 
presented on remand should be rejected. Further, as mentioned above, the resolution of 
the parties' intent is a factual issue inappropriate for summary judgment. 
B. Whether or Not the "Nightly Rental" Provision Is Ambiguous, the 
Trial Court's Interpretation of the Provision Was Incorrect 
Even if the "nightly rental" provision is deemed unambiguous, the meaning 
supplied by the trial court is simply incorrect, because it does not coincide with the plain 
and ordinary meaning of the language. In other words, the language of the CC&Rs is 
"not reasonably susceptible to [the HOA's] interpretation." Dairies, 2008 UT 51, Tf 34 
(concluding that the plaintiffs interpretation of contractual language was inconsistent 
with the agreement's unambiguous and plain language). 
In the Order and Judgment memorializing its summary judgment ruling, the trial 
court stated: 
The CCRs prohibit use of any South Ridge Subdivision home for "nightly 
rental or similar use[s] . . . ," which the Court interprets, consistent with 
Summit County business licensing ordinances, as any rental for a period of 
less than 30 days. 
R. 114 at 2; Ex. A at 2. This interpretation is flawed for a number of reasons. 
First, as discussed above, the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms at issue 
contradict the trial court's interpretation. The term "nightly" has a specific meaning, 
which, essentially, is "by the night." The term "nightly" does not - and cannot - mean 
"thirty days or less," because such a definition would conflate the term "nightly" with 
"weekly." These terms are not the same. As stated, "nightly" is defined as "every night" 
23 
or "by night;" by contrast, "weekly" is defined as "every week" or "by the week." If the 
developers had intended to proscribe "weekly" rentals, they could have easily done so. 
Cf Scott, 645 S.E.2d at 283 ("If the restrictive covenant at issue was intended to prevent 
the short-term rental. . . , 'it would have been easy to say so, and it would not likely have 
been left to the uncertainty of inference.'" (citation omitted)). Instead, the developers 
selected the term "nightly" to describe the only type of rentals that would be prohibited. 
Second, the appearance of the term "similar uses" in the "nightly rental" provision 
does not contradict this analysis, but instead supports it. As explained by the Supreme 
Court in Swenson /, where a specific enumeration precedes a general term such as 
"similar uses," the court will not override the specific language. In Swenson /, the court 
considered a restrictive covenant prohibiting the use of any "trailer, basement, tent, 
shack, garage, barn or other outbuilding" for human habitation. In determining whether 
the construction of a workshop by the defendant would violate this provision, the court 
noted that "the only term that could be read to allow the erection of Erickson's workshop 
is 'other outbuildings.'" The court explained its reasoning as follows: "It is not this 
court's practice to override specific language with general provisions dealing with wholly 
distinct subject matter. Under the well-established rule of construction esjudem generis, 
general language must be confined to its meaning by specific enumeration which 
proceeds it, unless a contrary intention is shown." Swenson /, 2000 UT 16, ^ | 16; see also 
o 
Notably, the HOA at any time could have clarified the CC&Rs to restrict all rentals for 
less than thirty days, by proposing an amendment and putting the amendment to a vote of 
the members. The HOA apparently chose not to go this route, proceeding directly against 
Ms. Brown instead. 
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Cafe Rio, 2009 UT 27, j^ 25 (stating that, under the rule of esjudem generis, the court 
"determine[s] the meaning of a general contractual term based on the specific 
enumerations that surround that term"). The Utah Supreme Court reached a similar result 
in Cafe Rio, where the court determined, 'it is plain that the parties did not intend the 
general term 'obstruction' to include buildings." Cafe Rio, 2009 UT 27, \ 32. Here, as in 
Swenson I and Cafe Rio, the general term "similar uses" may not be used to expand upon 
or override the meaning of the preceding enumeration. 
Third, in defining the term "nightly" as anything less than monthly, the court 
improperly relied upon the purported Summit County business licensing ordinance 
presented by the HOA at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. However, 
the purported ordinance was only partially read into the record, see R. 124, at 8, and it 
was not made part of the record on appeal. Thus, this Court cannot consider the 
purported ordinance in reviewing the trial court's determination. See, e.g., Pliego, 1999 
UT 8, f^ 7. Moreover, even if this Court were to consider the ordinance, and even if the 
Court were to presume that the ordinance provides as indicated by counsel, the ordinance 
does not support the trial court's interpretation. As explained by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Dairies, extrinsic evidence considered by a court in the ambiguity determination may 
not be given a preference "over the language of the contract," Dairies, 2008 UT 51, ]j 27, 
which is precisely what the trial court did in this case. Stated differently, a trial court 
may not "allow surrounding circumstances to create ambiguity where the language of a 
contract would not otherwise permit." Id. "Thus, even though we permit admission of 
extrinsic evidence to support of a claim of ambiguity in contractual language, the claim 
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'must be plausible and reasonable in light of the language used.'" Id. at ^ 31 (citation 
omitted). For these reasons, the court's reliance upon the belatedly-submitted ordinance 
was error. 
In short, whether or not the "nightly rental" provision is ambiguous, the court's 
interpretation was incorrect. Accordingly, the case must be remanded for a ruling in 
accordance with the proper interpretation of the term. 
C. Renting Property for Less than Thirty Days Does Not Transform 
Single Family Residential Use to Commercial or Business Use 
The HOA argued below that business uses are prohibited under Section 16 of the 
CC&R's, and that Ms. Brown's occasional weekly rental of her property was a prohibited 
business use. According to the HOA, Ms. Brown's business use of her property also 
conflicted with statement in Section 2(a) the CC&Rs that the lots shall be used "for single 
family residential purposes." Two serious flaws mar this argument. 
First, regardless of how the HOA contends "business use" is defined, the very 
same provision that precludes business uses expressly and specifically grants to the 
owners the right to "rent or lease" their homes "from time to time," and it does so without 
specifying the length of time for which a property may be rented. 
Second, numerous courts have considered and rejected this same argument, as 
should this Court. For example, in the Scott case discussed above, the Virginia Supreme 
Court concluded that nightly and weekly rentals did not violate a restrictive covenant 
stating that "no lot shall be used except for residential purposes." See Scott, 645 S.E.2d 
278. Unlike in this case, the covenant in Scott did not specify that any rentals were 
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precluded, nor did it use the term "nightly." Nevertheless, the Court determined that the 
nightly and weekly rentals engaged in by the defendants did not constitute using the 
home as a business, noting that the length of time for which the owners rented their 
properties was not the critical factor - the critical factor was whether the property was 
used for living purposes, remarking that, "[a] transitory use does not defeat the residential 
status." See id. at 216-17 (citation omitted). 
Similarly, in Yogman, 937 P.2d 1019, the Oregon Supreme Court addressed a 
situation in which the short-term vacation rentals of their properties by certain 
subdivision owners were alleged to have violated the applicable restrictive covenants. 
Although the covenants in Yogman did not specifically address "nightly rental," the 
covenants generally proscribed commercial uses, stating: 
All lots within said tract shall be used exclusively for residential purposes 
and no commercial enterprise shall be constructed or permitted on any of 
said property. 
Id. at 1020. Moreover, like Ms. Brown, the defendants in Yogman "use[d] their beach 
house as a vacation home and, when they are not using it themselves, rent if for short 
period of time to others, who likewise use it as a vacation home." Id. Construing the 
term "residential," the Oregon Supreme Court held that the defendants' short term rentals 
did not violate the covenant, stating that, "if 'residential' refers to an intention to live in a 
home for more than a temporary sojourn or transient visit, even defendants' own use of 
the property, as well as their rental use, is not 'residential." Id. (emphasis in original). 
The Missouri Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in Mullen, 195 
S.W.3d 484, in which a number of owners sought a declaratory judgment that nightly 
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rentals were permitted under the governing declarations. As in Yogrnan, there was no 
provision expressly addressing "nightly rental," but there were provisions restricting use 
of the properties to "single family residential use" and prohibiting business uses. See id. 
at 487-88. As in this case, however, the proscription of business uses was modified by 
the grant of the right to "rent or lease his (their) condominium unit from time to time . . . 
." Id. at 488. Interpreting these covenants "narrowly in favor of the free use of 
property," the appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the owners were not 
prohibited from "renting or leasing their units on a daily or nightly term"' and that such 
use did not violate the covenant. The hdiillen case strongly supports a similar outcome 
here. 
As these cases establish, nightly and even weekly rentals do not amount to a 
business or commercial use of property. Thus, the HOA's argument to that effect must 
be rejected. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY GRANTING A 
BROAD AND INVASIVE PERMANENT INJUNCTION IN THE ABSENCE 
OF ANY THREAT OF CONTINUING HARM 
The permanent injunction entered against Ms. Brown was improperly granted 
because the HO A failed to establish any threat of ongoing harm or violations. Further, 
the scope of the injunction far exceeds the relief necessary to achieve the HOA's goal. 
A. No Continuing Harm, No Permanent Injunction 
A permanent injunction is an extraordinary remedy, to be utilized only sparingly 
and only in atypical situations. See Systems Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 425 
(Utah 1983) ("Injunction, being an extraordinary remedy, should not be lightly 
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granted."); see also O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 
F.3d 973, 1002 n.2 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating that injunctive relief is an extraordinary 
remedy). To obtain a permanent injunction, a party must establish, among other things, a 
threat of continuing harm. See Cqmp Coast to Coast, Inc. v. Woodbine Investments, LLC, 
No. 08-CV-00981-REB, 2008 WL 4936205 (D. Colo. Nov. 17, 2008) ("[PJlaintiffs 
cannot establish the type of ongoing or continuing threat of future harm that undergirds 
the extraordinary remedy of permanent injunctive relief.").9 "Ordinarily, a permanent 
injunction will only be granted after a full trial on the merits." Birch Creek Irrigation, 
858 P.2d at 993-94. 
Here, the trial court's entry of a permanent injunction contradicts its own ruling on 
the subject. That is, the trial court specifically scratched out the portion of the Order and 
Judgment indicating that Ms. Brown "threatens to continue violating the CCRs" and the 
portion stating that she "threatens to continue renting" the property. R. 114, Ex. A at 2. 
Despite its deliberate conclusion that no threat of continuing harm had been established, 
the trial court entered a permanent injunction against Ms. Brown. Absent a finding of a 
threat of continuing harm, entry of a permanent injunction is improper, and undermines 
the very purpose injunctive relief, which is to prevent future acts or violations from 
occurring - not to punish past violations. See U.S. v. Oregon State Medical Soc, 343 
U.S. 326, 333 (1952); Mitchell v. Hertzke, 234 F.2d 183, 186-87 (10th Cir. 1956) ("[A]n 
injunction will not issue merely to punish past violations but only to stop existing 
A copy of this unpublished opinion is included in the Addendum as Exhibit G. 
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violations or to prevent future infractions."). The permanent injunction should be 
vacated. 
B. The Injunction Must Be Narrowed in Scope to Conform to Its 
Purpose 
The permanent injunction entered by the trial court is not only unjustified, it is 
also far broader than necessary to achieve its ostensible purpose. 
In addition to establishing the required elements, "an injunction must be narrowly 
tailored to remedy the harm shown." Garrison v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, 
Inc., 287 F.3d 955, 961 (10th Cir. 2002). For example, the Utah Supreme Court in a 1929 
case reversed a permanent injunction enjoining the defendant from allowing his cattle to 
trespass on the plaintiffs lands, where "the effect of the injunction [was] to reach further 
than the protection of the plaintiffs lands." Winters v. Turner, 278 P. 816, 822 (Utah 
1929). The court explained: 
[T]he plaintiffs lands are unenclosed and disconnected tracts scattered 
through a much larger area of public lands. The defendant, in common 
with the plaintiff and other persons, has the legal privilege to pasture and 
graze his animals upon these public lands. If the defendant is enjoined 
from trespassing upon the lands of the plaintiff upon pain of fine or 
imprisonment for contempt of court, he is practically excluded from 
making any use of the public lands adjoining and surrounding the plaintiffs 
lands, and the result is that the plaintiff has the exclusive use not only of his 
own lands, but of a much larger area of public lands. . . . The comparative 
convenience or inconvenience of the parties from granting or withholding 
an injunction sought should be considered, and none should be granted if it 
would operate oppressively or inequitably or contrary to the real justice of 
the case. 
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The injunction requires that, any time she has family or friends visit her residence, 
Ms. Brown must take the affirmative step of notifying the HOA in writing, one week in 
advance, that visitors will be coming. Even more egregiously, the injunction requires 
Ms. Brown to identify each of the visitors to the HOA, and to inform the HOA of how 
long each visitor will stay at the home. As the trial court itself noted, Ms. Brown has the 
unquestionable right to have friends and family visit her home whenever she sees fit. The 
injunction improperly amounts to a prohibition of that right. See Winters, 278 P. at 822 
(rejecting injunction that restricted defendant's right to use public property located close 
to the plaintiffs property); see also Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 500 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (concluding that additional injunctive relief was unnecessary where 
defendant was compelled to return plaintiffs property and enjoined from using plaintiffs 
confidential information). 
III. THE HOA IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES 
If the trial court's summary judgment ruling is reversed, then the judgment for 
attorney fees entered by the court must also be reversed. This non-controversial 
proposition has been repeatedly recognized by Utah courts. See, e.g., Ault v. Holden, 
2002 UT 33, \ 48, 44 P.3d 781 ("In this case, we reverse the trial court's summary 
judgment award in favor of the Holdens in its entirety, denying them any relief on the 
merits at this point in the litigation. Given our reversal, we also reverse the award of 
attorney fees and costs because the Holdens are no longer the prevailing party."); Harper 
v. Summit County, 2001 UT 10, \ 40, 26 P.3d 193 (reversing attorney fee award where 
case was reversed). 
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CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons set forth above, Ms. Brown respectfully asks the Court to 
reverse the trial court's entry summary judgment and its award of attorney fees and costs, 
and to either interpret the "nightly rental" provision as described herein, or tg remand for 
consideration of extrinsic evidence. Ms. Brown also asks that the permanent injunction 
be vacated. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of July, 2009. 
MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C. 
James E. Magleby 
Christine T. Greenwood 
Attorneys Defendant-Appellant Lisa M. Brown 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
SOUTH RIDGE HOMEOWNERS' : 




LISA M. BROWN, : Civil No. 070500211 
: Judge: Hilder 
Defendant, : 
—oooOooo— 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment came before the Court for hearing on May 9, 
2008. Eric P. Lee appeared on behalf of plaintiff South Ridge Homeowners' Association. 
Defendant Lisa M. Brown appeared pro se. Having considered the parties' written submissions 
and arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing, the Court reached the following 
conclusions: 
1. Read as a whole, the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for 
South Ridge Subdivision (the "CCRs") evince an intent to restrict use of the South Ridge 
Subdivision lots to single-family residential purposes and to exclude business uses. 
FILED DISTRICT COMRT 
Third Judicial District 




u u 0113 
2. The CCRs prohibit use of any South Ridge Subdivision home for "nightly rental 
or similar use[s]...," which the Court interprets, consistent with Summit County business 
licensing ordinances, as any rental for a period of less than 30 days. 
far 
3. Defendant violated the CCR^ nnri throntnis to continue violating llic GGRs* by 
using her South Ridge Subdivision residence at 4059 Sunrise Drive, Park City, Utah (the 
"Residence") for business purposes. In particular, defendant has rented aa€Uhreatefl3 to continue 
< renting the Residence for periods as short as one week. 
4. Defendant did not file a motion to compel arbitration and, given her substantial 
participation in the litigation, she waived any right to arbitration. 
5. Defendant has raised no genuine issues of material fact and plaintiff is entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law. 
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted and plaintiff is awarded JUDGMENT against defendant as follows: 
A. Defendant shall immediately cease and desist all efforts to rent the Residence or 
otherwise make it available for transient lodging purposes for periods of less than 30 days. 
B. Defendant shall remove or retrieve all advertising and marketing materials by 
which the Residence is offered for rent or for transient lodging purposes for periods of less than 
30 days. 
C. Defendant is permanently enjoined from renting the Residence or otherwise 
making it available for transient lodging purposes for periods of less than 30 days. 
U O u i l t 
D. This Order and Judgment shall not be construed to prohibit use of the Residence 
by defendant's family and friends provided defendant delivers one-week advance written notice 
to the president of South Ridge Homeowners' Association listing the name of each family 
member and friend who will be using the Residence and the expected dates of use. 
E. Plaintiff is hereby awarded judgment against defendant for the reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs it incurred in connection with this action, in an amount to be determined 
by the Court after review of plaintiff s affidavit of fees and costs, any objection filed by defendant 
within 30 days of receipt of plaintiff s affidavit and any response filed by plaintiff. 
DATED this Jl{^ day of%#f2008. 
BY THE CO 
District Court Judge 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
SOUTH RIDGE HOMEOWNERS' : 




LISA M. BROWN, : Civil No. 070500211 
: Judge: Hilder 
Defendant. : 
—oooOooo— 
On August 29, 2008, the Court issued its Ruling and Order on Defendant's Motion to 
Tax Attorney Fees. Based on that order, the affidavits in support of attorney's fees submitted by 
Plaintiff, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff South Ridge Homeowners' 
Association recover from Defendant Lisa M. Brown attorney's fees in the amount of $11,262.50 
FILEDI DISTRICT C0UHT 
Third Judicial District 
SEP 2 2 2008 
SUMMIT COUNTY 
beputy 6\erK 
and costs in the amount of $310.00, for a total award of $11,572.50, with interest at the statutory 
post-judgment rate of 5 42% until paid. 
DATED this^22^day of September 2008. 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
Lisa M. Brown 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on May 9, 20O8) 
3 COURT BAILIFF: Honorable Judge Robert Hilder presiding. 
4 THE COURT: Go ahead and be seated, please, and good 
5 afternoon. We're here on the matter of Southridge Homeowners 
6 Association vs. Lisa Brown, case No. 070500211. Please state 
7 appearances. 
8 MR. LEE: Eric Lee for Southridge Homeowners Association 
9 and with me at the table is Trudy Jakes the President of the 
10 Association, your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: Thank you. 
12 MS. BROWN: Good afternoon, your Honor. Lisa Brown. 
13 THE COURT: Thank you very much. We're here on the 
14 plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and it has been 
15 briefed by parties and Counsel. Just preliminarily, Mr. Lee, 
16 on your motion, you lay out certain facts, and I understand 
17 that many of them come from admissions, et cetera, and from 
18 documents you attach. 
19 You have some concern about the response of Ms. Brown, 
2 0 I think, in terms of what are properly — properly before the 
21 Court in terms of facts to dispute the facts you allege. What 
22 I have m addition to the attachments such as the email you 
23 refer to is a declaration. 
2 4 I guess I want — I have a declaration on the penalty 
25 of perjury, which puts a new statute on (inaudible). I think 
~3
~ 
1 what's alleged there is, to at least some degree, admissible; 
2 but to me, the core issue comes down to if I'm to make a 
3 determination that there are no genuinely disputed material 
4 facts that would bar summary judgment, it comes down to the 
5 meaning of Section 10 sub (2)(a) — I think I'm on the right 
6 one — and I guess what I want you to address fairly early in 
7 the piece is why that is not perhaps ambiguous. 
8 I'm struggling. You've tried to take the pieces and 
9 show me what they mean, for example — give me an example of 
10 what a timeshare means; but timeshare has at least more than 
11 one tenable meaning, I would think. I should have this section 
12 in front of me. I'm sure that you've probably got it memorized 
13 by now. 
14 MR. LEE: And you are — you're correct, your Honor. 
15 It is Section 10 — 
16 THE COURT: It's 10(2) (a). I know that. I just am not 
17 m it where I should be. Let me go there. Okay, 10(2) (a), 
18 seems like the critical language — and tell me if I've missed 
19 some language. "No time share, nightly rental or similar use 
20 will be allowed on any single family residential lot." 
21 I think it unambiguously suggests this is primarily 
22 intended as a single family homeowners association m the 
23 neighborhood; but words such as "timeshare," which generally 
24 has a meaning like — I see your meaning about blocks of 
25 time and weeks, but I think one meaning of that is actually 
- 4 -
1 ownership units versus rental, and similar use seems to be 
2 somewhat vague. 
3 I guess my concern is at least on summary judgment, 
4 that this indeed may be an ambiguous sentence and restriction 
5 that is subject to the need for some testimony, which might, in 
6 a fairly quick order, resolve the issue of what it means; but 
7 I'm struggling with whether it's sufficient at this time for 
8 summary judgment. 
9 Would you like — address anything, of course, always, 
10 Mr. Lee, but could you address my concern about that? 
11 MR. LEE: I will of course address your concern, 
12 your Honor. I have the same concern, and it's a concern that 
13 Ms. Brown has raised in her moving papers as well, of course. 
14 The first, I think, answer to your question is, I'm not sure 
15 you're going to get anything more in trial than you're getting 
16 in these moving papers. This is not a typ — 
17 THE COURT: Possibly not, because this has been around 
18 a while. 
19 MR. LEE: T h a t ' s r i g h t , 15 years — 
20 THE COURT: Yeah. 
21 MR. LEE: — the subdivision has been in place. We 
22 actually tried to locate the developers to get an affidavit — 
23 THE COURT: You can't find Mr. Doyale? 
2 4 MR. LEE: Mr. Doyale and Mr. Barnes have not been 
25 responsive to our efforts to find them. 
~5
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1 THE COURT: I tried his divorce, among other things. 
2 So I — 
3 MR. LEE: And I think my — 
4 THE COURT: — I don't think he's that far away. 
5 MR. LEE: — I think my partner, Mr. Sessions handled 
6 the divorce, and so — 
7 THE COURT: Indeed he did. I remember now. 
8 MR. LEE: And so we — we thought we would have the 
9 ability to find him; but you know, your Honor, this is — the 
10 Court has dealt with this kind of a situation before. 
11 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
12 MR. LEE: CC&R's are a contract between the Association 
13 and the individuals, but they're certainly not a contract 
14 drafted by the Association or individual owners, and so — 
15 THE COURT: That's the truth. 
16 MR. LEE: So the intent of the Association, or the 
17 intent of the individual owners is not necessarily going to be 
18 relevant, I guess, to the question of meaning. 
19 THE COURT: You've got a good point there. It's where 
2 0 — how do we get to it, or how do we bind someone to it, until 
21 maybe it's put before them. I mean, may — I'm not here to 
22 try and mediate this. This is something you guys have to work 
23 out; but it's possible that Ms. Brown was proceeding under a 
2 4 misunderstanding. You know, I did something really dumb. I 
















































use her home 
-6-
Well, we seek injunctive relief, your Honor— 
: Yeah. 
— and attorney's fees for having to enforce 
: I see. So you're not looking for damages? 
No, we're not. 
: Yeah. 
We're looking for — 
: Okay. 
— an order explaining to Ms. Brown that she 
for the short-term rentals that she's using 














are not at 






suant to CC&R's. 
: Okay. 
Let me see if I can help the Court — 
: Please, and let me just save a little bit 
because Ms. Brown, Mr. Lee just mentioned 
; and it is, the normal contract principals 
the constitutional arguments, et cetera, 
issue. What's at issue is what's meant and 
igation of the parties are, because it is a 




Thank you, your Honor. As I was thinking 
that the Court has identified, nightly 
use, I was — I tried to get a sense of 
-7-
1 what was intended by the language. What first came to mind is 
2 sort of a business or commercial use, and it's distinguished 
3 from a residential use. I'll get into the residential versus 
4 business issue a little bit more, because I think there's a 
5 clear distinction drawn in the CC&R's — 
6 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
7 MR. LEE: — too, but the wording, to me, connotes sort 
8 of a business or commercial use, and a prohibition against that 
9 kind of use, which brought to mind the possibility that if this 
10 is in fact a business kind of use, what does Summit County 
11 require regarding nightly rentals. Typically the County or 
12 the City, whatever government jurisdiction that is in charge, 
13 requires licensing for businesses. 
14 So I just this afternoon started digging around 
15 through the Summit County ordinances, and I found what I 
16 believe are a couple of ordinances which apply here. The 
17 Court knows, based on our brief, that the CC&R's obligate 
18 owners to — let me back up. No use prohibited by Summit 
19 County ordinances can be allowed in a subdivision. That's 
20 in the CC&R's. 
2 1 THE COURT: S u r e . 
22 MR. LEE: I t ' s one of t he i s sues we r a i s e in a l i t t l e 
23 d i f f e r e n t con tex t in the b r i e f . If I may approach, your Honor? 
24 THE COURT: You may. 
2 5 MS. BROWN: And your Honor, I 'm g o i n g t o o b j e c t t o t h e 
1 use of this. I haven't seen it. I don't know what context — 
2 THE COURT: Well --
3 MS. BROWN: — it comes from --
4 THE COURT: — let's look at it — 
5 MS. BROWN: — and it obviously hasn't been addressed. 
6 THE COURT: — because if it's -- if it's a local law, 
7 I have to take judicial notice of it, and we're all bound by 
8 it; but how I'll use it if at all, I really can't decide until 
9 we see what it is. So let's do that. 
10 MR. LEE: And your Honor, this is, as you can see, it' 
11 an ordinance providing for business licenses in Summit County. 
12 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
13 MR. LEE: It's really just the definitions section — 
14 THE COURT: Yeah. 
15 MR. LEE: — of this ordinance; and if the Court will 
16 turn to the second page --
17 THE COURT: Yeah. 
18 MR. LEE: — there's a definition for "nightly lodging 
19 facility," not completely on all squares with the language we 
20 have here, but it reads, "Nightly lodging facility means any 
21 place or a portion thereof that is rented or otherwise made 
22 available to persons for transient lodging purposes for a 
23 period of less than 30 days, including without limitation — " 
24 and then they go on and — 
25 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
-9-
1 MR. LEE: — describe the kinds of lodging facilities— 
2 THE COURT: Sure. 
3 MR. LEE: -- including single family residence. So 
4 Summit County defines nightly lodging, including lodging in 
5 single family residence as anything less than 30 days. 
6 THE COURT: Which is not a definition I would have 
7 expected, in all candor. I mean, it's what it is, but it — 
8 and Ms. Brown -- but the point is, this is just like a State 
9 statute, only it's a County version. You understand that? 
10 MS. BROWN: I understand that, your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: Whether it applies here, I think it's 
12 evidence of what one might consider. 
13 MS. BROWN: Well, it's — I'm just looking at the 
14 definition section here; and it's talking about engaging in 
15 business. That's what this applies to. I'm — and I do not 
16 fall within any of the definitions of — 
17 THE COURT: Well, that's one of the issues — 
18 MS. BROWN: — engaging in business. 
19 THE COURT: — Mr. Lee is raising, by the activities 
20 that you may or may not be engaged in; and that's something I 
21 haven't determined. You may be doing business. Isn't that one 
22 of your points? 
23 MR. LEE: That is exactly my point, your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: Yeah. 
25 MR. LEE: That is exactly my point; and the licensing 
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1 statute draws the line in a place that I think it makes sense. 
2 The distinction between a three or four or seven night renter, 
3 on the one hand, and a monthly renter, on the other hand, is 
4 I think the difference between a customer — somebody who's 
5 transient, as the statute — or as the ordinance indicates, 
6 and a resident. 
7 At a minimum, if somebody is staying in a house for 
8 30 days, or is a month-to-month tenant, I think the sense is 
9 that person is residing in that house. If a person is staying 
10 there for three or four or seven days, as Ms. Brown allows in 
11 her house, I think the sense is that person is a customer, a 
12 lodging guest, a paying customer for a transient purpose. I 
13 think that's the distinction. That's the commercial versus 
14 residential distinction that I'm talking about. I think it's 
15 the distinction that the ordinance is trying to draw. 
16 That gets us, your Honor, to the context in which this 
17 language is found. It's the context of the CC&R's; and we've 
18 already gone over to some extent, but I think — 
19 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
20 MR. LEE: — in our brief we've made clear that the 
21 objective of the CC&R's is to create a residential subdivision. 
22 Only allowed use is single family residential use. Commercial 
23 or business purposes are expressly prohibited. So the CC&R's 
24 create a context for understanding the meaning of nightly 
25 rental or similar use. 
- 1 1 -
1 I Again, the Court will have to -- this is the legal 
2 question that the Court is facing in this case, what does it 
3 mean? The Court knows that the law is that the CC&R's need to 
4 be read as a whole — 
5 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
6 MR. LEE: — and the meaning of this language, to 
7 the extent it's not clear standing alone, needs to be read 
8 in context — needs to be understood in context. Context 
9 here is residential, not business; and this is a business 
10 for Ms. Brown. She lives and works in California. This is 
11 an income property for her. She advertises it for rent. 
12 She apparently uses it herself. She and her family uses it 
13 herself, but there's no doubt about the fact that she generates 
14 business income from this property. 
15 THE COURT: Is it your position that it really doesn't 
16 matter what percentage of personal use versus business use, if 
17 at any level it's business use? That would be a violation? I 
18 mean, if it fits within the prohibition, it fits within — even 
19 if it was one month a year it happened? 
20 MR. LEE: I would say it doesn't make a difference in 
21 terms of the language of the CC&R's. It may make a difference 
22 to the Association in terms of practical enforcement issues. 
23 THE COURT: I see. 
24 MS. LEE: If she's not doing it much, then there may 
25 not be a problem. This has been a problem. It's been a 
-12-
1 problem for a number of years. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. 
3 MR. LEE: And it came to light, your Honor, when one 
4 of the renters using the house gave us these house rules we've 
5 attached to our brief. I don't know if the Court had a chance 
6 to look at those. 
7 THE COURT: Yeah, uh-huh. 
8 MR. LEE: Ms. Brown says they're outdated, but she 
9 acknowledges that they were in place at some point. She 
10 doesn't tell us what the current house rules are; but the 
11 house rules that we do have demonstrate that Ms. Brown herself 
12 recognizes the distinction that I'm trying to make here. 
13 The house rules say the neighbors are long-term, 
14 full-time residence. The implication, of course, is, you're 
15 not. You're renting my house. You're not a long-term, full-
16 time residence. Her customers are short-term renters. 
17 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
18 MR. LEE: She knows that what she has done is wrong; 
19 and as a consequence, she puts in the house rules, "Do not 
20 disclose that you are renting this house." 
21 THE COURT: And that's not necessarily the current one, 
22 because you don't know, but it's in the ones you have. 
23 MR. LEE: We don't know. She hasn't — 
2 4 THE COURT: Yeah. 
25 MR. LEE: — she hasn't shown us what the current 
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1 one is. It may have the same language. The overriding 
2 impression, your Honor, from the CC&R, as taken as a whole, 
3 is single families residing in their houses are allowed in 
4 this subdivision. Business uses, commercial uses, anything 
5 but single families residing in their houses is not allowed. 
6 So taken as a whole, the overriding impression is one I think 
7 that supports our position. 
8 There are other contexts that also — contexts in 
9 which this language needs to be viewed. One is the County 
10 ordinances and codes, one of which I just handed you. The 
11 other of which is the one that we referred to in our brief, 
12 the one that precludes this kind of lodging use in this 
13 particular zone. As the Court knows, the CC&R's insist on 
14 compliance with zoning requirements. 
15 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
16 MR. LEE: And in the final context, of course, is the 
17 context on the ground. The real world context or context in 
18 which these people live every day. That is a context of a 
19 family — single family residential subdivision. 
20 Just a few more points, and then I'll sit down. 
21 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
22 MR. LEE: The — if I may approach, your Honor? 
23 THE COURT: You may. 
24 MR. LEE: This is just something I pulled off the 
25 Internet also this afternoon. This is not, obviously, binding 
-14-
1 on the Court. This is just a Park City municipal code provision 
2 that defines nightly lodging facility in the exact way that the 
3 County defines it; and then it talks about nightly rental 
4 licenses. We don't know if Ms. Brown has a license for this 
5 home, and that's something — 
6 THE COURT: But does the County have such a requirement? 
7 This isn't a County — this isn't a City — 
8 MR. LEE: This is a City. This is a City — 
9 THE COURT: Yeah. 
10 MR. LEE: — but this ordinance — 
11 THE COURT: Yeah. 
12 MR. LEE: — is a County licensing ordinance; and one 
13 of the questions that we will be asking Ms. Brown if we do not 
14 prevail on summary judgment is does she have a license. If she 
15 does then she's m violation of the licensing — 
16 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
17 MR. LEE: — ordinance. It's not directly relevant, 
18 but if she does have a license, then she has it under this 
19 nightly rental provision. 
20 One more point, your Honor. Then I'll sit down. The 
21 distinction that Ms. Brown is trying to draw is a distinction 
22 between one day and more than one day. 
23 MR. LEE: Uh-huh. 
24 THE COURT: Under her definition, according to her, 
25 this is a meaningful distinction. She says one night is 
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1 prohibited, because, quote, "nightly rentals means one night, 
2 but two is okay." That's her position. How that distinction 
3 is meaningful, how there's a meaningful distinction between 
4 one night and two nights escapes me, and I assume it escapes 
5 the Court as well. That distinction is meaningless in this 
6 context. Either way we're still talking about the same thing. 
7 We're talking about a transient lodging customer. 
8 Unless the Court has questions — 
9 THE COURT: Not at this point. 
10 MR. LEE: Thank you. 
11 THE COURT: Either — wherever you're comfortable. 
12 There or at the lectern is fine. 
13 MS. BROWN: Well, for the record, I have never made 
14 any allegation. It is nowhere, anyplace that there's a 
15 distinction that I do one and two nights, as any sort of 
16 meaningful distinction. 
17 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
18 MS. BROWN: The CC&R's provide for nightly rentals. I 
19 don't rent my home on a nightly basis ever. Never have, never 
20 will. The plaintiffs, in their moving papers, used an online 
21 calendar to suggest that I rented my home for periods of less 
22 than a week. In fact, I provided the Court and opposing 
23 Counsel with my plane tickets showing that all of those usages 
24 were me at the house, with my family, celebrating things like 
25 Thanksgiving, and any other three-day weekend. 
-16-
1 In addition, I have friend — I have friends and 
2 family who live throughout the United States, who come and 
3 use my home with my permission. They do not pay me money to 
4 do that. They are my friends, they are my family, and they are 
5 welcome to come to my house --
6 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
7 MS. BROWN: — any time they want, and use it. I 
8 rent my house out about — in a good year, six weeks out of 
9 the year during ski season. There have been years when I have 
10 not rented it at all, not once. It's all dependent on who's 
11 coming, when they're coming, if they're people I trust, if 
12 they're people I know through a contact of mine or not. It's 
13 — I don't have --
14 THE COURT: But you've been candid in your papers. I 
15 think you've been candid with the Court now. There are times 
16 you rent it. 
17 MS. BROWN: Yes, absolutely. 
18 THE COURT: And this six weeks is not six consecutive 
19 weeks to one renter? 
2 0 MS. BROWN: No, it's not, no. 
21 THE COURT: Uh-huh, and that's the question, whether 
22 that does in fact put you in violation under the CC&R's. I 
23 mean, they're asking you to stop doing it. That's what 
24 injunctive relief means. So they're not saying, "Pay us 
25 damages because you did it," and I — I've had a very busy 
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1 I week, and I just didn't stop to look to see what they were 
2 asking for. I should have. 
3 So I'd have to say to you, in all candor, it would 
4 appear that if you are renting it for periods that are less 
5 than 30 days, under some of the things supplied to me now, 
6 and some general readings, it may be injunctive relief is 
7 justified. Why would it not be? 
8 MS. BROWN: I don't see that it is. I've read the 
9 CC&R's myself. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. 
11 MS. BROWN: I've asked for all documentation that 
12 demonstrates what the interpretation of "nightly" is. I've 
13 been provided by nothing from the Homeowners Association saying 
14 what "nightly" is, other than the term used in the CC&R's. 
15 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
16 MS. BROWN: There's nothing that precludes weekly 
17 rentals. In fact, many of the — most of the zoning ordinances, 
18 they allow people, owners of property, to rent their places for 
19 a week at a time. Nightly rentals are not allowed. 
20 THE COURT: But are you making a distinction here 
21 between a business use and a residential? Because there is 
22 plenty of short-stay business in this community. Of course 
23 you're right, but it does depend on where you are. CC&R's 
24 change everything, because they're the contract. 
25 MS. BROWN: Right. 
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1 THE COURT: The only role the ordinances have — well, 
2 to some degree they're incorporated; but secondly, they also 
3 inform us as to meaning. Which ordinances are you referring 
4 to that you think would support what you're doing, if any? 
5 MS. BROWN: I haven't looked at ordinances, because I 
6 have gone by the CC&R's. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. 
8 MS. BROWN: The CC&R's preclude nightly rentals, and 
9 they specifically ban time shares. We don't have either of 
10 those situations here. 
11 THE COURT: And similar. 
12 MS. BROWN: It doesn't say — 
13 THE COURT: They use the word "similar," and I agree 
14 it's a pretty weasley word. At least it's not my favorite 
15 words. 
16 MS. BROWN: And what's very concerning to me, your 
17 Honor, is it seems that the Homeowners Association just willy-
18 nilly interprets these terms how they want to. At one time 
19 the allegation was that I was doing nightly rentals. Then 
20 the allegation changed to short-term rentals. Well, there's 
21 nothing about short-term rentals. They ignore the fact that 
22 the — 
23 THE COURT: Not unless it fits in similar, it said. 
24 MS. BROWN: That the — well, what is "similar"? There 






































BROWN: — that defines that. There's also the 
the CC&R's, which I've pointed out, that says 
— you're allowed occasionally to rent your house 
specifically allowed. I certainly don't do it 
COURT: Which provision are you referring to now? 
BROWN: Let me find it, your Honor. 
COURT: Yes, please. (Cough). Excuse me. 
BROWN: There isn't any claim that I do this — 
well, at least — yeah, I don't do it on a regular basis. It's 












BROWN: Let me find this. It's in my opposing 
LEE: It's Section 16 in Article 10, your Honor. 
COURT: Oh. 
BROWN: Thank you. 
COURT: Thank you. 
LEE: Under business uses. 
COURT: Yeah. 
BROWN: Okay, so anyway, even if you want to 
construe it as a business use, it is something that would be 
authorized in that context. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, that's my question for you, 
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1 Ms. Brown. If you're renting it for money for relatively short 
2 term, as opposed to just renting your property to somebody on a 
3 regular tenancy, why isn't it a business use? 
4 MS. BROWN: Well, it's my home. So I — you know, 
5 people frequently rent out their homes, their summer homes, 
6 their vacation homes. 
7 THE COURT: Yeah. 
8 MS. BROWN: I'm not sure that that's considered a 
9 business use. That's something — 
10 THE COURT: It is up here. I mean, this is a resort 
11 community, and some areas allow short term, some do not. It's 
12 very clearly delineated, and I'll tell you, Summit County and 
13 its business licensing requirements, they take that pretty 
14 seriously, too. If there's something that — the business 
15 uses as it says, "use exclusively for single family residential 
16 living purposes. Shall never be occupied or used for any 
17 commercial or business purpose." 
18 Now, I can see where you're saying, "I'm not running a 
19 store out of the house." "I'm not renting snowmobiles out of 
20 the house," and of course you're not; but the trouble is we get 
21 back to what is designated business, or fitting it within a — 
22 MS. BROWN: Your Honor — 
23 THE COURT: — an area requiring a business license in 
24 this County. It seems to me like whether you intended to or 
25 not, you might be falling into that. 
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1 I THE COURT: Well, your Honor, specifically the CC&R 
2 is the provision that we're looking at right now, says that 
3 the occasional rental of your property does not constitute a 
4 precluded business use. So there isn't a violation to that 
5 extent. 
6 THE COURT: Well, rent or lease, exactly, residential 
7 building from time to time. 
8 MS. BROWN: Right. 
9 THE COURT: But you have to read it in its entirety, 
10 and it has to be consistent with (2)(a), that it's not short-
11 term. So yeah, of course you can lease it. I mean, you're 
12 not prohibited -- it's not just owner occupied. Of course 
13 it's not; but that doesn't mean you can then switch to the 
14 other end of the spectrum, and start doing this short-term 
15 business. Even though you're not doing it a lot. 
16 MS. BROWN: Your Honor, "short term" is nowhere in the 
17 CC&R's. That appears for the first time in this argument and 
18 in the reply papers. 
19 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
20 MS. BROWN: It's "nightly," not "short term." 
21 THE COURT: It's "nightly" or "similar;" and the 
22 similar does have meaning, and again, reading it m its 
23 entirety. 
24 The other way to reason, I think sometimes is by 
25 reasoning from the opposite. I think one thing that's very 
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1 clear from these CC&R's is this is a residential community. 
2 MS. BROWN: Absolutely. 
3 THE COURT: And so the problem is, if your use switches 
4 from residential to business or commercial in any sense, that 
5 raises a red flag that you're in violation of the CC&R's. Even 
6 your own statements — and again, as I say, I think you've been 
7 totally candid. I mean, you say that — you're saying, "I have 
8 rented for up to six weeks," but if it was two weeks, you may 
9 well be m violation. 
10 You said you've never said there's a distinction 
11 between one and two days or one and two nights. I think maybe 
12 that was inferred from your email. "Do I rent my house to 
13 people for a night, nightly rental?" and it's a "No, never have 
14 and never will." "Do I rent my house to people for periods of 
15 less than 48 hours?" A big stretch of the nightly theme. 
16 Answer, "No, never have, never will." 
17 I would read that, in all candor, as saying you're 
18 trying to distinguish between a day and less than two days, or 
19 less than 24 hours. That was your language; but I think you 
20 are too narrowly construing "nightly." Nightly doesn't mean 
21 only one night. It means that it's sort of measured by nights, 
22 whether it's a week or two weeks; and apparently, under the 
23 ordinance, less than 30. 
24 MS. BROWN: Well, but that ordinance isn't incorporated 
25 in here anyplace, nor has it — I have no idea what the context 
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1 of that — 
2 THE COURT: I'm going to ask Mr. Lee what the zoning 
3 ordinances are. This is a business ordinance. It's a very 
4 general incorporation of being in compliance with Summit County 
5 ordinances, that you recall? I haven't looked for it. It 
6 would take me a minute to do that. 
7 MR. LEE: It would take me a minutes as well, your 
8 Honor. I believe the provision in the CC&R's refers to zoning 
9 ordinances. 
10 THE COURT: It does on the 10-1. 
11 MR. LEE: That's right. 
12 THE COURT: Yeah. 
13 MR. LEE: I don't believe there's a — 
14 THE COURT: But generally to be in compliant use of 
15 any property, you've got to be in compliance with the County 
16 ordinances and State statutes. That's just part of the deal. 
17 I don't know if that was intended to be or not. Have you 
18 looked at it, Ms. Brown, and tried to tell if they have — did 
19 incorporate all ordinances? 
20 MS. BROWN: I have no idea what the City ordinances 
21 are. 
22 THE COURT: This is actually County. You're not in the 
23 City, right? 
24 MS. BROWN: No. 
25 THE COURT: You're in the Jeremy Ranch area? 
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1 MS. BROWN: I'm in Summit County. 
2 THE COURT: Yeah, exactly. So — but the County 
3 ordinance may be incorporated, it may not on this ordinance, 
4 but it's certainly of some substantial weight, in my mind, in 
5 determining what "nightly" means, which is just one of the 
6 terms at issue here. I don't see how the time share fits into 
7 it. Again, I think that would be about selling units; and you 
8 haven't done that. 
9 MS. BROWN: No. 
10 THE COURT: So I don't think you're in violation of 
11 that. Nightly rental or similar use, gosh, I mean, I read this 
12 with interest when it was filed. I read — re-read it again 
13 last night, and then it was just today after some hearings I 
14 looked again at the CC&R's, and had the concern I had about 
15 ambiguity, but — 
16 MS. BROWN: Your Honor — 
17 THE COURT: — looking at it in its entirety, it seems 
18 to me that the specific uses to which you have been putting it 
19 are problematic. 
20 MS. BROWN: I think — I think there's a question here. 
21 THE COURT: Yeah. 
22 MS. BROWN: No doubt. I have not had the time or the 
23 inclination to research what the County ordinances are, because 
24 it's not something that we have been discussing in this lawsuit 
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COURT: Well, let me ask, did you demand — 
BROWN: — homeowners to — 
COURT: — arbitration? 
BROWN: — do that. 
COURT: I did see an arbitration. Didn't read it. 
BROWN: As troublesome — 
COURT: What section is it; do you remember? 
BROWN: — as troublesome — yes, it's Article 12. 
COURT: Oh, 12. 
LEE: Yes, 12, your Honor. 
COURT: Thank you. 
BROWN: As troublesome as this issue seems to be 
for everybody, I think this is one that is appropriate for 
arbitration, especially if we want to find out what impact 




the CCR, or — 
COURT: Well, here's the problem. 
BROWN: — the ambiguity. 
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1 THE COURT: You clearly are not ignorant of the law, 
2 but I don't know if you're law trained. Are you? 
3 MS. BROWN: Yes. 
4 THE COURT: You are? 
5 MS. BROWN: Uh-huh. 
6 THE COURT: Do you have a degree? 
7 MS. BROWN: Yes, I do. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. You perhaps haven't spent the time I 
9 have on arbitration in this state, and you perhaps haven't been 
10 both reversed and affirmed as much as I have on arbitration in 
11 this state; but the leading cases in this case — state on 
12 that issue, in Chandler vs. Mass Mutual, Park West vs. Central 
13 Florida, and Smile vs. Bright Smile. Chandler vs. Mass Mutual 
14 was out of my office when I was a lawyer. My partners handled 
15 it, but I did a lot of work on it; and the other two were my 
16 cases. 
17 We definitely favor arbitration and mediation 
18 provisions in this state. Both Central Florida vs. Park West 
19 and Smile vs. Bright Smile go to the issue of whether someone 
20 waives their right to demand arbitration. You're considered 
21 to have waived it if you participate meaningfully in the 
22 litigation without demanding the right to arbitrate. 
23 One of the places you have to start is in the answer. 
2 4 In your answer did you demand arbitration? 
2 5 MS. BROWN: Well, I didn't specifically say I demand 
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1 arbitration. What I raised as an affirmative defense is 
2 failure to satisfy a condition precedent to asserting the 
3 claims. 
4 THE COURT: Okay, I see how you brought that — 
5 MS. BROWN: Is the affirmative defense. 
6 THE COURT: — and the other thing is, to participate 
7 in motions creates problems for you. Here's your answer. 
8 Let's have a look. 
9 MS. BROWN: And I also have briefed that issue a number 
10 of times in correspondence with plaintiff's Counsel. 
11 THE COURT: That's important. Then we do have an 
12 issue, because what you should do — or should have done, is 
13 file a motion to compel arbitration and stay the proceeding, 
14 or dismiss the proceeding, depending on the nature of the 
15 provision. I mean, I don't care if it's arbitrated or before 
16 the Court, but the rules are pretty clear about the way it 
17 works. Condition precedent. I suppose in a sense that is a 
18 condition precedent; and you say you've raised it in — 
19 MS. BROWN: It's — 
20 THE COURT: — correspondence? 
21 MS. BROWN: — it's been raised in correspondence. 
22 It's also raised in my responses to discovery. 
23 THE COURT: I see. Well, I'm going to be asking 
24 Mr. Lee to respond on the issue, the impact, if any, of the 
25 arbitration provision at this stage of the proceeding. If I 
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1 was to grant the motion, it would be an interesting problem, 
2 because you haven't made your motion to compel arbitration. 
3 Whether you waived it or not, I can't determine at this time, 
4 without understanding everything you've done; but I can assure 
5 you the case law gives us plenty of guidance on it. 
6 The last time I found waiver, I was affirmed. So I 
7 feel better about that one. In Park West, I found there wasn't 
8 waiver, and the Court — Supreme Court agreed with me; but they 
9 didn't agree with me on not compelling arbitration, and it was 
10 the worst arbitration agreement you've ever seen in your life. 
11 Both of those happened in this courthouse — no, one of them 
12 did. 
13 The thing is, whether we grant summary judgment today 
14 or not; and I find it right now to be a very close call. If I 
15 did not, the question is, is there room yet to deal with the 
16 arbitration provision? What you really need to address -- and 
17 as I say, my sense was that you had at least training in the 
18 law. I didn't know how much you did — the summary judgment 
19 standard. 
20 What genuine disputed material fact do you identify? 
21 I know there's the issue of meaning; but I'm not sure that we 
22 haven't gotten around that concern. What do you think are 
23 the most critical material disputed facts that would prevent 
2 4 summary judgment? 
25 MS. BROWN: Well, they have introduced no evidence of 
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1 what sort of rental activity is going on at that -- at my 
2 property, other than what I have said, which is, I occasionally 
3 rent it on a weekly basis. 
4 THE COURT: Well, you — as I say, you've answered the 
5 questions; and that's to your credit. There is the website 
6 advertising, which sort of suggests a business activity; 
7 wouldn't you agree? Whether it worked or not, I don't know. 
8 MS. BROWN: I don't know. It's vacation rentals by 
9 I owner. So I haven't — 
10 THE COURT: Yeah, that sure sounds like business to me, 
11 Ms. Brown. 
12 MS. BROWN: Well — 
13 THE COURT: So they've got that evidence. They've got 
14 your house rules, which m all candor suggests that you have 
15 concern about how it was construed by neighbors, but I can read 
16 that two ways. One, you try to avoid someone knowing you're 
17 doing business; and two, you just don't want to upset the 
18 neighborhood. 
19 MS. BROWN: Yeah, the — you know, the first time I 
2 0 had guests at my house, you know, Sherry West, the neighbor 
21 across the street came over and told me that there's no nightly 
22 rentals. Rather than have a discussion about what nightly 
23 rentals mean, you know, I just listened — 
2 4 THE COURT: Yeah. 
2 5 MS. BROWN: — and left it at that. 
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1 THE COURT: And if every instance was you having 
2 guests, I don't care how big your family is, I don't think 
3 you're violating anything. It's when you step over the line 
4 and rent it to somebody else. That's — for less than a lease 
5 term, which would normally be month-to-month. Then I think we 
6 step into the possibility of a commercial activity that would 
7 violate. 
8 Okay, what other specific disputes do you think would 
9 bar summary judgment? 
10 MS. BROWN: Well, I have some questions about this is a 
11 matter that's even appropriate for injunctive relief. 
12 THE COURT: Why is that? 
13 MS. BROWN: What — how in the world do you enforce 
14 something like this? Is -- you know, is it a business use if 
15 I rent my house out once or twice a week? Well, if you look at 
16 the tax codes, no. I wouldn't have to — 
17 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
18 MS. BROWN: — claim that as business income of any 
19 sort. If Sherry West has a concern anytime she sees somebody 
20 besides me at my house, does that give her the right, or the 
21 homeowners a right to come into Court and say, "I suspect that 
22 Lisa's renting her house"? I mean, a lot of what's going on 
23 here is suspicious, not — is suspicion, not fact based at all. 
24 THE COURT: In terms of how you would enforce it, the 
25 injunction would have to be written with certain specificity. 
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1 It would have to prohibit — we would have to define, from 
2 the Court's interpretation, what is prohibited by the CC&R's, 
3 specifically put that in the injunction. It would talk about 
4 number of days. It would talk about a business type activity. 
5 Then I think it would be clear to everybody, which would be a 
6 good thing going forward. 
7 I don't know, Ms. Brown, if you're here today saying 
8 you feel you have a right to retain the option to rent for 
9 less than 30 days. If you're saying that, I think you've got 
10 a problem again. I don't know if you're concerned about the 
11 future. Not about your family and friends. You don't have 
12 an issue there, and we can make that clear; but if you have 
13 an issue where you want to bring in people for profit, which 
14 is what those rentals are, then that's the core of the suit, 
15 isn't it? 
16 MS. BROWN: It could be a concern; but then again, I 
17 look — see, I look at the whole meaning of the CC&R's. as I 
18 said m one of my emails, I understand the concern if you have 
19 a bunch of strangers running around m the neighborhood on a 
20 nightly basis or just all the time random people. 
21 THE COURT: Yeah, but now you're talking of policy. 
22 I understood that, but it doesn't really matter what's good 
23 policy if the contract says X, because you're bound by the 
24 contract. When you buy into that neighborhood, the contract 
25 binds you. Even if the use prohibited by the CC&R's does not 
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1 create that kind of annoyance or degradation of the neighbor-
2 hood, it doesn't mean you can do it. 
3 MS. BROWN: Yeah, and I agree with that — 
4 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
5 MS. BROWN: — but I think the CC&R's are very unclear 
6 as to what you can do. That term — 
7 THE COURT: Which is why injunctive relief and the 
8 Court's determination and meaning would be what would bind 
9 you prospectively because I agree, to the extent there's 
10 unclearness, that needs to be addressed. I'm less concerned 
11 about unclearness now than I was when I walked m the door, in 
12 all candor. 
13 MS. BROWN: Well — 
14 THE COURT: I mean, that's why we have argument. 
15 MS. BROWN: Exactly. 
16 THE COURT: Yeah. 
17 MS. BROWN: And that's why you have arbitration, and 
18 that's why you have neighborhood talking before you go out and 
19 file a lawsuit, which was also something that's supposed to 
20 happen here. 
21 THE COURT: Well, that's a better thing, but you know, 
22 my 30b is to sit here and put on this robe and decide it if you 
23 didn't talk. That's just what I do. 
24 MS. BROWN: I understand that. 
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1 THE COURT: Why not? 
2 MS. BROWN: Because under the law, a weekly -- renting 
3 your home for a week is not a business use. 
4 THE COURT: No, that's changing the hypothetical. 
5 MS. BROWN: I'm sorry. 
6 THE COURT: Is that — no, maybe that's even badly 
7 said. If I determine that anything you have done even on 
8 one occasion violates the law as I interpret as a Court --
9 J obviously subject to appeal, and I have the greatest respect 
10 for people who try to appeal my decisions — but if I determine 
11 that a week or less or two weeks is still in violation and 
12 happened one time, doesn't that support an injunction? 
13 MS. BROWN: I am not sure that you can get injunctive 
14 relief where you have an ambiguous provision that needs to be 
15 defined. 
16 THE COURT: But again, you're changing it. I'm saying 
17 I've gotten past ambiguity, found a determination, defined it 
18 as X, and found that you have violated it once. Obviously we 
19 have to go through those steps. 
2 0 MS. BROWN: Yeah, that's — 
21 THE COURT: Yeah. 
22 MS. BROWN: If we had a definition, if we had something 
23 concrete here, if we had a definition, and you found that I had 
24 violated — 
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1 THE COURT: I mean, this isn't your prime business 
2 source of income. I didn't think for a moment it was. 
3 MS. BROWN: No. 
4 THE COURT: If it was, you wouldn't be doing very well. 
5 Not at six weeks on a good year. Okay, so enforceability, I 
6 didn't see the problem with it. 
7 MS. BROWN: I just foresee anytime a neighbor sees 
8 somebody she doesn't know in the neighborhood — 
9 THE COURT: Yeah. 
10 MS. BROWN: — and has a public fit — 
11 THE COURT: I guess, I mean — 
12 MS. BROWN: — here we go to Court again. 
13 THE COURT: — it could be a source of mischief, is 
14 what you're saying. 
15 MS. BROWN: Yes, exactly. 
16 THE COURT: And it could be; but that comes down to 
17 another issue for another day, I think. If someone frivolously 
18 attacks you, then I think you're the one with the action, not 
19 one — I mean, as you said, you don't want a neighborhood 
20 that's all about litigation. 
21 MS. BROWN: Well, your Honor, and quite frankly, if we 
22 were headed off to arbitration on this, I don't think we even 
23 go through an arbitration, because my position would be if me 
24 renting my home, getting money for people coming to stay at my 
25 house for a week during ski season is a big problem for you, 
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1 Homeowners Association, then I won't do it; but for me to pay 
2 attorney's fees because somebody -- because there's a vague 
3 provision — 
4 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
5 MS. BROWN: — that they choose to interpret many, many 
6 different ways, even in this single proceeding, that's wrong. 
7 THE COURT: It's really a different issue, though, 
8 isn't it? 
9 MS. BROWN: Well, the Court's always — 
10 THE COURT: And whether it's arbitration or — 
11 MS. BROWN: — (inaudible) equitable. 
12 THE COURT: — or the courtroom, an arbitrator decides 
13 the issue just like I would. 
14 MS. BROWN: Absolutely, but — 
15 THE COURT: Yeah. 
16 MS. BROWN: — what I'm saying is — 
17 THE COURT: And they could award — an arbitrator could 
18 award fees, right? 
19 MS. BROWN: Well, what I'm saying is there would be a 
20 compromise, and that's the whole purpose of — 
21 THE COURT: Well, that would be more like a mediation, 
22 I think. Mr. Lee, is it arbitration and/or mediation, or is it 
23 mediation then arbitration, the language? 
24 MR. LEE: There is no required mediation, your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: There is not? 
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1 MR. LEE: There i s a cond i t ion — the re i s no t . 
2 THE COURT: So i s t h e r e an a r b i t r a t i o n p r o v i s i o n ? I 
3 th ink I saw one, but — 
4 MR. LEE: Says, "Any controversy, claim or dispute 
5 arising out of this CC&R is essentially — shall be settled by 
6 arbitration." 
7 THE COURT: Okay, yeah, Article 12. So the question 
8 would be, when you get up again, not just yet — 
9 MR. LEE: Yeah. 
10 THE COURT: — whether that is still a requirement. My 
11 problem is there's been no motion. 
12 MR. LEE: That's my problem as well, and I have a 
13 couple of other problems I'd like to talk to the Court about. 
14 THE COURT: Okay, I look forward to hearing those; 
15 but you say that if there had been arbitration — and see, 
16 arbitration is a heck of a lot like Court, regardless of what 
17 people say. Mediation is more what you're talking about, where 
18 you sit down and try to reason it out and compromise, which 
19 would be ideal, but it's not required by the CC&R's. 
20 MS. BROWN: Actually it is, your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: It is? Where is that? 
22 MS. BROWN: That same paragraph, it says --
23 THE COURT: Okay, in 12? 
2 4 MS. BROWN: — "In the event the Association becomes 
25 involved m any controversy, claim or dispute, regardless of 
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1 the cause, it shall attempt to avoid litigation by offering to 
2 settle through the use of binding arbitration in accordance 
3 with the Commercial Arbitration Rules," et cetera. 
4 THE COURT: But it says "arbitration." I see what you 
5 mean about attempt to -- offering to settle, and I agree — 
6 MS. BROWN: Attempt to avoid litigation. 
7 THE COURT: — it's certainly is inconsistent with 
8 arbitration, because someone decides it for you. So we've 
9 got another bit of bad language here. It should have said 
10 "mediation." I know you know the difference. I can tell from 
11 what you're saying. 
12 Unfortunately, as I've said, I've seen a lot worse 
13 arbitration and mediation provision enforced by our Supreme 
14 Court and Court of Appeals, and I think we'll see many more. 
15 It is the policy of this State to favor it, unless it's waived. 
16 We're here today, and I can't determine if there's a waiver, 
17 but I do know I don't have a motion to send it to arbitration. 
18 So it's not the issue before me. 
19 MS. BROWN: Well, and if we go back to just he language, 
20 what does nightly or similar use mean — 
21 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
22 MS. BROWN: — I think that's something, too, that if 
23 — before a summary judgment should be granted or ruled upon, 
24 it's something that deserves to be in front of the Court, 
25 because if there's something that opposing Counsel's got 
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1 something, I — 
2 THE COURT: That brings me — 
3 MS. BROWN: — my guess is — 
4 THE COURT: — to the next question, though. 
5 MS. BROWN: — I could find something, too. 
6 THE COURT: What is — what could we do to make it 
7 clearer? Mr. Lee responded fairly early to my question, 
8 "Judge, who's going to come in and testify as to intent?" 
9 That's not really the issue. The people dealing with this 
10 now are not the people who drafted the agreement. 
11 MS. BROWN: Right. 
12 THE COURT: So I think you're telling me you want a 
13 chance to argue it more on a legal basis; but the definition 
14 is clearly before the Court today, and that should have been 
15 addressed. What would you do in terms of fact discovery, 
16 testimony, et cetera, to shed more light on the meaning? 
17 MS. BROWN: Well, what I did in terms of fact discovery 
18 is I asked for anything that defined the term "nightly." 
19 THE COURT: Yeah, my question is what would you do from 
20 the — if I denied summary judgment, you'd have more discovery. 
21 What would you do? 
22 MS. BROWN: I would ask — I would ask them how to — 
23 how they interpret the --
24 THE COURT: Yeah, but they've told us in the courtroom. 
25 MS. BROWN: Well, or did they — what they've said is 
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1 "short term." That's what their reply paper said. There 
2 hasn't ever been any definition — 
3 THE COURT: Yeah, but again, now we're about an hour of 
4 argument — almost an hour — and that's what we're here for. 
5 That's what we're doing. 
6 MS. BROWN: Yeah. So we — 
7 THE COURT: So I'm saying — 
8 MS. BROWN: — it's determined from the party. 
9 THE COURT: — what would we get in addition? That's 
10 my question. What could we add to this process, by going into 
11 discovery, and trial if necessary? 
12 MS. BROWN: Define the term. 
13 THE COURT: But no, tell me, how? What would — what 
14 steps would we specifically take to define the term, other 
15 than what you're doing? I mean, you've certainly addressed 
16 it. You've argued it. You argued it by analogy. You've 
17 argued it by specific examples, as has Mr. Lee. 
18 MS. BROWN: You know — 
19 THE COURT: So what else would you do? 
20 MS. BROWN: — I honestly can't say that you would 
21 do anything more. You would go to the rules of contract 
22 interpretation. 
23 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
24 MS. BROWN: Define the term "ambiguous." You would 
25 say there's an ambiguity there; and hopefully he would tell 
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1 the parties to work it out, or the Court is going to have to 
2 — have to define what it means, because there hasn't been 
3 sufficient information provided of a definition of nightly 
4 versus (inaudible). 
5 THE COURT: When you say "information," though, you 
6 seem to me to only be saying, "I want you to tell me again why 
7 you think this is contrary to the agreement;" but there isn't 
8 any evidence. I guess I maybe should have used that word 
9 earlier. What evidence would we seek? 
10 They've already told us their argument; and this is 
11 fundamentally a legal argument. If we don't have a dispute 
12 over the fact that you have on occasion rented it for a shorter 
13 term than 30 days, I have to decide if I think that fits within 
14 the definition. So what other evidence would we look for? 
15 MS. BROWN: We would look for similar homeowners' 
16 agreements where nightly rentals are prohibited, and see if 
17 those define nightly rental. We would maybe talk to some real 
18 estate agents to find out what the meaning is in the community. 
19 When — because I know there are communities around here where 
20 you can't rent for less than four days. So — 
21 THE COURT: Yeah, but they're -- but they all have 
22 their own rules, and that's the point. This is a contract 
23 cause of action. So just like the ordinance does give us 
24 some information, so too might what's happening m other 
25 communities; but ultimately it comes down to you have a 
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1 contract. It has terms. Is it ambiguous? I raise the issue. 
2 I'm less inclined to think it is at this point. 
3 MS. BROWN: Well — 
4 THE COURT: And at least it's not so ambiguous to me, 
5 that what you agree to doing does not appear to me to be in 
6 violation of (2)(a). That's the concern I have. You talk 
7 about the fees issue. Obviously you have the right to pursue 
8 anything as far as you wish; but say we went — you went to 
9 arbitration from here and lost, all you've got is bigger fees, 
10 if you lost. 
11 MS. BROWN: Yeah, I — 
12 THE COURT: If you go on in this case and you lose, you 
13 have bigger fees. If you win, of course, you don't have a fee 
14 obligation. If you've got a lawyer, you might get some fees. 
15 MS. BROWN: Right. 
16 THE COURT: Yeah, but the fees is just that monster 
17 that keeps growing. 
18 MS. BROWN: Yeah, and we were still — you know, if the 
19 Court — I find the term and I find the language ambiguous. 
20 It says, "Occasional rental is not a business use." It says, 
21 "Nightly rental is prohibited." It says, "Timeshare use is 
22 prohibited," and "Similar use is prohibited." That's all it 
23 says. 
24 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
25 MS. BROWN: There's nothing that prohibits weekly 
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1 rental. There's nothing that prohibits 10 days or 14 or — and 
2 there's nothing that allows 30 days. So — 
3 THE COURT: I think my — sorry, I didn't mean to cut 
4 you off. 
5 MS. BROWN: — so it is — I don't see how it can be 
6 found to not be an ambiguous term. You have to go to outside. 
7 THE COURT: And the reason I think it may not be, is 
8 what I said a little bit earlier. That is, looking at it more 
9 within the context of the entire purpose of the CC&R's and 
10 their development, or the Association in the neighborhood, and 
11 that is residential versus commercial or business. 
12 You look at that, and it becomes easy to see what 
13 is intended by this language. That is to avoid a commercial 
14 short-term use. They don't use the term "short-term," I agree 
15 with that; but the commercial or business use is identified, 
16 for example, in the ordinances. By your own admission, what 
17 you did was commercial. Apparently you didn't think so. 
18 You didn't think renting your house was business, but it is 
19 business. It's an income generating activity. 
20 It doesn't mean that if your family comes in and does 
21 a use with your permission and gives you some money to offset 
22 the cost that that's business. That's not; but when you start 
23 advertising it, which we have evidence of; when you do some 
24 short-term, which you agree you have; when you have done it up 
25 to six weeks in a year — but even if you've done it one or two 
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1 weeks m a year — that sounds pretty commercial, and seems to 
2 be to get beyond any concern about ambiguity. 
3 MS. BROWN: I would have to say I disagree that that — 
4 THE COURT: I know you do. 
5 MS. BROWN: -- rises to a commercial use. 
6 THE COURT: Uh-huh 
7 MS. BROWN: Commercial use is something, you know, I'm 
8 in the business of doing something and selling something, and 
9 yeah, it's not — 
10 THE COURT: You're selling nights of lodging. Multiple 
11 nights, but not renting your property like — you're right, 
12 there are some gray areas here. For example, if you own six 
13 houses in Summit County, and rented them out on a six-month 
14 lease, that's clearly a business; but it's also not in 
15 violation of the CC&R or any others that I'm aware of. 
16 MS. BROWN: And you know, if you — if you say it's for 
17 profit, well, it's not for profit. I don't get a profit off of 
18 it. It doesn't cover — 
19 THE COURT: The fact that one's a bad business woman — 
20 MS. BROWN: — my mortgage. 
21 THE COURT: — doesn't actually change the rules, but 
22 — and I don't mean you're a bad business woman. I bet you're 
23 a good one; but my point is making a profit doesn't define a 
24 business. 
25 MS. BROWN: Yeah, I — well, I agree, it's — 
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1 THE COURT: Yeah. 
2 MS. BROWN: — wouldn't be a good one. 
3 THE COURT: I need to hear from Mr. Lee on the effect 
4 of arbitration. I will not preclude you from adding something 
5 when he's done on any of these issues, but I want to hear that. 
6 So why don't you take a seat for a moment, if you would. 
7 Mr. Lee, I think we both know the law. The question 
8 is, where are we procedurally, and what's the impact? 
9 MR. LEE: Well, I think the Court knows the law much 
10 better than I know the law. I've never been good at the 
11 deciding case (inaudible), and just rattled off all of the 
12 relevant ones, but — 
13 THE COURT: Learn the hard way. 
14 MR. LEE: Sometimes the best way. 
15 THE COURT: Yeah. 
16 MR. LEE: It's clear to us, however, your Honor, that 
17 the arbitration — the right to demand arbitration has been 
18 laid in this case. We — this case was filed in April of last 
19 year. We've gone through substantial proceedings, including 
20 complete discovery. Discovery is completed under the scheduling 
21 order. 
22 THE COURT: It is? I didn't look at that. Okay. 
23 MR. LEE: No more discovery can be done in this case; 
24 so if the question is, what more can we do to get to this 
25 issue? The answer is nothing. 
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1 THE COURT: Well, apparently under the time table, but 
2 also I think Ms. Brown was candid when we finally got down to 
3 the point, she can't identify anything to do m discovery — 
4 MR. LEE: Yeah. 
5 THE COURT: -- that would shed light. 
6 MR. LEE: That's correct; and that's kind of the point 
7 I'm making here — 
8 THE COURT: All right. 
9 MR. LEE: — in the argument. In terms of arbitration, 
10 in the two years that these parties were discussing this issue 
11 off and on before we filed the case, and in the year since the 
12 case has been pending, arbitration has not been raised. That 
13 word has not been used, as far as I know. Ms. Brown said it 
14 was referenced m responses to discovery. I — frankly, I 
15 didn't see it. I just looked. 
16 THE COURT: She mentioned correspondence, too. Did 
17 you — 
18 MR. LEE: And I do not have my correspondence file with 
19 me, your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. 
21 MR. LEE: But the affirmative defense she references, 
22 that we haven't satisfied the conditions precedent to serving 
23 our claims, is fairly vague. It certainly doesn't reference — 
24 THE COURT: Well, actually, I've thought about that a 
25 little more since I looked at it. Arbitration is not set forth 
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1 as a condition precedent to filing a suit. You don't get — 
2 MR. LEE: That's right. 
3 THE COURT: — to file suit if you pursue arbitration. 
4 MR. LEE: That's right, your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: But if you waive arbitration, then you 
6 live with that fact. 
7 MR. LEE: That's right. We're here on a motion for 
8 summary judgment. There is no motion pending to compel 
9 arbitration in this case. We've gone through the substantial 
10 proceedings that the cases look at in terms of waiver; and I 
11 think it's time to resolve this thing. 
12 THE COURT: In terms of discovery, was it all paper, 
13 interrogatories, et cetera? 
14 MR. LEE: It was all paper, that's correct. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. 
16 MR. LEE: Ms. -- the costs in this case have been, 
17 frankly, relatively low, and I think the Court makes a good 
18 point; it's time to cut off those fees and move on. Ms. Brown 
19 was quite candid when she said that if the Association had come 
20 to her and said, "We don't like your weekly rental," she would 
21 stop it. 
22 Well, they came to her three years ago, and they've 
23 talked about this issue for a couple of years. Today is the 
24 first time we've heard that she would be willing to stop it; 
25 and frankly it sounds like we've got a solution. You know, the 
-49-
1 Court's got to issue an injunction, and I agree the injunction 
2 has to be carefully crafted, to avoid the issues that Ms. Brown 
3 raises, preliminary issues. 
4 All we want is an injunction at this point, and the 
5 attorney's fees we've incurred to get to this point. I think 
6 under the circumstances, the Court has identified all of the 
7 reasons why we're entitled to it. Ms. Brown is a bright, 
8 articulate person. She is a -- as I understand it, she's 
9 m-house Counsel for a large international corporation. She 
10 knows the law. She knows what she's doing. Had she insisted 
11 on arbitration, had she wanted arbitration, she could have 
12 compelled it. 
13 THE COURT: Ms. Brown, anything else you wish to add on 
14 any issue? 
15 MS. BROWN: No, your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: All right. There really is a place for 
17 summary judgment, and one of the most important is to avoid 
18 matters going forward that only entangle people in further 
19 litigation and cost. That will very much be an outcome here 
20 if the Court does not grant summary judgment, if it is in fact 
21 warranted. 
22 I've read this with great interest. I believe the 
23 controlling — one controlling provision is Article 10(2)(a), 
24 no timeshare, nightly rental or similar use will be allowed on 
25 any single family residential lot; but also that no lot shall 
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1 be used except for single family residential purposes. 
2 Also, the overriding concern throughout the document 
3 — and I won't cite a specific here, but there is language 
4 I read a little earlier — that no business uses. That was 
5 in 16, I think, actually 10-16. Yeah, "The lands within 
6 the property shall be used exclusively for single family 
7 residential living purposes, shall never be occupied or used 
8 for any commercial or business purpose." 
9 I agree, as I said before, Ms. Brown, the evidence 
10 does not support use for a traditional business in the sense 
11 of trading out of the house or any of these items you've 
12 mentioned; but a business purpose, a short-term rental — 
13 and I know that term grates on you every time. Every time I 
14 say it, I regret saying it — but a rental for less than 30 
15 days, which I think is the appropriate definition — I think 
16 we need to import the ordinance definition of "nightly lodging 
17 facility," which is for transient lodging purposes for a period 
18 of less than 30 days, including without limitation a single 
19 family residence. 
20 That's what it says in 10, and that is what your home 
21 is. That was not contemplated — well, it was contemplated by 
22 the CC&R's to not permit such use; and the undisputed facts 
23 show that there have been such uses, and that it is contrary 
2 4 to the CC&R's to have such uses in the future. 
25 I find there are no disputed facts that prevent the 
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1 Court from making that determination; and in terms of the 
2 arbitration, there is no motion before the Court to compel 
3 arbitration and dismiss this action, which would be the 
4 appropriate way to proceed, because it's not a condition 
5 precedent to suit. It's in lieu of suit. 
6 I also believe that even if there was a motion before 
7 the Court, participation through answering the complaint, not 
8 insisting upon arbitration, participating in discovery — I'm 
9 very pleased to hear it hasn't been extensive, expensive 
10 discovery. It's always expensive, as we all know as lawyers, 
11 that nevertheless has put both sides to some prejudice. 
12 That's one of the standards in Smile vs. Bright 
13 Smile and Mass Mutual. There is a prejudice at this point 
14 in ordering arbitration; but as I say, most importantly, it's 
15 not even before the Court. I don't think the fact of an 
16 arbitration provision in the agreement can be raised at this 
17 point to defeat an otherwise meritorious summary judgment. 
18 So in short, I find that summary judgment should be 
19 granted, and injunction should enter. It should be very 
20 carefully crafted. First, Mr. Lee will take a crack at it. 
21 Then you will edit it. If you think it doesn't state the 
22 provisions, it will define the terms in 2(a), as I've stated, 
23 and it will talk about no business use. 
24 It should also make clear that Ms. Brown is not 
25 prohibited from allowing family, friends from using the 
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1 property. I don't know if the language here can work on 
2 this, but there should be someway of addressing that it's not 
3 improper to have some kind of reasonable compensation, whether 
4 it's for cleaning or whatever, for people who fall within that 
5 category, but that it may not -- I'm struggling with this one. 
6 I'm not sure the language is going to work, Mr. Lee, because 
7 we don't want to go to profit issues, because that's not the 
8 issue; but there shouldn't be a prohibition, and I don't think 
9 anyone in the subdivision or HOA wants to be prohibited from 
10 having their family come. People bring their families here at 
11 Thanksgiving and Christmas and skiing. So I don't know if 
12 you've got some language in mind for that. 
13 The main point is to separate, as you said earlier, 
14 residential from business. Family purposes, friends are not 
15 the people who you get on the Internet offering short stay. 
16 So got to work on that language a little. 
17 MR. LEE: I'll do it. 
18 THE COURT: Submit it to Ms. Brown. 
19 MR. LEE: And I'll work with Ms. Brown. 
20 THE COURT: On the fees, you are clearly entitled, as 
21 prevailing party to fees. You must submit an affidavit of 
22 those fees at any time you wish after the order is completed. 
2 3 Then, Ms. Brown, how long would you like to respond to the 
24 pleas as in terms of necessity and reasonableness? You take 
25 whatever you want. I want you to be able to address them; and 
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1 I would suggest you address them under the criteria of Dixie 
2 State Bank vs. Bracken. 
3 MS. BROWN: Could you say that again? 
4 THE COURT: Dixie State Bank vs. Bracken. Says what's 
5 reasonable and what isn't. That's the way I analyze fees. So 
6 it's helpful for me. It's a fairly old case, over 20 years, I 
7 think. Can you give me the cite, Mr. Lee? 
8 MR. LEE: I cannot, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: There are professional responsibility 
10 rules, but they're really not as important to me as the 
11 controlling case. What is your hourly rate at this time, 
12 Mr. Lee? 
13 MR. LEE: It is $250 an hour. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. 
15 MR. LEE: Very reasonable. 
16 THE COURT: Yeah. One of the standards is whether 
17 a lawyer's fee is reasonable for his or her experience, 
18 reputation, et cetera, in the community. I'm very familiar 
19 with rates here, and $250 is well within the range. In 
20 California it would be a pittance, but here it's well within 
21 the range. It's just maybe you don't want to spend too much 
22 time on that; but what you should analyze is whether the work 
23 needed to be done, et cetera, those kinds of things. 
24 So how long did you say you'd like to respond on that? 
25 MS. BROWN: Is thirty days good? 
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1 I THE COURT: Thirty. 
2 MS. BROWN: Fifteen to thirty, in that range. 
3 ( THE COURT: Thirty is fine. 
MS. BROWN: Okay. 
5 I MR. LEE: Thirty is. 
6 THE COURT: I think you're going to take a little time. 
7 J I encourage you to actually work together on the language here, 
because no one wants an order that you can't all understand; 
9 I but they're entitled to that order. 
10 MR. LEE: I think we can do that, your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: Anything else you need? 
12 MR. LEE: No, thank you. 
13 THE COURT: Thank you for your courtesy, and you have 
14 presented it well, Ms. Brown. 
15 MS. BROWN: Thank you. 
16 THE COURT: Thank you. 
17 MR. LEE: Thanks for coming up, your Honor. 
18 (Hearing concluded) 
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SEP - 2 2008 
SUMMll oUUNIV 
By
 m /hf* 
deputy Clerk _ SOUTH RIDGE HOMEOWNERS' 




LISA M. BROWN, 
Defendant. 
RULING & ORDER 
CASE NO. 070500211 
JUDGE ROBERT K. HILDER 
Currently before the Court is defendant Lisa Brown's "Motion to Tax Attorney Fees," filed 
by Ms. Brown on July 10, 2008. In her motion, defendant challenges specific costs and fees that 
plaintiff South Ridge claims entitlement to as set forth in its affidavit in support of attorney fees and 
costs. Taxation generally refers only to costs, but the Court will address both costs and fees, and 
defendant's concerns, regardless of terminology. 
1. Costs 
Costs, as referenced under Rule 54(d) are defined as "those fees which are required to be paid 
to the court and to witnesses, and which the statute authorizes to be included in the judgments." 
Frampton v Wilson 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980). This Court has substantial discretion in 
awarding costs. Some are clearly warranted costs, such as filing fees; some expenses are awarded 
only if they were necessary—perhaps even essential—to the prosecution or defense of a case, such 
as depositions used at trial; and some expenses are not taxable costs. Here, the Court agrees with 
Ms. Brown and finds that electronic research or photocopying charges are not taxable costs. 
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Accordingly, I shall award $155.00 for the filing fee and $155.00 service fees, for a total of $310.00 
in costs. 
2. Attorney's Fees 
The entitlement to fees is based in the parties contract, Article XI Section 1 which 
states that "costs of such enforcement, including reasonable attorney's fees shall be borne by the 
party(ies) in violation." The issue before the Court is whether the fees requested are both necessary 
and reasonable. The standards for determination of this question are contained in Rule 1.4, Rules 
of Professional Conduct, and case law, primarily Dixie State Bank v Bracken 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 
1988). 
Addressing those standards, the court first finds that the hourly rates charged by all three 
counsel, Mr. Lee, Ms. Schulte, and Mr. Andreason, are eminently reasonable for attorneys's of 
their respective experience levels and skill in this legal community. The court specifically notes 
that Mr. Lee is highly skilled, and the bill reflects appropriate involvement by him in both his 
own work, and in his supervision of his associates. In fact, the court sees no basis to reduce 
any of Mr. Lee's time, except perhaps by implication in the general reduction of time post-filing 
of the supplemental affidavit. 
Next, the court notes that the result was entirely favorable to plaintiff, and each element 
of work done for the plaintiff to achieve this result was necessary. The area that invites some 
reduction in the fees is the reasonableness of the amount of time spent on each task. The court 
should not nitpick a billing statement to second-guess every entry (which would also imply 
second-guessing of strategic choices to some degree), but some broad categories identified by 
2 
n n n i n a 
defendant should be adjusted in the court's discretion. By applying the following reductions the 
court is not suggesting that the time was not invested, but sometimes a choice by counsel to 
invest in excellence does not automatically translate into a reasonable charge to be imposed on 
the unsuccessful litigant under fee-shifting provisions. With that brief explanation, the court will 
require the following reductions: 
Drafting Complaint: deduct 2.0 hours @ $160.00 (EAS) = $320.00 
Initial discovery: deduct 4.0 hours @ $ 145.00 (RDA) = $580.00 
Drafting MSJ: deduct 5.8 hours @ 145.00 (RDA) = $841.00 
Drafting Reply: deduct 3.5 hours @ 145.00 (RDA) = $507.50 
Total deduction from first Affidavit and billing detail = $2,248.50. 
Finally the court limits post-initial affidavit fees to $750.00, lest this matter becomes an 
ongoing dispute over fees incurred in the collection of fees. Of course, this limitation shall not 
affect any future fees incurred in connection with enforcement of the order generally or collection 
procedures. Plaintiffs counsel are instructed to apply the costs and fees adjustments set forth 
herein. 
3. Order 
As a final matter, the court has received competing Orders. Defendant's objections are 
not well taken. To the extent defendant re-argues her opposition to plaintiffs Motion, the 
objections are overruled. Defendant contends that the Order should include Findings of Fact, but 
that is contrary to the purpose or scope of summary judgment. Findings imply that the court 
considered and weighed evidence to determine what is true. That did not occur. The court found 
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that certain facts are undisputed, and based on that determination, the court then found that 
plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs proposed Order and Judgment best 
states the court's process and its conclusion. Finally, defendant objects to a conclusion that she 
"threatens" to continue renting her residence in contravention of the CC&Rs. Based on 
defendant's statement in her objection that she has no such intention, the court has deleted that 
phrase, but plaintiff is nevertheless entitled to the injunctive relief prayed for in its complaint. 
With the one change stated, the Order proposed by plaintiff was signed on August 25, 2008. 
Dated this 29th day of August, 2008. 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 070500211 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail LISA M BROWN 
Defendant 
3 73 INMAN COURT 
DANVILLE, CA 9452 6 
Mail ERIC P LEE 
Attorney PLA 
ONE UTAH CENTER 13TH FLOOR 
201 S MAIN ST 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Dated this 2^ day of 3tfkmbty / 2 0 ^ . 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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ALAN SPRIGGSr SUilrilT COUNTY RECORDER 
1993 AUG 13 1 5 : 4 7 PJ1 FEE $ 4 0 . 0 0 BY 
REQUEST: HIGH COUNTRY TITLE 
South Ridge 
Western Summit County, Utah 
WHEN RECORDED RETURN TO: 
South Shore Group L.C. 
4115 Sunrise Drive 
Park City, UT 84060 
DECLARATION OF COVENANTS, CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS 
tor SOUTH RIDGE SUBDIVISION 
SUMMIT COUNTY, UTAH 
THIS DECLARATION made thisZgth day of July, 1993 by South Shore Group L C , a Utah 
Limrted Liability Corporation, hereinafter referred to as "Declarant": 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, Declarant is, at the time of recordation of this document, the owner of the real 
property in the County of Summit, State of Utah, described as: 
All of Lots 1 through 102, Inclusive, SOUTH RIDGE SUBDIVISION, according to the official 
plat thereof, on file and of record In the office of the Summit County Recorder. 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM ALL OF SUNRISE HILLS LOTS 44. 45, 46, 47. 46, 49, 50, S\t 52, 53. 56, 57, 
58, 59, 60, 61, 78, AND 112 AS RECORDED WTH THE SUMMIT COUNTY RECORDERS OFFICE, 
JSLSO EKCCPT/NO. TWOSC Fblt7-iON5 * * LOTS 64 AMD STS Of SU*mS£ HlU>* NOJ £M&BAC£& Sfj 
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WHEREAS, Declarant has deemed It desirable to impose a general plan for the Improvement 
and development of the portion of said tract and all of the property described herein and the adoption and 
establishment of covenants, conditions and restrictions upon said real property and each and every lot 
and portion thereof and upon the use, occupancy, and enjoyment thereof, all for the purpose of 
enhancing and protecting the value, desirability and attractiveness of said tract, and 
WHEREAS, Declarant has deemed It desirable for the efficient preservation of the value, 
desirability and attractiveness of the portion of said tract and any additional property which may be 
annexed thereto, pursuant to the provisions of this Declaration, to create a corporation to which should be 
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delegated and assigned the powers of maintaining and administering the common area and administering, 
and enforcing these covenants, conditions, and restrictions and collecting and disbursing funds pursuant 
to ihe assessments and charges hereinafter created and referred to; and 
WHEREAS, South Ridge Homeowners* Association, a nonprofit corporation, Is Incorporated 
under the laws of the State of Utah for the purpose of exercising the powers and functions aforesaid; 
NOW, THEREFORE, Declarant hereby covenants, agrees and declares that all of said lots 
and property described above and such additions thereto as may hereafter be made pursuant to 
Article II hereof shall be held, sold, and conveyed subject to the following covenants, conditions, 
restrictions and easements which are hereby declared to be for the benefit of the whole tract and all of 
the property described herein and the owners thereof, their successors and assigns. These 
covenants, conditions, restrictions, and easements shall run with the said real property and shall be 
binding on all parties having or acquiring any right, title or interest in the described real property or any 
part thereof and shall inure to the benefit of each owner thereof and are imposed upon said real 
property and every part thereof as a servitude in favor of each and every parcel thereof as the dominant 
tenement or tenements. 
ARTICLE I 
DEFINITIONS 
The following terms used In these covenants, conditions, and restrictions shall be applicable 
to this Declaration and also to any supplemental declaration recorded pursuant to Article II hereof and 
are defined as follows: 
Section 1. "Association" shall mean and refer to South Ridge Homeowners' Association, a 
nonprofit corporation, incorporated under the laws of the State of Utah, its successors and assigns. 
Section 2. "Common area" and •common facilities" shall mean all real property owned by the 
Association for the common use and enjoyment of the members of the association. 
Section 3. "Lot" shall mean any parcel of property shown as a separate numbered lot on the 
recorded Plat of the Subdivision. Each single family dwelling unit shall be deemed to be one lot for the 
purposes of this Declaration. 
Section 4, "Member" shall mean and refer to every person or entity who holds membership in 
the Association. 
Section 5t "Owner* shall mean and refer to the record owner, whether one or more persons or 
entities, of a fee simple title to any lot which is a part of the properties, including contract sellers and 
buyers, but excluding those having such interest merely as security for the performances of an obligation. 
Section 6. "Declarant" shall mean and refer to South Shore Group L.C., its successors and 
assigns. 0 0 3 8 5 0 9 6 BK00744 PG0073? 
Section 7T "Deed of Trust" shall mean the conveyance of any lot or other portion of the property 
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to secure the performance of an obligation. 
Section 8. "Conveyance" shall mean and refer to conveyance of a fee simple title to any lot., 
Section 9. "Properties" shall mean and refer to that certain real property herein before described and 
such additions thereto as hereafter may be made subject to this Declaration, and excluding any real property 
that hereafter may be withdrawn from this Subdivision pursuant to this Declaration. 
Section 10. "Subdivision" or "South Ridge" shall mean "South Ridge Subdivision" according to the 
official plats thereof recorded In the office of Summit County, State of Utah, and any subdivision hereafter 
added pursuant to the terms of this Declaration. 
Section 11. "Board of Trustees" shall mean the three (3) to six (6) Members who are 
elected by the Association to manage the Association. The initial Board of Trustees shall be: 
James A. Doilney, 1351 Moray Court, Park City, UT 84060 
Michael S. Barnes, PO Box 1980, Park City, UT 84060 
Michael J. Todd, PO Box 3384, Park City, UT 84060 
These individuals will serve as the board, until they are replaced by the Declarant or until the first 
meeting of the Association, whichever occurs first 
Section 12. "Fire Lane" shall mean the platted easement bordering lots 51 ,52,53,98,99, and 100. 
In the event an easement is established through lots 49 and/or 50 connec ting South Ridge Court to Sunrise 
Drive, such easement shall become an addition to and part of the "Fire Lane." 
ARTICLE II 
ANNEXATION QF ADDITIONAL PROPERTY 
Any real property may be annexed to and become subject to this Declaration by any of the 
methods set forth hereinafter in this Article as follows: 
Section 1 Annexation Without Approval and Pursuant to Gensral Plan. Any real property may 
be annexed to and become subject to this Declaration and subject to the jurisdiction and a part of the 
Association without the approval, assent or vote of the Association or its members, providing and on 
condition that: 
(a) Prior to the conveyance of title to any Improved tots within the real property to be annexed to 
individual purchasers thereof, fee simple title or right-of-way to the common area within said real property 
shall be conveyed to the Association, free and clear of any and all encumbrances and liens, except current 
real property taxes, which taxes shall be prorated to the date of transfer, and easements, covenants, 
conditions and restrictions then of record, including those set forth in this Declaration. 
(b) A supplementary Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and restrictions, as described 
hereinafter in Section 3 of this Article describing the real property to be annexed shall be executed and 
recorded by South Shore Group L C , the owner of said real property or its successors and assigns. The 
recordation of said Supplementary Declaration shall constitute and effectuate the annexation of the said 
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real property described therein, making said real property subject to this Declaration and subject to the 
functions, powers and jurisdiction of the Association, and thereafter all of the owners of lots in said real 
property shall immediately and automatically be members of the Association. 
Section 2 Annexation Pursuant to Approval. Upon approval in wrrting of the Association, 
pursuant to a two-thirds vote of those present at a meeting for this purpose that has been duly called of 
members including proxies who are entitled to vote, any owner of communal property, multiple family units 
and/or single family residential property and/or property for the common use of owners of such residential 
property who desire to add such property to the plan of this Declaration and to subject such property to 
the jurisdiction of the Association, may file of record a Supplementary Declaration, as described in Section 
3 of this Article. 
Section 3. Supplementary Declarations. The additions authorized under the foregoing sections 
shall be made by filing of record a Supplementary Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions 
or similar instrument, with respect to the additional property which shall extend to the plan of this 
Declaration to such property. 
Such Supplementary Declarations contemplated above may contain such complementary 
additions and modifications of the covenants, conditions and restrictions contained in this Declaration as 
may be necessary to reflect the different character, if any, of the added property and as are not 
inconsistent with the plan of this Declaration. In no event, however shall any such Supplementary 
Declaration merger or consolidation, revoke, modify or add to the covenants established by this 
Declaration within the existing property, except as hereinafter otherwise provided. 
The recordation of said Supplementary Declaration shall constitute and effectuate the 
annexation of the said real property described therein, making said real property subject to this Declaration 
and subject to the functions, powers and jurisdiction of the Association, and thereafter all of the owners of 
lots in said real Property shall automatically be members of the association. 
Section 4. Mergers or Consolidations. Upon a merger or consolidation of the Association with 
another association, as provided In Its Articles of Incorporation, its properties, rights and obligations may, 
by operation of law, be transferred to another surviving or consolidated association or, alternatively, the 
properties, rights and obligations of another association may, by operation of law, be added to the 
properties, rights and obligations of the Association as a surviving corporation pursuant to a merger. The 
surviving or consolidated association may administer the covenants, conditions and restrictions 
established by this Declaration within the existing property, together with the covenants and restrictions 
established upon any other property, as one plan. 
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ARTICLE III 
MEMBERSHIP 
Section 1. Membership. Every person or entity who is a record owner of a fee or undivided fee 
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Interest in any lot which Is subject by covenants of record to assessment by the Association, shall be a 
member of the Association. The terms and provisions set forth In this Declaration, which are binding upon 
all owners of ail lots and all members In the Association, are not exclusive, as the member shall, in addition, 
be subject to the terms and provisions of the Articles of Incorporation and the Bylaws of the Association. 
The foregoing Is not Intended to include persons or entities who hold an interest merely as security for the 
performance of an obligation. No owner shall have more than one membership for each lot owned. 
Membership shall be appurtenant to and may not be separate from the ownership of any lot which is 
subject to assessment by the Association. Ownership of such lot shall be the sole qualification for 
membership. 
Section 2. Transfer. The membership held by any owner of a lot shall not be transferred, 
pledged or alienated in any way, except upon the sale or encumbrance of such lot, and then only to the 
purchaser or deed of trust holder of such lot. Any attempt to make a prohibited transfer is void, and will not 
be reflected upon the books and records of the Association. In the event the owner of any lot should fail 
or refuse to transfer the membership registered in his name to the purchaser of such lot, the Association 
shall have the right to record the transfer upon the books of the Association. 
Section 3. Voting Rights, The Association shall have two (2) classes of voting membership. 
Class A, Class A members shall be all those owners as defined in Section 1 above with the 
exception of the Declarant. Class A members shall be entitled to one (I) vote for each lot in which they hold 
the interest required for membership by Section 1. When more than one person holds such interest In 
any lot, all such persons shall be members. The vote for such lot shall be exercised as they among 
themselves determine, but in no event shall more than one (I) vote be cast for any one lot. 
Glas&JBLThe Class B member shall be the Declarant. The Class B member shall be entitled to 
three (3) votes for each lot In which H holds the interest required for membership by Section 1. 
All voting rights shall be subject to the restrictions and limitations provided herein and in the 
Articles and Bylaws of the Association. 
ARTICLE IV 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THF COMMON AREAS 
Section 1. Members' Easemflpts of Eniovmsnt Every member shall have a right and easement 
of enjoyment in and to the common area, Fire Lane, and such easement shall be appurtenant to and shall 
pass with the title to every assessed lot, subject to the following provisions: 
(a) The right of the association to establish uniform rules and regulations pertaining to the use of 
the common area including but not limited to private streets and the recreational facilities thereof. 
(b) The right of the Association, in accordance with its Articles and Bylaws, to borrow money for 
the purpose of improving the common area and facilities and to aid thereof, to mortgage said property, 
provided that the rights of any mortgagee shall be subordinate to the rights of the members. 
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(c) The right of the Association to dedicate or transfer all or any part of the common area to any 
public agency, authority or utility, or to any association or master association or multiple homeowners 
associations for such purposes and subject to such conditions as may be agreed to by the members. No 
such dedication or transfer shall be effective unless a written Instalment pursuant to a two-thirds majority 
vote oi those present at a meeting for this purpose that has been duly called of members including 
proxies who are entitled to vote has been recorded, agreeing to such dedication or transfer, and unless 
written notice of the proposed action is sent to every member not less than ten (10) days in advance. 
However, the Declarant reserves the right to grant easements over any part of the common area or any 
other designated utility easement areas for utility purposes. 
(d) The right of the Declarant (and Its sales agents and representatives) to the non-exclusive 
use of the common area and the facilities thereof, for display and exhibit purposes in connection with the 
sale of any real property, which right Declarant hereby reserves. No such use by Declarant or its sales 
agents or representatives shall otherwise restrict the members in their use and enjoyment of the common 
areas or facilities thereof. 
Section 2. Delegation of Use. Any member may delegate, in accordance with the Bylaws, his 
right of enjoyment to the common area and facilities to the members of his family, his tenants or contract 
purchasers who reside on the property. 
Section 3. Waiver of Use. No member may exempt himself from personal liability for 
assessments duly levied by the Association, nor release the tot owned by him from the liens and charges 
hereof, by waiver of the use and enjoyment of the common area and the facilities thereon or by 
abandonment of his lot other than by sate thereof. 
Section 4. Title to the Common Area. The Declarant hereby covenants for itself, Its successors 
and assigns, that in the event ft designates any portion of the properties as a common area, that it will 
convey fee simple title or rights-of-way to such common areas in the existing property to the Association, 
free and clear of all encumbrances and Hens, except current real property taxes, which taxes shall be 
prorated to the date of transfer, and easements, conditions and resen/ations then on record, including 
those set forth In this Declaration. 
Section 5. Nothing in this Declaration shall be construed to obligate Declarant to 
designate or provide any part of the properties as common area. 
ARTICLE V 
COVENANT FOR MAINTENANCE ASSESSMENTS 
Section 1 Creation of the lien and Personal Obligation of Assessments. Each member, by 
acceptance of a real estate contract or deed therefor, covenants and agrees to pay to the Association: (I) 
regular assessments or charges, and (2) special assessments for capital Improvements, and other 
Association purposes, such assessments to be fixed, established and collected from time to time as 
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hereinafter provided, and shall be a continuing lien upon the Lot against which each such assessment is 
made. Each such assessment together with any interest, costs and reasonable attorney's fees, shall also 
be the personal obligation of the owner of such property at the time when the assessment fell due. In any 
conveyance, except to a mortgagee holding a first lien on the subject Lot, the grantee of a Lot shall be 
Jointly and severally liable with the grantor for all unpaid assessments against the latter up to the time of the 
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grant or conveyance, without prejudice to the grantee's nght to recover from the grantor the amounts paid 
by the grantee. However, any such grantee shall be entitled to a statement from the Board of Trustees 
setting forth the amounts of the unpaid assessments against the grantor, and such grantee shall not be 
liable for, nor shall the Lot conveyed by subject to a lien for, any unpaid assessments against the grantor in 
the excess of the amount set forth. No membership may be transferred to a subsequent purchaser until all 
assessments, interest, penalties and other charges that are due have been paid in full to the Association. 
Section 2. Purpose of Assessments. The assessments levied by the Association shall be used 
exclusively for the purpose of promoting the recreation, health, safety and welfare of the members of the 
Association and, in particular, for the improvement and maintenance of the properties, Fire Lane, services, 
and facilities devoted to this purpose and related to the use and enjoyment of the common area. 
Following initial improvement of the Fire Lane by the Declarant, the improvement and maintenance of the 
Fire Lane, including snow removal, shall be the obligation of the Association. 
Section 3. Regular Assessments. The amount and time of payment of regular assessments 
shall be determined by the Board of Trustees of the Association after giving due consideration to the 
current maintenance costs and future needs of the Association. Written notice of the amount of an 
assessment, regular or special, shall be sent to every owner, and the due date for the payment of same 
shall be set forth in said notice. 
Section 4. Special Assessments. In addition to the regular assessments authorized above, the 
Association may levy special assessments for the purpose of defraying, in whole or in part, the cost of any 
construction or reconstruction, repair or replacement of a capital improvement upon the common area, 
including fixtures and personal property related thereto, or costs incurred for any other Association 
purpose, provided that any such assessment shall have the assent of a majority of the Members entitled to 
vote at a meeting duly called for this purpose. Written notice of such meeting shall be sent to all Members 
not less than ten (10) calendar days nor more than thirty (30) calendar days in advance of the meeting. 
Section 5. Uniform Rate of Assessment. Both regular and special assessments shall be fixed at 
an identical rate for all lots owned by members and may be collected monthly or at such other times as the 
Board may determine. If an assessment for improvements of costs is more or less beneficial to one or more 
types of lots (single family residential, multiple dwelling condominium, commercial) such assessments may 
be levied at a rate reflecting such difference in benefits. 0 0 3 8 5 0 9 6 B K O Q 7 U PG00744 
Section 6. Data of Commencement of Regular Assessments and Fixing Thereof, The regular 
assessments provided for herein shall commence as to all lots on the first day of the month following the 
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purchase of each lot to an individual owner. Monthly, quarterly or annual assessments will be payable as 
designated by the Board of Trustees of the Association. 
Section 7. Certificate of Payment. The Association shall, upon the written request of any Lot 
owner or any encumbrancer or prospective encumbrancer of a Lot, and upon payment of a reasonable fee 
not to exceed $10, fssue to the requesting person or persons, a written statement setting forth the 
unpaid assessments with respect to the Lot covered by the request. This written statement of 
Indebtedness is conclusive upon the remaining Lot owners in favor of all persons who rely thereon in 1 
good faith. Unless the Association complies with the request for a statement of indebtedness within ten 
(10) days, all unpaid assessments, which became due prior to the date of the making of such request are 
subordinate to the lien held by the person requesting the statement. Any encumbrancer holding a lien 
payable with respect to the Lot and upon payment the encumbrancer shall have a lien on such Lot for the 
amounts paid of the same rank as the lien of his Lot. 
Section 8. Exempt Property. The following property subject to this Declaration shall be exempt 
from the assessments created herein: 
(a) All properties dedicated to and accepted by a local government or public authority; and 
(b) The common area, if any. 
ARTICLE VI 
NONPAYMENT OF ASSESSMENTS 
Section t. Delinquency. Any assessment provided for in this Declaration, which is not paid 
when due, shall be delinquent. With respect to each assessment not paid within fifteen (15) days after its 
due date, the Association may, at its election, require the Owner to pay a "late charge" in the sum to be 
determined by the Association, but not to exceed $100 per year. If any such assessment is not paid 
within thirty (30jhdays after the delinquency date, the assessment shall bear interest from the date of 
delinquency at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum, and the Association may, at its option, 
bring an action at law against any person obligated to pay the same, or, upon compliance with the notice 
provisjor)^ set forth in .^ntinn 2 {lergof, to foreclose the lien (provided for the Section 1 of Article V 
hereof) against the Lot, and there shall be added to the amount of such assessment aHY la*e charges, 
interest and all costs of collecting the same, including a reasonable qyome/5 fpe. whether incurred by 
filing suit or not. Each Owner vests in the Association or its assigns, the right and power to bring all actions 
at law or in equity or lien foreclosure against all proper parties for the collection of such delinquent 
assessments. 
{Section 2. Notice of Llep. No action shall be brought to foreclose said assessment lien or to 
proceed under the power of sale, provided herein, prior to thirty (30) days after the date a notice of claim of 
lien Is deposited In the United States mail, certified or registered, to the owner of said lot. 
Section 3. Foreclosure Sale. Any such foreclosure and subsequent sale provided for above is 
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to be conducted in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah relating to liens, mortgages, and deeds 
of trust. The Association, through Its duly authonzed agents, shall have the power to bid on the lot at 
foreclosure sate, and to acquire and hold, lease, mortgage, and convey the same. 
Section 4. Curing of Default. Upon the timely curing of any default for which a notice of claim of 
lien was filed by the Association, the officers of the Association are hereby authonzed to file or record, as 
the case may be, an appropnate release of such notice, upon payment by the defaulting owner of a fee, to 
be determined by the Association, but not to exceed $50 to cover the costs of prepanng and filing or 
recording such release, together with payment of such other costs, interest or fees as shall have been 
incurred. 
Section 5. Cumulative Remedies. The assessment lien and the rights to foreclosure and sale 
thereunder shall be in addition to and not in substitution for all other rights and remedies which the 
Association and its assigns may have hereunder and by law, including a suit to recover a money judgment 
for unpaid assessments, as above provided. 
Section 6. Subordination of Assessment Liens. If any lot subject to a monetary lien created by 
any provision hereof shall be subject to the lien of a deed of trust: (I) the foreclosure of any lien created by 
anything set forth in this Declaration shall not operate to affect or impair the lien of such deed of trust; and 
(2) the foreclosure of the lien of deed of trust or the acceptance of a deed in lieu of foreclosure of the 
deed of trust shall not operate to affect or impair the lien hereof, except that the lien hereof for said 
charges as shall have accrued to the foreclosure or the acceptance of the deed in itpu of foreclosure shall 
be subordinate to the lien of the deed of trust, with the foreclosure-purchaser or deed-in-lieu grantee 
taking title free of the lien hereof for all said charges that have accrued up to the time of the foreclosure of 
deed given in lieu of foreclosure, but subject to the lien hereof for all said charges that shall accrue 
subsequent to the foreclosure or deed given in lieu of foreclosure. 
ARTICLE VII 
ARCHITECTURAL CONTROL 
It is the intent of the Declarant to build all the homes within the subdivision. Homes built by the 
Declarant, whether part of the Association as defined herein or part of a larger Association expanded to 
incorporate additional lots, shall be required to comply with the architectural intent of this section, but not 
required to complete the filings specified herein. All other parties shall be required to complete the filings 
specified herein. 
Section 1. Approval bv Architectural Cflrrimrttee. No building, fence, wall, or any other structure 
shall by commenced, erected, or maintained upon the properties, nor shall any extenor addition to or 
change or alteration therein be made, nor shall any excavating, alteration of any stream, waterway, pond, 
or cleanng, removal of shrubs or trees or landscaping on any lot within the properties be done unless a 
written application is submitted for approval of such improvement or improvements to the Architectural 
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Committee and in connection therewith shall submit two complete sets of plans and specifications for the 
proposed improvement or Improvements, together with a reasonable processing fee as determined by 
the Architectural Committee. For buildings, such submittal shall Include: 
(a) An overall view of the proposed Improvement or improvements. 
(b) The location of said Improvement or improvements on the lot upon which it or they will be 
placed or constructed and the location of the proposed improvement or improvements relative to other 
improvements on said lot. 
(c) Floor plans of each floor level. 
(d) The basic structural system of the improvement or improvements and the materials to be 
used in the construction thereof. 
(e) Elevations. 
(f) Provision for temporary and permanent paricmg of vehicles in connection with use of the 
facility. 
(g) Design and layout of proposed sewage lines to sewer system, 
(h) Proposed time schedule for construction to completion. 
(i) A survey acceptable to the Architectural Committee locating lot corners and the proposed 
building position. 
(|) Any additional demands or requirements for culinary or irrigation water. 
(k) Specifications for water conserving plumbing fixtures in compliance with Article X Section 14 
herein. 
Section 2. The Architectural Committee shall not give rts consent to the proposed improvement 
unless, in the opinion of the Architectural Committee, the improvement is property designed and the 
design, contour, materials, shapes, colors, and general character of the improvement shall be in harmony 
with existing structures on the lot and on neighboring lots, and in harmony with the surrounding 
landscape, and the improvements shall be designed and located upon the lot so as to minimize the 
disruption to the natural land forms. 
Section 3. The Architectural Committee shall have the right to disapprove any application in the 
event said application and the plans and specifications submitted therewith are not of sufficient detail, or 
are not in accordance with the provisions herein set forth, or if the design or constaiction of the proposed 
improvement is not in harmony with neighboring improvements and the general surroundings, or if the 
design and the plans for construction do not include sufficient safeguards for preservation of the 
environment. The decision of the Architectural committee shall be final, binding and conclusive on all of 
the parties affected. At no time will the Arcnrtectural Committee unreasonably restrict or refuse any 
proposed improvement. 0 0 3 S 5 0 9 6 BK00744 PG00747 
Section 4. Declarant reserves the right to change, at any time, the bounds and area of any lot 
owned by rt provided such change does not adversely affect the access to any lot sold to a third party, and 
that such change has been approved and Is in accordance with the various county, state, and/or federal 
regulations controlling this Subdivision. 
Section 5. Non-Waiver. The approval of the Architectural Committee of any plans, drawings, or 
specifications for any work done or proposed, or in connection with any other matter, requiring the 
approval of the Architectural Committee under these restrictions, shall got be deemed to constitute a 
waiver of any right to withhold approval as to any similar plan, drawing, specification or matter whenever 
subsequently or additionally submitted for approval. Upon approval or disapproval of the plans by the 
Architectural Committee, one set of plans shall be returned to the lot owner and one set shall be retained 
by the Committee. If the Architectural Committee fails to approve or disapprove such design and location 
within thirty (30) days after said plans and specifications have been submitted to It, approval will not be 
required and this Article will be deemed to have been fully complied with. In order to obtain such approval, 
the owner must submit for consideration of the Architectural Committee such details and information with 
relation to the contemplated action as the Architectural Committee shall request. 
Section 6. Professional Assistance. If at any time the Architectural Committee shall determine 
that it would be in the best Interest of the members and owners of the Subdivision for such owner to 
employ professional assistance, to design any improvement involved in the proposed work, the 
Architectural Committee shall inform such owner in writing of Its determination, whereupon all plans and 
specifications shall be prepared by such qualified professionals as the Architectural Committee shall 
determine at the expense of such owner. 
Section 7. Landscaping Control. Each member shall maintain his lot in an attractive and safe 
manner so as not to detract from the community. 
Section 8. Architectural Committee Rules. The Architectural Committee may, from time to time 
and in its sole discretion adopt, amend, and repeal by unanimous vote, rules and regulations to be known 
as "Architectural Committee Rules- which, among other things interpret or Implement the provisions of 
Section 1 to be applied to all improvements occurring or commencing after such adoption, amendment, or 
repeal. A copy of the Architectural Committee Rules as they may from time to time be adopted, amended 
or repealed, certified by any member of the Architectural Committee, shall be available from the 
Architectural Committee. 
Section 9. Building and Landscaping Time Restrictions. The exterior construction of all 
structures shall be completed within one (1) year following commencement of construction. The front 
yard of each lot shall be landscaped within a period of one (1) year following completion or occupancy of 
each dwelling. Side and rear yards shall be landscaped within a period of two (2) years following 
completion or occupancy of each dwelling. 0 0 3 8 5 0 9 6 B K 0 0 7 U PG00748 
All members of the Association possessing vacant lots shall be responsible for keeping such 
lots clean in appearance and free from all refuse and potential fire hazards. No vacant lot shall be used for 
storage of any kind except during the construction period. 
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Section 10. Appointment of Architectural Committee. The Declarant shall appoint the 
Architectural Committee, consisting of not less than three (3) members for a term not to exceed three (3) 
years. In the event of the death or resignation of any member of the Committee, the Board of Trustees of 
the Association, with the approval of the Declarant, shall appoint such members successor. 
Section 11. Liability. Neither the Architectural Committee nor any member thereof shall be liable 
to any owner or third persons for any damage, loss or prejudice suffered or claimed on account of: (a) the 
approval or disapproval of any plans, drawings and specifications, whether or not defective; (b) the 
construction or performance of any wortc, whether or not pursuant to approved plans, drawings and 
specifications; or (c) the development or manner of development of any property within the subdivision. 
Section 12. General Provisions. The powers and duties of such Committee shall be in force for a 
period of forty (40) years from the date of recording of this Declaration. Such powers and duties shall 
continue following the forty year period unfil a written instrument has been executed and duly recorded by 
the then record owners of a majority of the lots appointing a representative or representatives who shall 
thereafter exercise the same powers previously exercised by said Committee. Said representatives may 
be the members of the Board of Trustees of the Association. 
Section 13. Variances, A petition may be filed for a variance by any owner. The Architectural 
Committee may, in its sole discretion, by an affirmative vote of a majority of the members of the 
Architectural Committee, allow reasonable variances as to any of the covenants and restrictions contained 
in this instrument, on such terms and conditions as it shall require. 
ARTICLE Ylll 
DUTIES AND POWERS OF THE ASSOCIATION 
Section 1, Duties and Powers, in addition to the duties and powers enumerated in the Articles 
of Incorporation and By-laws, or elsewhere provided for herein, and without limiting the generality thereof, 
the Association shall: 
(a) Own and/or maintain and otherwise manage all of the Fire Lane, common areas and all 
facilities, improvements and landscaping thereon, including but not limited to the private streets and street 
fixtures, any under drain system, and all other property acquired by the Association. 
(b) Pay any real and person property taxes and other changes assessed against the common 
areas. 
(c) Have the authority to obtain, for the benefit of all of the common areas, all water, gas, sanitary 
sewer, electncal, and refuse collection services. 
(d) Grant easements where necessary to utilities and sewer facilities over the common areas to 
serve the common areas and the lots. 0 0 3 8 5 0 9 6 BK007*4 PG0074? 
(e) Maintain such policy or policies of insurance as the Board of Trustees of the Association 
deems necessary or desiraoie in furthering the purposes of and protecting the interest of the Association 
and its members. 
(f) Have the authority to employ a manager or other persons and to contract with Independent 
contractors or managing agents to perform all or any part of the duties and responsibilities of the 
Association. 
(g) Have the power to establish and maintain a working capital and contingency fund in an 
amount to be determined by the Board of Trustees of the Association. 
(h) Have the power to: establish uniform maintenance standards for all Lots; lien any Lot. 
whether improved with a building or buildings or not, which is not being properly maintained as 
determined by the Board of Trustees; and enter any Lot to perform required maintenance on ths Lot of 
the exterior surface of buildings. 
ARTICLE IX 
EASEMENTS 
Section 1. The rights and duties of the owners of lots within the properties with respect to 
sanitary sewer and water, electricity, solar heating systems, gas, telephone, cable television lines and 
drainage facilities shall be governed by the following: 
(a) Wherever sanitary sewer connections and/or water connections or electricity, gas or 
telephone and cable television lines, solar heating systems, or drainage facilities are installed within the 
properties, which connections, lines or facilities, or any portion hereof lie in or upon lots owned by the 
Association or other than the owner of a lot served by said connections, the Association and the owners 
of any lot served by said connections, lines or facilities shall have the right, and are hereby granted an 
easement to the full extent necessary thereof, to enter upon the lots or to have utility companies or 
service companies enter upon the lots within the properties in or upon which said connections, lines or 
facilities, or any portion thereof, lie, to repair, replace and generally maintain said connections as and when 
the same may be necessary as set forth below. 
(b) Wherever sanitary sewer connections and/or water connections or electricity, gas or 
telephone or cable television lines, solar heating systems, or drainage facilities are installed within the 
properties, which connections serve more than one lot, the owner of each lot served by said connections 
shall be entitled to the full use and enjoyment of such portions of said connections as service his lot. 
Section 2. Easements over the lots and common area properties for the installation and 
maintenance of electric, telephone, cable television, water, gas, and sanitary sewer lines, drainage 
facilities, solar heating systems, and street entrance ways as shown on the recorded tract map of the 
properties, or other documents of record, are hereby reserved by Declarant, together with the right to 
grant and transfer the same for the use and benefit of the members of the Association. 
Section 3. Easements for installation and maintenance of utilities and drainage facilities are 
reserved as shown on the recorded Plat and typically within ten feet of any lot boundary. Notwithstanding 
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the preceding sentence, owners are advised that easement dimensions change on specific lots as noted 
on the recorded Plat. Within these easements, no structure, including bridges, planting or other materials 
shall be placed or permitted to remain which may damage or interlere with the installation and maintenance 
of utilities, or which may change the direction of flow of water through drainage channels in the 
easements. The easement area of each lot and ail improvements in it shall be maintained continuously by 
the owner of the lot, except for those improvements for which a public authority or utility company is 
responsible. 
Section 4. No fences may be built closer than ten feet to the rear or side lot line without 
approval by the Architectural Committee. Any fences built at more than ten feet, but less than eighteen 
feet from the rear lot line, may be subject to temporary removal at lot owner's expense in order to allow 
access for maintenance of the drainage facilities. 
ARTICLE X 
USE RESTRICTIONS 
The general objectives and Intent of these covenants, restrictions and conditions is to create and 
maintain a large residential district characterized by the following; single family homes, private parks, open 
spaces and/or playgrounds; well kept lawns, trees and other plantings; minimum vehicular traffic; and quiet 
residential conditions favorable to family living. 
Section 1. Zoning Regulations. The lands within the properties shall newer be occupied or used 
by or for any building or purpose or in any manner which is contrary to the planning and zoning ordinances 
and regulations applicable thereto validly enforced from time to time. 
Section 2, Land Use and Building Type, 
(a) No lot shall be used except for single family residential purposes. No buildings shall be 
erected, altered, placed or permitted to remain on any lot other than one detached single family dwelling 
not to exceed two stories in height exclusive of basement. No timeshare, nightly rental or similar use will 
be allowed on any single family residential lot. The structures existing on lots 101 and 102 at the time of 
this declaration are exempted from this section. 
(b) No single story dwelling shall be erected or placed on any tot in the subdivision with floor 
space in said dwelling of less than 1200 square feet on the ground level; excluding garage and patio. 
(c) Two-story dwellings shall have at least 1500 square feet, exclusive of garage and patio. 
(d) All single family dwellings may include the following accessory building and structures not 
used for residential occupancy; an attached private garage for the storage of not more than four 
automobiles; greenhouses for private use only; and one small storage shed. 
(e) Every single family dwelling must have a minimum of a two-car garage. 
(f) Driveways for single family dwellings must be large enough to accommodate two parked 
automobiles side by side. 
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(g) No fences shall be allowed In the front yards or in side yards from the average front line of the 
dwelling forward or, If in side yards of corner lots which face the street, closer than 5 feet to the property 
line. Hedges and landscaping will be permitted if it does not Interfere with driving visibility. 
Section 3. Lot Area No single family dwelling or associated building shall be erected or placed 
on any lot containing less than 7000 square feet without written approval of the Architectural Committee. 
Section 4. Building Location, The goal of building location standards is to place the home as 
close to the street as logical to hold site topography changes to a minimum and minimize grading on the 
site. This philosophy will allow the disturbance of natural land forms and vegetation to be minimized. In no 
event shall any garage door be closer than twenty (20) feet to the top back of the curb, in order to 
guarantee two, off road, uncovered parking stalls on every driveway. No single family dwelling or 
associated building shall be tocated on any lot nearer than five (5) feet to the road right-of-way line, except 
for garage doors, which must be located at least ten (10) feet from such right-of-way, or nearer than ten 
(10) feet to the rear or side lot lines. Notwithstanding any language in this Section to the contrary, if 
easements for utilities, drainage, or other purposes as shown on the recorded Plat require a greater 
setback from the front, rear, or side lot line than that provided for in this Section, the requirements of the 
recorded Plat shall control. 
Section 5. Height Requirements No single family dwelling shall be erected to a height which is 
greater than thirty five (35) feet above fire fighting grade. 
Section 6. Re contouring, Except as performed by the Declarant during the initial construction of 
each home and the subdivision Improvements, no lot shall be re contoured in excess of four feet excluding 
grading for purposes of basement construction, without prior written approval of the Architectural Committee. 
Section 7. Nuisances, No noxious or offensive activity shall be carried on upon any lot, nor shall 
anything be done thereon which may be or may become an annoyance or nuisance to the neighborhood. 
Section 8. Temporary Structures. No structure of a temporary character, trailer, mobile home, 
basement, tent, shack, garage, bam or other outbuilding shall be used on any lot at any time as a 
residence either temporarily, meaning two or more days, or permanently. No temporary structure, house 
trailer, mobile home, camper, or non-permanent outbuilding shall ever be placed or erected on any lot 
except with the approval of the Architectural Committee and only then during construction. No dwelling 
house on any lot shall be occupied In any manner prior to its completion without a written approval of the 
Architectural Committee. No old or secondhand structures shall be moved onto any of said lots, unless 
granted by a variance. The intention hereof is that all dwellings and other buildings to be erected on said 
lots, or within said subdivision, shall be new construction of good quality workmanship and materials. This 
Section 8 does not apply to any structure being used by Declarant, any of its employees, sub-contractors 
or otherwise for construction purposes during the construction period . n n 3 8 5 0 9 6 BKQ07W P B 0 0 7 5 2 
Section 9. Overnight Parking and Storage of Vehicles. No vehicle of any kind, including but not 
limited to, automobiles, trucks, buses, tractors, trailers, camping vehicles, boats, boat trailers, 
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snowmobiles, mobile homes, two and three wheeled motor vehicles, or other wheeled vehicles shall be 
permitted to be parked on any public street within the subdivision project between the hours of 1:00 
o'clock A.M. and 10:00 A.M. of any morning or at any other time while it is snowing. The storage of any 
automobiles, trucks, buses, tractors, trailers, camping vehicles, boats, boat trailers, snowmobiles, mobile 
homes, two and three wheeled motor vehicles, or other wheeled vehicles shall be forbidden unless such 
vehicles are kept from the view of the general public common areas and/or vehicular traffic, with such 
screening approved by the Architectural Committee.. 
Section 10, Pets. No animals, other than house pets, shall be kept or maintained. These 
animals shall be contained or otherwise controlled at all times and shall be restricted to two per household. 
Individual owners will be responsible to control their lots so that dust, noise and odor do not become a 
problem to the property owners. Animal privileges may be revoked by the Association if the owner does 
not adhere to the above restrictions. 
Section 11, Sfons. No sign of any kind shall be displayed to the public view on any lot except 
legal notices and one professional sign of not more than two (2) square feet, one sign of not more than 
three (3) square feet advertising the property for sale or rent, or signs used by a builder to advertise the 
property during the construction and sale. 
Section 12. Oil and Mining Operations. No oil drilling, oil development operations, oil refining, 
quarrying or mining operations of any kind shall be permitted upon any lot, or in any lot, nor shall oil wells, 
tanks, tunnels, mineral excavations or shafts be permitted upon or in any lot. No derrick or other structures 
designed for use in boring for oil, oil products, or natural gas shall be erected, maintained or permitted 
upon any lot. 
Section 13. Garbage and Refuse Disposal. No lot shall be used or maintained as a dumping 
ground for rubbish, trash, garbage or other waste. Such trash, rubbish, garbage or other waste shall not 
be kept except in sanitary containers. No rubbish, trash, papers, junk or debris shall be burned upon any 
lot except that trash may be burned inside homes that are properly equipped with inside incinerator units. 
Garbage and trash receptacles shall be permitted when kept in a visually screened enclosure and 
contained in covered containers. 
Section 14. Sewage Disposal. Waste Disposal and Water Supply. No individual sewage disposal 
system or water supply systems shall be permitted on any tot nor may any owner pump water from or 
impound any stream, waterway or pond at any time for any purpose. 
All homes and common area facilities shall be fitted and furnished with water conserving toilets, 
faucets, shower heads and such other water conserving devices as approved by South Ridge Mutual 
Water Company Inc. 
Section 15. Sight Distance at Intersections. No fence, wall, hedge or shrub planting which 
obstructs sight lines at elevations between two and six feet above the roadways shall be placed or 
permitted to remain on any comer lot within the triangular area formed by the street property lines and a 
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line connecting them at points twenty-five (25) feet from the intersection of the street lines, or in the case 
ot a rounded property corner from the intersection of the street property lines extended. The same sight-
line limftations shall apply on any lot within ten (10) feet from the intersection of a street property line with 
the edge of a driveway or alley pavement. No tree shall be permitted to remain within such distances of 
such intersection unless the foliage line Is maintained at sufficient height to prevent obstruction of such 
sight lines. 
Section 16. No Business Uses. The lands within the property shall be used exclusively for 
single family residential living purposes and shall never be occupied or used for any commercial or 
business purpose other than traditional home business conducted within the home and except that the 
Declarant or its duly authorized agent may use any tot owned by Declarant as a sales off be, sales model, or 
property office or rental office, and with the further exception that any owner or his duly authorized agent 
may rent or lease said owner's residential building from time to time. 
Section 17. No Re-Subdivision. No lot shall be re subdivided, and only one single family 
residence shall be constructed or allowed to remain per lot. 
Section 18. Underground Utility Llne^ All permanent water, gas. electrical, telephone and 
television cables, other electronic pipes and lines and all other utility lines within the limits of the property 
must be buried underground and may not be exposed above the surface of the ground. 
Section 19. Maintenance of Property, All lots and all improvements on any lot shall be kept and 
maintained by the owner thereof in a dean, safe, attractive and sightly condition and good repair. 
Section go. No Hazardous Activities, No activity shall be conducted on any lot and no 
improvements constructed on any lot which are or might be unsafe or hazardous to any person or party. 
Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, no firearms shall be discharged upon any lot. and no open 
fires shall be lighted or permitted on any lot except in a contained barbecue unit while attended and in use 
for cooking purposes or within safe and well designed interior fireplaces. 
Section 21. Dwelling Construction and Fence Restrictions. In order to promote a harmonious 
community development and protect the character of the neighborhood, the following guidelines are set 
out: 
(a) Dwelling style, design, alterations or addition will conform to standards determined by the 
Architectural Committee. 
(b) Exterior construction materials will be limited to stone, wood, wood siding, or stucco and shall 
be in earth tones indigenous to the area and approved by the Architectural Committee. No reflective finish 
other than glass shall be used on exterior surfaces other than surfaces of hardware fixtures, including but 
without limitation, the exterior surfaces of any of the following: roofs, all projections above roofs, retaining 
walls, doors, trim, fences, pipes, equipment, and only mailboxes approved by the Architectural Commrttee 
or required by the U.S. Postal Service. 0 0 3 8 5 0 9 6 &K00744 P G0075* 
(c) Roof design shall be limited to a minimum of a 4/12 pitch unless otherwise approved by the 
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Architectural Committee Roofs shall be constructed so that no reflective surfaces are visible by other 
property owners. 
(d) Location of all storage or utility buildings, garbage and refuse containers, air conditioning 
equipment, clothes drying lines, and utility pipes, etc., must be placed at the rear of the dwelling and 
located on the site in such a manner as not to be conspicuous from the frontage street. 
(e) Any light used to illuminate garages, patios, parking areas or for any other purpose shall be 
so arranged as to reflect light away from adjacent residences and away from the vision of passing 
motonsts. 
(?) Fences or walls shall be of wood. No fences or walls of chain link, wire mesh, bnck or concrete 
block (except for architectural concrete block approved by the Architectural Committee) shall be allowed 
Fences, walls or hedges shall not exceed six feet in height. 
Section 22. Off-Road Vehicles. No automobiles, trucks, motorcycles, trail bikes, snowmobiles, 
four-wheel drive vehicles or vehicles of any kind shall be operated on any of the Declarant's property 
wherever the same may be situated or any place on the subdivision other than the public roadways. 
Section 23. Pnvate Area: Uses. Restrictions. The Architectural Committee or its duly authorized 
agents shall have the nght, at any time, and from time to time without any liability to the Owner for trespass 
or otherwise to enter upon any private area for the purpose (I) of removing any improvement constructed, 
reconstructed, refimshed, altered, or maintained upon such pnvate area in violation of these covenants, 
(2) of restoring or otherwise reinstating such private areas, and (3) of otherwise enforcing without any 
limitation, all of the restnctions set forth in this Declaration. No improvement, excavation or other work 
which in any way alters any pnvate area from its natural or improved state existing on the date such pnvate 
area was first sold shall be made or done except upon strict compliance with this Declaration. 
Section 24. Removal of Natural Foliage. No trees shall be removed except as is absolutely 
necessary for the ingress and egress and construction of the dwelling and other structures on the lot 
without the prior written approval of the Architectural Committee. 
Section 25. Restoration of Cut and Fill. Declarant shall be responsible for restoration of cut and fill 
slopes between the back of the curb and each respective property. All cut or fill slopes shall be restored as 
per Declarant's landscaping plan for such area at the sole expense of the Declarant. 
Section 26. Rules regarding Fires. No extenor fires whatsoever, except barbecue fires contained in 
receptacles provided therefor, shall be allowed. 
Section 27. Antennas. No antenna of any sort, either installed or maintained, which is visible from 
the front of neighbonng properties shall be allowed No satellite dishes shall be permitted except as may be 
albwed by the architectural rules. 0 0 3 S 5 0 9 6 BK00744 PG00755 
Section 2B. Rules and Regulations. No owner shall violate the rules and regulations for the use of 
the lots as adopted from time to time by the Association. No such rules and regulations shall be established 
which violate the intention or provisions of this Declaration or which shall unreasonably restrict the use of any 
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lot by the owner hereof. 
ARTICLE XI 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Section 1. Enforcement. The Association, shall have the right to enforce, by any proceeding at law 
or in equity, including injunctive proceedings, all restrictions, conditions, covenants, reservations, liens and 
charges now or hereafter imposed by the provisions of this Declaration. Proper notice under this Section 
shall be defined to require written notice of any action authorized under this Section to be sent to the 
affected Member by certified mall at the Member's Lot address not less than ten (10) calendar days prior to 
taking any such action. Failure by the Association or by any Owner to enforce any covenant or restriction 
herein contained shall In no event be deemed a waiver of the right to do so thereafter. Costs of such 
enforcement, including reasonable attorney's fees, shall be borne by the party(ies) in violation. 
Section 2. Term. These covenants are to run with the land and shall be binding on all parties and all 
persons claiming under them for a period of forty (40) years from the date these covenants are recorded, after 
which time said covenants shall be automatically extended for successive periods of ten (10) years unless an 
instrument signed by a majority of the then owners of the lots has been recorded, agreeing to change said 
covenants in whole or in part. 
Section 3. Severability. Invalidation of any one of these covenants by judgment or court order shall 
in no way affect any of the other provisions which shall remain In full force and effect. 
Section 4. Amendments. At any time while any provision, covenant, condition or restriction 
contained in this Declaration or amendment thereto is in force and effect, it may be amended or repealed by 
the recording of a written Instrument specifying the amendment or repeal, executed by owners representing 
a majority of the combined votes of both classes of membership entitled to vote. It is Intended by this 
paragraph that the Declarant having three (3) votes per lot owned, as per Article III, Section 3 above, shall 
have sufficient votes, by itself, to amend this Declaration until such time as 75% or more of the lots within the 
properties are owned by Class A members. 
Section 5. Consent to Future Zoning. Each lot owner hereby acknowledges receipt of a copy of 
this Declaration and of Declarants master plan and acknowledges that Declarant may request zoning 
changes from time to time to permit smaller residential lots, multiple family and commercial use of Declarant's 
land. Each lot owner for himself, his successors and assigns hereby consents to and covenants not to object 
to any application made by Declarant for a change in zoning permitting the use of any of Declarant's land for 
smaller residential lots, multiple family uses and commercial use, including but not limited to duplexes, 
fourplexes, apartments, condominiums, offices, etc. Each lot owner for himself, his successors and assigns, 
covenants and agrees to execute any and all instruments in writing that may be required or needed by 
Declarant to obtain such zoning change or changes. 0 0 3 S 5 0 9 A B K 0 0 7 U PGOG756 
Secffon 6. Withdrawal of Properties. The trustees of the Association shall have the authority to 
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withdraw any common area lot or lots from the operation of this Declaration prior to the sale of said lot or lots so 
that said common area lot or lots shad not thereafter be subject to any of ihe provisions of this Declaration. 
Section 7. Llfnrted Liability. Neither Declarant, the Association, the Trustees of the Association, 
the Architectural Committee, nor any Member, Agent, Representative, Officer, Director or employee of 
any of the same shall be liable to any party for any action or for any failure to act with respect to any matter 
pertaining or contemplated by this Declaration, provided, however, that this limited liability shall not apply if 
the loss, expense or liability involved resulted from the willful misconduct or gross negligence of such 
person. Covenants, conditions or restrictions herein contained nor the enforcement of any lien provisions 
herein shall defeat or render invalid the lien of any deed of trust made in good faith and for value, but all of 
said covenants, conditions and restrictions shall be binding upon and effective against any owner whose 
title is derived through foreclosure of trusteed sale, or otherwise. 
Section 8. Singular Includes Plural. Whenever the context of this Declaration requires same, the 
singular shall include the plural and the masculine shall include the feminine. 
Section 9. Nuisance, The result of every act or omission whereby any provision, condition, 
restriction, covenant, easement or reservation contained in this Declaration is violated in whole or in part is 
hereby declared to be and constitutes a nuisance and every remedy allowed by law or equity against a 
nuisance either public or private, shall be applicable against every such result and may be exercised by the 




Any controversy, claim or dispute arising out of or related to this Declaration of Covenants, 
Conditions and Restrictions, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the 
Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon ihe award 
rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. Furthermore, it is 
agreed by any and all parties to this Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions that any and all 
fees of the American Arbitration Association shall be paid, in advance, on a pro-rata basis by the parties to 
such arbitration, or at such time as specified by the American Arbitration Association. 
In the event the Association becomes involved in any controversy, claim, or dispute, regardless 
of the cause, it shall attempt to avoid litigation by offering to settle through the use of binding arbitration in 
accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment 
upon the award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Declarant has executed this instrument the day and year first herein 
above written. 
SOUTH SHORE GROUP LC. 
Michael S. Barnes, 
Manager 
STATE OF UTAH 
SS. 




Michael J. Todd, 
Manager 
BEFORE ME, a Notary Public in and for said county and state, on this Z8th day of July, 1993, 
personally appeared James A. Doilney, Michael S. Barnes and Michael J. Todd known to me to be the 
Managers of South Shore Group LC. f the Managers that executed the within instrument on behalf of the 
corporation therein named, and acknowledged to me that such corporation executed the same. 
Notary Pubilo 
 I'UDUO . 
ROBERT 6. RODMAN J 
P. O. Box 2033 I 
Pork City, Utah 84060 , 
My Commission ExpTQ* I 
November 27,1003 I 
State of Utah . 
teh«~ (L^as— 
Notary Public 
Residing at: ^ CoO^. 
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Westlaw 
Not Reported in Cal Rptr 3d 
Not Reported in Cal Rptr 3d, 2004 WL 385347 (Cal App 
Nonpublished/Noncitable (Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 
(Cite as: 2004 WL 385347 (Cal.App. 4 Dist.)) 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available 
California Rules of Court, rule 8 1115, restricts 
citation of unpublished opinions in California 
courts 
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, Cali-
fornia 
Frank RAGEN, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v 
Robert PETERSON, Defendant and Appellant 
No. D040766. 
(Super.Ct.No. 727563). 
March 2, 2004 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
San Diego County, Wayne L Peterson, Judge Af-
firmed 
Sandra J Biower, Sullivan, Wertz, Mc Dade & 
Wallace, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Respondent 
Anthony Joseph Passante, Todd F Stevens, 
Keeney, Waite & Stevens, David A Niddne, Nid-
dne & Fish, LLP, San Diego, CA, for Defendant-
Appellant 
HALLER, Acting P J 
*1 Frank Ragen sued a neighboring property owner, 
Robert Peterson, alleging Peterson's plan to build a 
residence on his vacant lot violated written restric-
tions (CC & R's) governing the subdivision The 
trial court initially granted Ragen's summary judg-
ment motion, but on appeal this court reversed the 
judgment determining Ragen did not meet his sum-
mary judgment burden to show the CC & R's unam-
biguously precluded Peterson from building a resid-
ence on his property In reversing, we agreed with 
Peterson that on remand the parties would be per-
mitted to present extrinsic evidence that was relev-
ant to clarify the ambiguous terms contained in the 
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CC & R's 
After a court trial in which the parties presented ex-
trinsic evidence, the trial court concluded Peterson's 
proposed residence would violate the CC & R's and 
that Peterson did not prove his asserted defenses, 
and thus granted Ragen injunctive and declaratory 
relief Peterson appeals, contending the trial court 
erred because its interpretation of the CC & R's is 
unreasonable as applied to him Peterson's appellate 
contentions are unsupported by applicable legal au-
thority We therefore reject his contentions and af-
firm the judgment 
FACTS 
A Governing Written Document 
The parties own property in a subdivision known as 
La Jolla Corona Estates (Corona Estates), governed 
by a "Declaiation of Restrictions" recorded in 1956 
(the Corona Estates CC & R's) The preamble to the 
Corona Estates CC & R's describes the property as 
"Lots 1 to 65 inclusive of La Jolla Corona Estates" 
as described on the 1956 recorded subdivision map 
The CC & R's then identifies various conditions 
and restrictions "for the benefit of said property and 
of each owner," including successor owners The 
restriction at issue, contained in Paragraph 3, reads 
'Wo building shall be erected on any of said lots 
other than one detached single family dwelling, 
with gai age and such other out-buildings as may be 
suitable and necessary for the purpose which said 
property is permitted to be used " (Italics added) 
Other CC & R's restrictions concern required set-
backs, minimum square feet requirements, tempor-
ary dwellings, building materials, and signs The 
CC & R's further incorporates "[a]ll of the ordin-
ances, regulations and resolutions of the [San Diego 
city council and planning commission], pertaining 
to the construction of dwelling units and the zoning 
thereof, which are not in effect or which may be-
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come effective hereafter, and hereby referred to and 
by this reference incorporated and made a part 
hereof as though fully set forth herein." 
B. Relevant History of the Corona Estates Proper-
ties 
The Corona Estates property was initially owned by 
Wilzel Estates, which then subdivided the property 
and recorded the CC & R's. Each of the 65 lots 
were then sold to individual purchasers, subject to 
the 1956 recorded CC & R's. In 1958, the owners of 
Lots 3 and 4 agreed to a lot line adjustment under 
which Lot 3 was enlarged and Lot 4 was reduced in 
size. Three years later, the Lot 3 owners construc-
ted a residence on the enlarged Lot 3 across what 
formerly would have been the boundary line 
between original Lots 3 and 4. 
*2 In 1976, Ragen purchased a home in the Corona 
Estates subdivision on the reduced Lot 4. The home 
had ocean and canyon views, as did all the other 
homes in the Corona Estates subdivision. After re-
viewing the CC & R's, Ragen believed that no other 
home could be built on the neighboring properties 
and therefore his view would be protected. At the 
time, Seymour Wulf owned the home on the adja-
cent property (the enlarged Lot 3). 
Approximately three years later, Wulf obtained ap-
proval from the City of San Diego to subdivide his 
enlarged property into two lots (identified as Parcel 
1 and Parcel 2). Parcel 2 contained Wulfs resid-
ence; Parcel 1 was a vacant lot of approximately 
14,440 square feet, an average size lot for the area. 
At the time, Ragen was not legally entitled to notice 
of the lot division, and was unaware the lot had 
been divided. 
In 1981, Wulf sold Parcel 1 to third parties (the 
Hondas), who did not build on the vacant parcel. 
Wulf later sold his own home located on Parcel 2. 
In 1991, the Hondas sold Parcel 1 to defendant 
Peterson, an experienced building contractor, for 
$260,000. In 1992, Peterson scraped and cleaned 
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the lot, and had a survey performed. Although 
Peterson intended to build a home on the lot, he 
took no action for the next six years because of the 
downturn in the real estate market and construction 
business. 
In 1998, Peterson began processing building plans 
for a single family residence on his property. Ragen 
first learned of these plans in the summer of 1998, 
and filed objections with the city. In November 
1998, the city planning commission approved 
Peterson's building plans, but the commission did 
not address Ragen's claim that Peterson's proposed 
home would violate the Corona Estates CC & R's. 
At about the same time, Ragen learned that 
Peterson's proposed home had been approved by 
the Corona Estates Architectural Committee and 
immediately protested this action to the Architec-
tural Committee. The Committee responded that the 
Lot 3 lot division had been legally approved by the 
City. The Committee later stated it did not believe 
it had the authority to make a determination on the 
issue raised by Ragen and declined to become leg-
ally involved in the matter. 
C. Complaint and Summary Judgment 
In January 1999, Ragen filed a complaint for in-
junctive and declaratory relief, seeking to prevent 
Peterson from building his proposed home and 
seeking a judicial determination that the Corona Es-
tates CC & R's "prohibit the construction of a 
second dwelling on one of the original 65 subdivi-
sion lots that has been split into two par-
cels."Peterson denied that the CC & R's prevented 
him from building on his parcel, and asserted sever-
al affirmative defenses, including that Ragen's 
claim was barred by the applicable statute of limita-
tions, laches, and changed circumstances, and that 
relief should be denied because enforcing the al-
leged restrictions would be unfair and inequitable. 
The court granted Ragen a preliminary injunction to 
maintain the status quo and prevent irreparable 
harm. Ragen then successfully moved for summary 
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judgment, relying solely on the written Corona Es-
tates CC & R's document. On appeal, this court re-
versed the judgment, concluding that Ragen failed 
to meet his summary judgment burden to establish 
the CC & R's unambiguously supported judgment 
in his favor. (Ragen v. Peterson (March 19, 2001, 
D035435 [nonpub. opn.].) The majority found the 
document was reasonably susceptible to differing 
interpretations as to whether the CC & R's preven-
ted more than one home on an original lot after the 
lot had been legally subdivided. (Ibid.) We ex-
plained that it was "at least equally reasonable" that 
the Paragraph 3 restriction applies to permit only 
one residence per parcel of land after that parcel 
has properly come into existence under the CC & 
FN1 R's and state and local laws. We stated that on 
remand both parties were entitled to present relev-
ant and admissible extrinsic evidence, if any exis-
ted, to clarify the ambiguous terms, and that this 
evidence may include (1) industry custom and us-
age to clarify the meaning of the disputed language; 
(2) evidence regarding the intent of the original de-
veloper (or owner) as to the general scheme or plan; 
and (3) the nature of the particular development as 
it affects the meaning of the term "lots" as used in 
the document. 
FN1. The dissenting justice found the CC 
& R's unambiguously precluded building 
more than one home per original lot, and 
therefore would have affirmed the sum-
mary judgment. 
D. Trial on Remand 
*3 At the ensuing trial, both parties presented ex-
trinsic evidence on the issue of the meaning of the 
disputed provision and on Peterson's defenses. 
With respect to the CC & R's interpretation issue, 
Ragen relied primarily on the testimony of Alan 
Perry, an experienced San Diego real estate attor-
ney, who was the corporate secretary and attorney 
for the original Corona Estates developer (Wilzel 
Estates) in the mid-1950's when the CC & R's were 
recorded. Although the CC & R's was drafted by a 
title company, Perry was responsible for reviewing 
the CC & R's to ensure the CC & R's reflected the 
grantor's intent before the document was recorded 
and before the lots were sold. According to Perry, 
Wilzel Estates sought to ensure that the building re-
strictions would provide for "a relatively expensive 
subdivision of homes" and that subsequent pur-
chasers could enforce these restrictions. With re-
spect to Paragraph 3, Perry testified that the intent 
of Wilzel Estates was that only one home could be 
built on each original lot and the words "said lots" 
contained in Paragraph 3 specifically referred to 
Lots 1 through 65 identified in the preamble. Based 
on his experience drafting and reviewing numerous 
CC & R's in the mid-1950's, Perry further explained 
that it was the custom and practice at that time to 
use similarly worded contractual provisions to re-
strict the number of residences that could be built in 
a subdivision, and there was no other method for 
accomplishing this goal at that time. Perry testified 
that the "custom and belief... was that the manner 
in which it was stated in Paragraph 3 in these re-
strictions was adequate to the task. I've probably 
seen between six and a dozen worded almost 
identical to Paragraph 3, and perhaps it should be 
emphasized that modernly we don't do it quite that 
way."He further stated that the CC & R's provision 
incorporating the city ordinances and regulations 
was included because at that time title insurance 
companies "had been subjected to criticism because 
purchasers of restricted lots somehow got the idea 
that those restrictions superseded the zoning regula-
tions of the city" and the title company wanted to 
make clear that the city regulations applied not-
withstanding the CC & R's. 
Ragen also supported his interpretation of the 
Corona Estates CC & R's with his own testimony 
about the nature and history of the housing devel-
opment. Ragen testified his home is on a cul-de-sac 
on the south side of Mount Soledad, and the homes 
in the subdivision are located in such a way that 
they each have some view of the water. Each lot is 
relatively large and the homes are set back for pri-
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vacy. When he purchased his home in 1976, Ragen 
believed the cul-de-sac was "built out" based on his 
review of the CC & R's, including Paragraph 3. In 
approximately 1985, Ragen first learned of the Lot 
3 subdivision, but concluded the CC & R'% did not 
expressly prohibit the lot split. Peterson never 
spoke with Ragen, and Ragen did not learn of the 
proposed development until he received a notice 
from the city in the summer of 1998. Ragen testi-
fied that if Peterson is permitted to build his pro-
posed home, the home would increase the density 
and traffic in the neighborhood, eliminate Ragen's 
view of the canyon and ocean, and interfere with 
the "air, wind, breeze that comes up the canyon to 
[his] home." 
*4 In support of his position that the Corona Estates 
CC & R's do not prevent him from building a home 
on his lot, Peterson presented the testimony of 
Katharine Rosenberry, a professor of law at Cali-
fornia Western School of Law, who specializes in 
law pertaining to common interest developments. 
Rosenberry had no personal knowledge of the 
Corona Estates CC & R's, and there was no founda-
tion to show she was familiar with industry custom 
and practice at the time the CC & R's were drafted. 
Over Ragen's objections, Rosenberry was permitted 
to testify to her opinion that Paragraph 3 does not 
restrict the number of homes in the Corona Estates 
subdivision and that more than one home may be 
built on an original lot if that property has been leg-
ally subdivided. Rosenberry opined that although 
the Corona Estates CC & R's reflect a clear intent 
"to create an upscale development ...," this "intent 
was not tied into a certain number of houses."In 
reaching her conclusions, Rosenberry relied on the 
language of the Corona Estates CC & R's, the city's 
1998 approval of Peterson's building plans, and the 
fact the CC & R's did not preclude lot splits. 
Peterson also called William Moser, a civil engin-
eer, who testified that based on his analysis of the 
subdivision neighborhood, Peterson's proposed 
home would be consistent with the existing homes 
in the neighborhood in terms of size and design, 
and would not significantly increase the density in 
the neighborhood. Moser further identified two 
Corona Estates lots that could possibly fit a second 
home, but opined that given the size and shape of 
the lots and the existing homes, "there is no other 
place in this subdivision that could be subdivided 
similarly to what's been done with the Peterson 
lot." 
Peterson additionally presented evidence that be-
fore he purchased the lot he received a copy of the 
CC & R's and was told by his real estate agent and 
architect that the property was a buildable lot. 
Peterson also retained an attorney to review the 
Corona Estates CC & R's, but he did not receive 
any information from his attorney leading him to 
believe he could not build a home on the lot. Al-
though he knew that his proposed home would 
block Ragen's view and that Ragen would probably 
object to the home, he never asked Ragen about the 
nature of any objections. Peterson testified that he 
has incurred $488,000 in costs relating to the prop-
erty and that his property is "virtually worthless" if 
a home cannot be built on it. 
E. Trial Court's Decision and Judgment 
After taking the matter under submission, the trial 
court concluded the language of the CC & R's, 
viewed in context of the surrounding circumstances 
and extrinsic evidence, had only one reasonable in-
terpretation-that only one single family dwelling 
may be built on each of the original 65 subdivision 
lots, even if those lots were later subdivided. In so 
concluding, the court found Perry's testimony cred-
ible and "more persuasive" than Rosenberry's testi-
mony, emphasizing that Perry was personally in-
volved in reviewing the CC & R's before they were 
recorded and was familiar with the custom and 
practice in the legal community in 1956 with re-
spect to the meaning of the disputed CC & R's pro-
visions. Although the court did not agree with 
Rosenberry's opinions, it noted that her credentials 
were impressive. 
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*5 With respect to Peterson's defenses, the court 
stated that "[although the evidence clearly estab-
lished the significant amount of monies spent by 
Peterson in his efforts to prepare the lot for con-
struction of a single-family residence, and that he 
8 
acted in good faith, he has failed to meet his burden 
of proof that any of the affirmative defenses has 
been established. The lot split in 1979, which cre-
ated the parcel owned by [Peterson], did not violate 
the CC & R's. [Ragen] was not required to take any 
action to enforce the CC & R's until [Peterson] at-
tempted to build a single family dwelling on the 
parcel ..., which did not occur until [Peterson] ob-
tained approval of his building plans from the City 
of San Diego on November 5, 1998. [Ragen] filed 
the subject action January 25, 1999. There was no 
waiver by [Ragen] of his rights to enforce the CC & 
R's, and the statute of limitations to do so had not 
expired. [Ragen] and his wife had no duty to inform 
[Peterson] or [Peterson's] predecessors in interest, 
as to the CC & R's prohibition on building a single 
family dwelling on defendant's parcel. [Ragen] is 
not estopped from enforcing the CC & R's." 
The trial court therefore concluded Ragen was en-
titled to injunctive and declaratory relief prohibit-
ing Peterson from constructing a dwelling on his 
property. The judgment read as follows: "1 . 
[Ragen] is granted a permanent injunction enjoin-
ing defendant, his agents, servants, employees, all 
persons acting under, in concert with, or for him, 
and any successors in interest from building a de-
tached single family dwelling on: [Peterson's prop-
erty], [f] 2. A judicial determination and declara-
tion is made that the CC & Rs prohibit more than 
one single family dwelling for each of the original 




I. Interpretation of Corona Estates CC & R's 
The issue in this case concerns the proper interpret-
ation of the Corona Estates CC & R's, specifically 
Paragraph 3, which provides: "No building shall be 
erected on any of said lots other than one detached 
single family dwelling, with garage and such other 
out-buildings as may be suitable and necessary for 
the purpose which said property is permitted to be 
used."(ltalics added.) Ragen contends the phrase 
"said lots" refers to the 65 lots that existed on the 
original parcel map, identified in the Corona Es-
tates CC & R's preamble, and therefore Paragraph 3 
precludes building more than one residence on an 
original lot, even if that lot has been subsequently 
legally subdivided. Peterson contends Paragraph 3 
does not refer to original lots, and merely precludes 
more than one building on any one legally divided 
lot. 
A. Generally Applicable Law and Review Standard 
The interpretation of a restrictive covenant in a CC 
& R's governing a subdivision is governed by con-
tract principles. ( Hannula v. Hacienda Homes 
(1949) 34 Cal.2d 442, 444-445; see Nahrstedt v. 
Lakeside Village Condominium Assn. (1994) 8 
Cal.4th 361, 3M-3Sl(Nahrstedt).) The fundament-
al goal of contractual interpretation is to give effect 
to the mutual intention of the parties as these inten-
tions are objectively set forth in the written docu-
ment. (Civ.Code, § 1639; Morey v. Vannucci 
(1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 904, 912: Ticor Title Ins. 
Co. v. Rancho Santa Fe Assn . (1986) 177 
Cal.App.3d 726, 730; see City of Manhattan Beach 
v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 232, 238.)"The 
whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to 
give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, 
each clause helping to interpret the 
other."(Civ.Code. § 1641.) 
*6 As applied in this case, these principles mean we 
must try to effectuate the legitimate desires of the 
covenanting parties, the original grantor and 
grantee, as those intentions are stated in the Corona 
Estates CC & R's. (See Citizens for Covenant Com-
pliance v. Anderson (1995) 12 Cal.4th 345, 357; 
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Ezer v. Fuchsloch (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 849, 
861-862.)However, where as here, the meaning of a 
provision in a CC & R's is reasonably susceptible to 
more than one interpretation, a court may consider 
extrinsic evidence, not to vary any of the contract 
terms, but to assist in determining the parties' ori-
ginal intent regarding the ambiguous provision. 
(See Morey v. Vanmwci, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 912; Bramwell v. Kuhle (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 
767, 776-777.) 
The parties disagree as to the proper standard of re-
view. Generally, "[t]he interpretation of a written 
instrument, even though it involves what might 
properly be called questions of fact..., is essentially 
a judicial function" that is reviewed de novo. ( Par-
sons v. Bristol Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 
861, 865; see City of Manhattan Beaeh v. Superior 
Court, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 238.)A substantial 
evidence review standard applies only if extrinsic 
evidence was properly admitted and the trial court 
was required to resolve factual disputes in the un-
derlying relevant facts. ( Estate of Dodge (1971) 6 
Cal.3d 311, 318; Parsons, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 
866, fn. 2; Capitol Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Mega 
Construction Co. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1049, 
1056.)"[I]t is only when the foundational extrinsic 
evidence is in conflict that the appellate court gives 
weight to anything other than its de novo interpreta-
tion of the parties' agreement."( Medical Opera-
tions Management, Inc. v. National Health Labor-
atories, Inc. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 886. 891.) 
In this case, the relevant foundational facts sur-
rounding the execution of the Corona Estates CC & 
R's and the nature of the subdivision were not dis-
puted. The appellate issues concern the meaning of 
ambiguous contractual language, including the 
question of what inferences the court should draw 
from the CC & R's language and the undisputed 
factual context in which the CC & R's was ex-
ecuted. Conflicting expert testimony as to the legal 
interpretation of a contract has no effect on our 
duty to independently interpret the policy language. 
(See Cooper Companies v. Transcontinental Ins. 
Co. (1995) 31 Ca1.App.4th 1094, 1100.)Thus, we 
conduct a de novo review of the record in determin-
ing the proper interpretation of the CC & R's. 
B. Analysis 
Applying these principles, we conclude the coven-
anting parties-i .e., Wilzel Estates and each initial 
grantee-intended to restrict the number of homes in 
the subdivision to one home for each original sub-
divided lot. Although in our prior opinion the ma-
jority of this court found the contractual language 
facially ambiguous (i.e., reasonably susceptible to 
either party's interpretation), this ambiguity has 
been substantially resolved by the testimony of 
Alan Perry, who was the corporate secretary and at-
torney for the grantor at the time the CC & R's were 
drafted and recorded. Perry testified that in attempt-
ing to create a relatively expensive subdivision of 
homes, Wilzel Estates included several building 
and use restrictions in the Corona Estates CC & R's, 
including Paragraph 3, which was intended to limit 
the number of homes to one home per original lot 
and that the phrase "said lots" in Paragraph 3 re-
ferred to Lots 1 through 65 of the subdivision as 
stated in the CC & R's preamble. 
*7 Although there was no direct evidence that this 
was also the grantees' understanding, Perry's testi-
mony about the relevant custom and practice sup-
ports the reasonable inference that at the time of the 
conveyance the grantees would have interpreted 
this provision in the same manner. Perry testified 
that he was familiar with the industry custom and 
practice in 1955 with respect to CC & R's restric-
tions and that it was a custom and practice to use 
similarly worded contractual provisions to restrict a 
subdivision to a certain number of residences. Al-
though Perry acknowledged that the Corona Estates 
CC & R's did not expressly limit lot divisions, he 
explained that it was not the custom or practice to 
specifically include this type of provision and "I 
don't think we even thought about it because we 
didn't think anybody would be so foolish as to" 
subdivide a lot when only one house could be built 
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on each original lot *8 Although Rosenberry's opinions were different 
from Perry's testimony, there was no foundation 
showing she had any personal knowledge of the cir-
cumstances under which the CC & R's were drafted 
or that she had any knowledge or experience with 
respect to the applicable custom and practice in 
1955 As we cautioned in our prior opinion, al-
though expert testimony may be admissible to the 
extent it is relevant and helpful to resolve ambigu-
ities in a contract, expert evidence is not admissible 
"solely to offer a legal opinion as to the meaning of 
the CC & R's "(Ragen v Peterson, supra, 
D035435 )Rosenberry's testimony was offered as 
expert opinion on the manner in which the language 
of the CC & R's should be interpreted, a subject 
matter that is solely a judicial function (See 
Cooper Companies v Transcontinental Ins Co, 
supra 31 Cal App 4th at p 1100 ) 
Perry's testimony is consistent with the evidence of 
the intended purpose and nature of the subdivision 
As both Perry and Rosenberry recognized, the 
Corona Estates CC & R's was drafted with the obvi-
ous purpose of creating an upscale and spacious 
residential subdivision, and by recording the vari-
ous building restrictions, the grantor and each of 
the purchasers had a reasonable expectation that 
this character of the neighborhood would be main-
tained throughout the years If Corona Estates prop-
erty owners are now permitted to split their lots and 
then build on each new lot, the character of the 
neighborhood (I e , density, views, traffic) would 
not be maintained Although Peterson argues that 
he is the only property owner that could, in practic-
al terms, build a second home on a divided lot, the 
evidence did not support this position Peterson's 
engineering expert, Moser, acknowledged that at 
least two other lots could support an additional res-
idence The fact that these lots arguably could not 
be subdivided under current city planning rules 
does not mean that these rules will necessarily con-
tinue in the future 
In construing the CC & R's, it is further relevant 
that in the past 48 years no other lot owner has at-
tempted to split an original lot or build a second 
home within original lot boundaries, except for one 
property owner who abandoned an effort to build a 
second home after neighborhood opposition While 
this evidence is not conclusive, it supports the con-
clusion that the mutual understanding of the seller 
and buyers was that Paragraph 3 of the CC & R's 
prohibited more than one home on each original lot 
"The rule is well settled that where a contract is 
ambiguous, the court may consider the subsequent 
conduct of the parties for the purpose of discover-
ing their intent in entering into a contract It is 
generally recognized that the acts of the parties to a 
contract afford one of the most reliable means of 
arriving at their intention "( Western Medical En-
terprises hit \ Alters (1985) 166 Cal App 3d 383. 
391 ) 
C Peterson's Contentions 
On appeal, Peterson does not challenge the admiss-
ibility or relevance of Perry's testimony or Ragen's 
other proffered extrinsic evidence, nor does he even 
mention Rosenberry's testimony Instead, he disreg-
ards the evidence admitted at trial and devotes his 
appellate briefs to arguing that an interpretation of 
the Corona Estates CC & R's that permits only one 
home per original lot is unreasonable and unfair as 
applied to him 
Ragen counters that Peterson's failure to discuss the 
admitted extrinsic evidence in his appellate briefs 
constitutes a waiver of his right to maintain the ap-
peal We need not reach this waiver issue because 
Peterson's challenge to the reasonableness of the 
trial court's interpretation is unsupported by applic-
able legal principles A court's fundamental task is 
not to determine whether a challenged CC & R's 
provision is "reasonable" or "fair" or whether the 
CC & R's should have been written in a certain 
way, but it is to effectuate the actual intent of the 
grantor and grantee (See hahstedt supra 8 
Cal 4th at p 381, Ezei \ Fuchsloth supra 99 
Cal App 3d at p 862 )"Like any promise given in 
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exchange for consideration, an agreement to refrain of Paragraph 3 to restrict one home to each original 
from a particular use of land is subject to contract lot is unreasonable under any of the Nahrstedt 
principles, under which courts try 4to effectuate the factors. First, the restriction is not arbitrary. As 
legitimate desires of the contracting both experts recognized, a covenant restricting the 
parties.'[Citation.]" ( Nahrstedt, supra, 8 Cal.4th at number of homeseper lot is a common and reason-
pp. 380 381.)" 'We may not understand why prop- able method for maintaining the density and charac-
erty owners want certain obligations to run with the ter of a neighborhood. The restriction of one home 
land, but as it is their land ... some very strong reas- per original lot bears a rational relationship to en-
on should be advanced' before courts should over- suring the continuation of the upscale and un-
ride those obligations." {Id. at p. 381, quoting Ep- crowded nature of the neighborhood, 
stein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law 
of Servitudes (1982) 55 So.Cal.L.Rev. 1353, 1359.) Second, there is no fundamental public policy that 
would be violated by interpreting Paragraph 3 to 
refer to a one-home per original-lot restriction. 
Peterson complains that this interpretation of the 
CC & R's "ties all future property rights in the de-
velopment to ancient title."But there is nothing in 
the public policy of this state preventing this result. 
To the contrary, that is precisely the purpose of re-
cording a CC & R's applicable to a residential sub-
division, so that buyers purchasing property subject 
to the restrictions can rely on the prior restrictions 
in determining whether to purchase the home. (See 
Citizens for Covenant Compliance v. Anderson, 
supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 363-368.)Peterson's reli-
ance on Welch v. Kai (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 374 for 
his argument that property rights may not be tied to 
"ancient title" is misplaced because in that case the 
court merely interpreted a subdivision map "to as-
certain and give effect to the intent of [the grantor] 
as it existed at the time of the execution of the in-
strument." (Id. at p. 378.)That is precisely the prin-
ciple that we apply in this case. Additionally, the 
fact that Lot 3 was legally divided does not pre-
clude a finding that the CC & R's restriction con-
trols. ( MuJlally v. Ojai Hotel Co . (1968) 266 
Cal.App.2d 9, 12 [recorded declaration controls to 
extent it is more restrictive than zoning ordinance].) 
In Nahrstedt, the legal issue concerned the inter-
pretation of a CC & R's provision for a condomini-
um development, which is governed by a specific 
statutory scheme (Civ.Code. § 1350 et seq.; 
Nahrstedt, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 370-384). In in-
terpreting the enforcement provisions of these stat-
utes, the California Supreme Court held that the Le-
gislature intended to apply equitable servitude law 
as the standard for enforcing CC & R's in con-
dominium (common interest) developments. 
(Nahrstedt, supra, at p. 380.)After extensively sur-
veying applicable equitable servitude law, the 
Nahrstedt court "distill[ed]" these principles: "An 
equitable servitude will be enforced unless it viol-
ates public policy; it bears no rational relationship 
to the protection, preservation, operation or purpose 
of the affected land; or it otherwise imposes bur-
dens on the affected land that are so disproportion-
ate to the restriction's beneficial effects that the re-
striction should not be enforced."(Id. at p. 382, ital-
ics added.) Further, the court stated that in evaluat-
ing a property owner's arguments that the enforce-
ment of a CC & R's provision is unreasonable, "the 
focus is on the restriction's effect on the project as a 
whole, not on the individual homeowner."(M at p. 
386.)These principles apply here because the CC & 
R's provision at issue is in the nature of an equit-
able servitude. (See Citizens for Covenant Compli-
ance v. Anderson, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 
352-355.) 
*9 The record here does not show the interpretation 
Third, interpreting the CC & R's to permit no more 
than one home per original lot does not impose a 
burden on the use of the land that "far outweighs" 
any benefit. ( Nahrstedt, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 
382.)Peterson argues repeatedly that we should ad-
opt his interpretation because the burden that would 
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be imposed on Ragen (losing his ocean view) is 
minor when compared to the burden on Peterson in 
losing his substantial investment in the land and 
creating a situation where the vacant lot is now 
worthless. However, in balancing the relevant 
factors, it is not appropriate to focus on the restric-
tion's burden to the individual homeowner. (Id. at p. 
386.)Rather, as made clear by Nahrstedt, a court is 
required to compare the benefits and burdens to the 
entire subdivision. The one home for each original 
lot restriction burdens the subdivision because a 
property owner is prohibited from selling a portion 
of his or her lot to a third party as a building site. 
While this does affect the marketability of the prop-
erty and restrict the freedom of each property own-
er, it also substantially enhances the property value 
of the homes by maintaining the low density and 
upscale character of the neighborhood. On this re-
cord, the restriction does not impose a burden that 
far outweighs the benefit to the subdivision. 
*10 In arguing that the trial court's interpretation 
was incorrect, Peterson relies on authority inapplic-
able to the circumstances here. For example, in 
contending that this court is required to strictly con-
strue the CC & R's language in his favor and re-
solve any ambiguities in support of permitting him 
to build his home, Peterson relies on decisions gov-
erning the interpretation of conditions subsequent 
in a deed. (See Sanders v. East Bay Mun. Utility 
Dist. (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 125; Springmeyer v. 
City of South Lake Tahoe (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 
375.)Because a condition subsequent permits a 
grantor to "automatically" regain ownership of land 
if the condition occurs, the courts have applied a 
rule of strict construction based on the disfavored 
nature of an automatic termination provision. 
{Ibid.) These same concerns do not logically extend 
to the interpretation of a building restriction, the vi-
olation of which is subject to injunctive relief rather 
than an automatic loss of title. (See Ezer v. Fuchs-
loch, supra, 99 Cal.App.3d at p. 861 [rejecting rule 
that restrictive covenants will be strictly construed 
against persons seeking to enforce them].) We are 
similarly unpersuaded by Peterson's argument that 
the court's interpretation is wrong as a matter of law 
because it renders his property valueless. For sup-
port of this argument, Peterson relies on concepts 
from two California Supreme Court decisions, one 
of which is contained in the dissenting opinion (see 
Hocking v. Title Ins & Trust Co. (1951) 37 Cal.2d 
644, 655 (dis. opn. of Carter, J.) and the other 
which is reflected in the lower court's decision that 
was reversed by the high court. ( Landgale, Inc. v. 
California Coastal Com. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1006 
[concerning temporary takings doctrine].) 
Finally, as he did in opposing the summary judg-
ment, Peterson relies on language in the Corona Es-
tates CC & R's to argue that the provision should be 
interpreted to permit him to build on his property. 
He argues, for example, that the CC & R's incorpor-
ation of local ordinances and resolutions, together 
with the grantor's failure to prohibit lot subdivision 
and the absence of the phrase "original lot" in Para-
graph 3, supports his argument that the contracting 
parties intended to permit an additional home to be 
built if a lot was legally subdivided. As recognized 
in our prior opinion, these aspects of the Corona 
Estates CC & R's create a facial ambiguity as to the 
meaning of Paragraph 3. But at this stage of the 
proceedings our task is to resolve the ambiguity 
based on the evidence and arguments presented at 
trial. As explained, we have concluded that the lan-
guage of the Corona Estates CC & R's, when con-
sidered with the surrounding circumstances and 
purpose of the document, establishes that the ori-
ginal covenanting parties intended to permit only 
one home per original lot. Given this conclusion, 
the fact that there is language in the CC & R's that 
could support a contrary interpretation is not dis-
positive. 
II. The Court Did Not Exceed its Equity Jurisdic-
tion 
*11 Peterson next asserts numerous contentions in 
an attempt to challenge the court's equity jurisdic-
tion and equitable rulings. In evaluating these con-
tentions, we apply a deferential review standard. A 
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trial court has broad discretion in exercising its 
equitable powers and in determining whether in-
junctive relief should be granted and the form of 
the relief under the particular facts of the case. (See 
Ojavan Investors, Inc. v. California Coastal Com. 
(1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 373, 394; Smith v. Mend-
onsa (1952) 108 Cal .App.2d 540. 543; Biagini v. 
Hyde (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 877, 880; see also Mor-
gan v. Veach (1943) 59 Cal.App.2d 682, 691.) 
Peterson first argues the court had no authority to 
grant injunctive relief because Ragen had an ad-
equate remedy at law. In support of this argument, 
Peterson directs us to Ragen's testimony that 
Peterson's proposed home would decrease the value 
of Ragen's property by approximately $350,000. 
However, the courts have long held that "the legal 
remedy of damages is generally inadequate in real 
property disputes...." ( Wilkison v. Wiederkehr 
(2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 822, 830; see also Rem-
mers v. Ciciliot (1943) 59 Cal.App.2d 113, 
!19-120.)Moreover, as stated by the California Su-
preme Court in the decision relied upon by 
Peterson, " '[e]quitable remedies exist to supply re-
lief where no legal remedy exists, or where the ex-
isting legal remedy is inadequate under the circum-
stances of a particular case.' " ( Pacific Scene, Inc. 
v. Pehasquilos, Inc. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 407, 412, ital-
ics added.) The trial court had sufficient grounds to 
find that monetary damages would not provide Ra-
gen with the necessary relief under the circum-
stances. Ragen testified that Peterson's home would 
block his view of the ocean and diminish his pri-
vacy, and would interfere with the use and enjoy-
ment of the home in which he had lived for the past 
25 years. The court could reasonably find that mon-
etary damages would not adequately compensate 
for these losses. 
Peterson next argues the court abused its discretion 
because the injunction results in a forfeiture of his 
property and therefore the enforcement of the CC & 
R's is "inequitable," "oppressive" and "unjust" as 
applied to him. While we are sympathetic with 
Peterson's concerns, the arguments are insufficient 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. 
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to show the trial court abused its discretion to de-
cide the appropriateness of the injunction. 
Generally, " ' "[forfeitures ... are not favored by 
the courts, and are never enforced if they are 
couched in ambiguous terms...." ' " ( Sanders v. 
East Bay Mun. Utility Dist., supra, 16 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 130.)However, the record shows that Peterson, 
an experienced developer, understood the risks of 
purchasing the vacant lot in a neighborhood gov-
erned by CC & R's, including the possibility that 
the lot would not be a buildable site. Peterson had 
actual notice of the CC & R's before he purchased 
the property and before he incurred the develop-
ment costs. Although Peterson could have ap-
proached the adjacent neighbor (Ragen) to inquire 
about the Paragraph 3 issue and/or brought a de-
claratory relief action seeking to establish his right 
to build on the land (Code Civ. Proa, § 1060), 
Peterson elected not to take these steps. Under 
these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in implicitly finding that the "forfeiture" 
was, at least in part, a result of Peterson's own ac-
tions and therefore the resulting detriment was not 
an appropriate basis for the refusal to enforce the 
building restriction. To the extent Peterson reason-
ably relied on professionals in believing he could 
build on the site, his remedy is to seek relief from 
these individuals. As the trial court made clear, 
there was nothing that Ragen did, or failed to do, 
that created Peterson's loss. Thus, the court could 
reasonably find it was Peterson and not Ragen who 
should bear the consequences of any forfeiture. 
*12 Peterson additionally argues that the court ab-
used its discretion in granting equitable relief be-
cause Ragen had "unclean hands" given the fact 
that there are now two homes on the original Lot 4. 
As discussed in our factual summary, before Ragen 
purchased his property, the owners of original Lots 
3 and 4 agreed to adjust lot lines so that the original 
Lot 4 was reduced and the original Lot 3 was ex-
panded. The Lot 3 owner then built a home on Lot 
3 that partially sits on a portion of the original Lot 
4. 
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Based on these circumstances, Peterson argues that 
the court should have denied Ragen relief based on 
the unclean hands doctrine. However, to bar an ac-
tion based on this equitable doctrine, the defendant 
must establish "inequitable conduct by the plaintiff 
in connection with the matter in controversy...." ( 
Dickson, Carlson & CampMo v. Pole (2000) 83 
Cal.App.4th 436, 446.)The fact that Ragen did not 
complain about the residence on the enlarged Lot 3 
does not show the type of inequitable conduct that 
would bar the action here. First, the record shows 
Ragen purchased his home after the Lot 3 owner 
built a home that was located partly on the original 
Lot 4 property. The CC & R's specifically state that 
"[a]ny building erected on any of said lots which 
has been completed shall be deemed to comply with 
each and all of the restrictions contained herein...." 
Thus, there was no opportunity or grounds for Ra-
gen to object to the CC & R's violation when he 
first moved into the neighborhood. Moreover, there 
are now a total of two homes on the two original 
Lots 3 and 4, which arguably complies with the 
spirit-if not the technical wording-of the CC & R's 
one-lot/one-residence rule. In contrast, if Peterson 
is permitted to build a home, this would result in 
three homes on two original lots, creating a materi-
al deviation from the Corona Estates CC & R's. 
Finally, to the extent Peterson contends the trial 
court's statement of decision is deficient because 
the court failed to specifically address each of 
Peterson's equitable defenses, we reject the conten-
tion. The trial court's statement of decision shows 
the court considered the substance of all the matters 
raised by Peterson. Although the court could have 
been more specific as to each equitable argument, 
the statement of decision sufficiently disposed of 
all the basic issues in the case. (See Code Civ. 
Proc. §§ 632, 634.) 
III. Form of Judgment 
Peterson next challenges the form of the judgment 
because it does not take into account the possibility 
of future changed circumstances. The judgment 
granted Ragen a permanent injunction preventing 
Peterson "from building a detached single family 
dwelling on [his Corona Estates lot]" and a judicial 
declaration "that the CC & Rs prohibit more than 
one single family dwelling for each of the original 
65 [Corona Estates] subdivision lots...." Peterson 
argues that this language was too broad because 
Ragen's expert admitted at trial that there are cir-
cumstances under which he may be permitted to 
build a home on his lot, including: (1) a waiver by 
the other Corona Estates lot owners; (2) changed 
circumstances that render the CC & R's restrictions 
"obsolete"; (3) a finding that the restrictions contra-
vene state or local law; or (4) an amendment to the 
CC & R's permitting more than one home per ori-
ginal lot. 
*13 However, to the extent any of these circum-
stances occur, Peterson would be entitled to reassert 
his rights in a new action. " ' "It is settled that 
where there has been a change in the controlling 
facts upon which a permanent injunction was gran-
ted, or the law has been changed, modified or ex-
tended, or where the ends of justice would be 
served by modification or dissolution, the court has 
the inherent power to vacate or modify an injunc-
tion where the circumstances and situation of the 
parties have so changed as to render such action 
just and equitable.' " [Citations.]...." ( Mendly v. 
County of Los Angeles (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1193, 
1207; accord Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. Superior 
Court (1941) 18 Cal.2d 92, 94-95.)"[A] preventat-
ive injunction ... is always subject, upon a proper 
showing, to modification or dissolution by the 
court...." (Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. Superior 
Court, supra, 18 Cal.2d at pp. 94-95.) 
Given these principles, the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in concluding that there was no need 
to identify the various circumstances under which 
the injunction may be modified or vacated. 
DISPOSITION 
Judgment affirmed. Peterson to bear Ragen's costs 
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on appeal. 
WE CONCUR: McINTYRE and O'ROURKE, JJ. 
Cal.App. 4 Dist.,2004. 
Ragen v. Peterson 
Not Reported in Cal.Rptr.3d° 2004 WL 385347 
(Cal.App. 4 Dist.) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court, 
D. Colorado. 
CAMP COAST TO COAST, INC., a Delaware cor-
poration, Grand Incentives, Inc., a Florida corpora-
tion, and Chicago Title Company, a California cor-
poration, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
WOODBINE INVESTMENTS, LLC, a Wyoming 
corporation, Defendant. 
Civil Action No. 08-cv-00981-REB. 
Nov. 17,2008. 
Richard John Capriola, Weinstock & Scavo, P.C., 
Atlanta, GA, Todd Laurence Vriesman, Mont-
gomery, Kolodny, Amatuzio & Dusbabek, LLP, 
Denver, CO, for Plaintiffs. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
ROBERT E. BLACKBURN, District Judge. 
*1 The matter before me is Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Default Judgment [# 29], filed October 16, 2008. I 
deny the motion. 
This civil action was commenced on May 12, 2008, 
by plaintiffs filing of the Verified Complaint [# 1]. 
The verified complaint avers three substantive 
claims for relief: 1) breach of the Distribution and 
Fulfillment Agreement; 2) breach of the Escrow 
Agreement; and 3) conversion and infringement of 
trade secrets. 
I have subject matter jurisdiction over this action 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity of citizenship). 
Venue is proper in the United States District Court 
for the District of Colorado under 28 U .S.C. § 
1391. 
I granted plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restrain-
ing order following a hearing on May 15, 2008. 
(See Temporary Restraining Order [# 13], filed 
May 15, 2008.) The TRO was set to expire by its 
own terms and in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 
65(b) at 4:35 p.m. MDT on Friday, May 30, 2008. 
(Id. at 4, Tj 8.) A hearing on plaintiffs' motion for 
preliminary injunction was scheduled for a hearing 
on Friday, May 30, 2008, at 4:00 p.m. (Id. at 4, K 
9.) Although defendant was served with a copy of 
the TRO (see Return of Service [# 17], filed May 
15, 2008), it did not appear by counsel or other-
wise. Following that hearing, I entered a Prelimin-
ary Injunction [# 24], filed May 30, 2008, enjoining 
defendant as follows: 
a. Contacting or communicating with any consumer 
purchasers ("Participants") in the Coast to Coast 
Getaways Club ("Program"); 
b. Using or disseminating personal information re-
lating to Participants, including but not limited to 
Participants' names, addresses, telephone num-
bers, fax numbers, email addresses, and other 
contact information, personal information, and 
financial information of Participants ("Participant 
Information"); 
c. Using plaintiff Camp Coast To Coast, Inc.'s 
trademarks, including but not limited to the 
names "Camp Coast to Coast," "Coast to Coast," 
and the winged "Coast to Coast Est. 1972" logo[.] 
(Preliminary Injunction at 3, ^  2.) 
Given defendant's failure to appear or defend in this 
action, plaintiffs sought and were granted a Clerk's 
Entry of Default [# 27], filed June 9, 2008, pursu-
ant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a). When the case then ap-
peared to languish, I issued an Order To Show 
Cause [# 28], filed October 8, 2008, requiring 
plaintiffs to show cause why the case should not be 
administratively closed or dismissed for failure to 
prosecute. Plaintiffs responded to the show cause 
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order (Response to Order To Show Cause [#31], 
filed October 16, 2008) P N 1 and also filed the 
present motion for default judgment pursuant to 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b). 
FN1. The Order To Show Cause was sub-
sequently discharged. (Order Discharging 
Order To Show Cause [# 32] filed 
November 7, 2008.) 
Plaintiffs' motion seeks only a permanent injunc-
tion, having determined that "Defendant has appar-
ently closed its offices and ceased to operate as a 
going concern, and is unlikely to answer a judg-
ment for monetary damages."(Response to Order 
To Show Cause at 1-2.) By virtue of that same 
fact, however, plaintiffs cannot establish the type of 
ongoing or continuing threat of future harm that un-
dergirds the extraordinary remedy of permanent in-
junctive relief: 
*2 The purpose of an injunction is to prevent future 
violations.... [T]he moving party must satisfy the 
court that relief is needed. The necessary determ-
ination is that there exists some cognizable 
danger of recurrent violation, something more 
than the mere possibility which serves to keep the 
case alive. The chancellor's decision is based on 
all the circumstances; his discretion is necessarily 
broad and a strong showing of abuse must be 
made to reverse it. To be considered are the bona 
fides of the expressed intent to comply, the ef-
fectiveness of the discontinuance and, in some 
cases, the character of the past violations. 
Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, Inc., 
124 F.3d 1221, 1230 (10th Cir.1997) (quoting 
United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633, 
73 S.Ct. 894, 898, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953)).&* also 
Law v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 
185 F.R.D. 324, 349-50 (D.Kan. 1999) (noting that 
"mere proof of a past violation does not justify in-
junctive relief because an injunction is only avail-
able to prevent continuing or future harm") (citing 
United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 343 
U.S. 326, 333, 72 S.Ct. 690, 695, 96 L.Ed. 978 
Page 2 
(1952)). If there is no proof of future violations, the 
movant lacks standing to seek a permanent injunc-
tion. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 
105-06, 103 S.Ct. 1660,1667, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 
(1983); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96, 
94 S.Ct. 669, 676, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974)); Buch-
wald v. University of New Mexico School of Medi-
cine, 159 F.3d 487, 493 (10th Cir.1998). 
The mere fact of defendant's default per se does not 
entitle plaintiffs ipso facto to the entry of perman-
ent injunctive relief. "An injunction is a matter of 
equitable discretion; it does not follow from suc-
cess on the merits as a matter of course." Winter v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, 2008 WL 
4862464 at *16 (November 12, 2008); see also 
Prows v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 981 F.2d 466, 
468 (10th Cir.1992), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 830, 
114 S.Ct. 98, 126 L.Ed.2d 65 (1993). Plaintiffs 
have produced no evidence suggesting that there is 
any danger of future communications between de-
fendant and plaintiffs' participants of the kind that 
precipitated this lawsuit. Indeed, it appears that de-
fendant has ceased operations all together. It is dif-
ficult to imagine that defendant could pose a con-
tinuing threat of future violations under those cir-
cumstances. 
Thus, it appears that at this juncture, this lawsuit 
has accomplished by operation of time and circum-
stance plaintiffs' original purpose. The entry of a 
permanent injunction is not warranted on the facts 
presented. The motion for default judgment must be 
denied. Moreover, given the circumstances, I find 
and conclude that the matter should be administrat-
ively closed as provided by the Local Rules of this 
district, subject to reopening for good cause shown. 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows: 
1. That Plaintiffs' Motion for Default Judgment 
[# 29], filed October 16, 2008, is DENIED; and 
*3 2. That the Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to 
administratively close this matter pursuant to 
D.C.COLO.LCivR 41.2, subject to reopening for 
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good cause shown. 
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